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VI 
RESUME 
 Turkey and Spain experienced drastic changes after Second World War.  
Turkey started the occidentalization process, with the reforms made by Atatürk but 
today the country still has continued struggle somewhere between full democracy 
and authoritarianism. On the other hand Spain stands as a solid example of 
democratic consolidation. The focus of the thesis is to analyze the effects of 
democratic transition and consolidation to foreign policy decision making process. 
The idea is to properly examine similar and different cases in both states and see 
the results in decision making. In particular, the main focus is Middle East policy 
of Turkish Republic between 2002 and 2013. The perspective of research is mainly 
based on the relations of Turkey with Middle East countries, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Israel 
and also Cyprus. Alternately, purpose of the dissertation is to comprehend the 
fundamental characteristic of Turkey‘s foreign policy under AKP rule and in what 
way and wherefore Turkish foreign policy changed. Additionally, the importance 
of Alliance of Civilizations and Barcelona Process clarified in the framework of 
democracy and peace promoters in Middle East region. 
 
Key worlds: Turkey, Spain, foreign policy, Middle East, democracy, 
revolutions, Islamism, Alliance of Civilizations and Barcelona Process. 
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Notes on Spelling 
 
In Turkish alphabet, the letters are pronounces as in English, with following 
exceptions: 
a- short ‘a’ as in English ‘u’ in ‘hut’. 
c- ‘j’, as in English ‘jam’. 
ç- ‘ch’, as in English ‘church’. 
ğ- generally silent. 
ı- as in the first ‘a’ in ‘banana’ 
ö- as in French ‘eu’. 
ş-‘sh’ in ‘sheriff’. 
ü- as in the French ‘u’. 
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1. Evolution of the Thesis 
 My whole education has been a great journey through many countries 
and cultures, which allowed me to observe the necessity to build mutual 
understanding and international cooperation from various angles. I have 
accomplished Public Administration and Political Sciences in University of 
Marmara. In order to get familiar with the language and the culture I have been 
on student exchange at the University of Rennes I in faculty of law and political 
sciences, as an Erasmus student where I had several EU-related courses like 
construction of European Union, public international law, business law, and 
major international problems. The formation which I have received during my 
studies in Turkey as well as in France, I have got familiar with the processes in 
the EU, EU institutions, the logic of decision-making system and the 
enlargement as well. My Erasmus experience has enriched me profoundly and 
convinced me that I would like to further develop my knowledge by deepening 
my understanding of the issues that are special interest for me and of great value 
for the international community. For this reason I made an Official European 
master on Mediterranean Cultural Studies at UNESCO Chair in Intercultural 
Dialogue in the Mediterranean which established in 2006 at the University of 
Rovira I Virgili, Tarragona/ Spain. Due to my advanced skills in 3 European 
languages I have had the possibility to gain complex knowledge about different 
countries, cultures and legal systems. This willingness to study diverse cultures 
to create more sensibility and synergy is something that I directly associate with 
my dissertation project. After master studies I made a professional internship in 
the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed, Barcelona/Spain), which is 
a think tank specialized in Euro-Mediterranean relations. During my internship I 
worked for Quaderns de la Mediterrània under the supervision of Maria-Àngels 
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Roque at 2010. As a result of the internship, it was published a paper. Soon 
after my internship, I participated a summer course in English and diplomatic 
discourse in the University of Westminster at Diplomatic Academy of London. 
This summer course developed my skills on foreign policy and reinforces my 
knowledge on diplomatic discourse. 
 The dissertation- Foreign Policy of Turkey and Spain versus Middle 
East, after 2002. Transition to Democracy and New International Agents- is a 
project developed after years of studies and preparation and covers different 
levels of relations: political diplomatic, economic, commerce issues to trade, 
military, culture and religious. During my three years of PhD studies I attended 
different kinds of seminars, workshops, talks and presentations that helped me 
ripen my ideas on this specific subject. In June 2011, the Universitat Rovira I 
Virgili and the Research Group Culture and Identities (of which I am a 
member), organized the seminar “Identity Conflicts: Middle East and Turkey.” 
There I presented the paper entitled " The deadlock of Cyprus: ethnic-
nationalism and religious-plurality, neither Enosis nor Taksim.” During the 
second year of my doctorate studies, I have been to University of Paris 8 for 
deepen my PhD investigation and for to fulfill the requirements of the 
international doctorate degree. I  made  an  internship  at  the  University  of  
Paris 8 in the Institute Français de Géopolitique with the acceptation of Barbara 
Loyer. During my internship I had access to many  bibliographical  references  
in  different libraries also I participated special courses on mapping and 
geopolitics. It was a very useful experience, because while I was deepening my 
knowledge I had the possibility to discuss my research with other doctoral 
students, attend workshops on Arab Revolutions. 
 In 2012, I spent 3 months in Turkey to conduct field work respecting the 
changes in Turkish foreign policy. I interviewed Turkish people from different 
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political ideas, academicians, policy makers and deputies. After in 2013, it was 
necessary to spent four months in order to complete the dissertation. Because of 
the turbulent times inside the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AK Parti, AKP, 
eng. JDP Justice and Development Party, hereinafter: AKP)1 government some 
officials preferred not to record the interviews and they only talked about their 
official ideas. Indeed all the comments enriched my understanding and the 
research process.   
 
 
2. The Research Problem and Hypothesis 
 The Middle East basin can be considered as a meeting point of different 
cultures and religions which also means the source of world conflicts. When 
Kofi Annan was puzzling, the possibility of a clash of Civilizations in 2005 as 
Huntington specify2, he addressed the leaders of Spain and Turkey to co-chair 
the Alliance of Civilizations. With their background of having different cultures 
co-existing peacefully and harmoniously, both in Iberia and Anatolia, no other 
countries would have better understanding to lead such an initiative.  
                                                          
1
 Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AK Parti, AKP, eng. JDP hereinafter AK Party: 
According to official party records given by the Ministry of Interior, the acronym of the 
party is ―AK Parti. In Turkish the word ―Ak means white and clean; or without stain 
that refers a clear reference to the party image of uncorrupted character. Instead of AK 
Parti, however, many scholars are using AKP, which is a misnomer.  
2
 See, Samuel P. Huntington, The Class of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order (Penguin Group, 1996). 
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  Turkey is a vital country from geo-strategic perspective, it is vital for 
the interests of Europe and the Western world. Geographic location between the 
East and West gives Turkey an easy access to strategically important regions 
and major energy resources. Besides, thanks to its character as a modern 
country and democratic state, Turkey stands as an example for Muslim majority 
countries.3 Due to the geographical position, Spain and Turkey situates in the 
periphery of Europe also unite East and West like a bridge. They are also two 
entry point for the E.U: Spain is an entry point of the Atlantic, Turkey for 
Central Asia, Middle East and Caucasus. Both states can be considerate as 
portal to the North of Africa and the rest of the Mediterranean in general. Spain 
and Turkey belongs to the European area, African area and Asian area. 
Furthermore they look in the same direction on the regional issues like the 
peace progress in the Middle East, and the Caucasus. On the other hand, they 
are members of NATO, ONU, OECD, IMF, Union for Mediterranean and 
Turkey is the unique pending candidate of the EU with a predominant Muslim 
population and Spain supports the full membership of Turkey. It means that 
multilateralism is the millstone of both countries foreign and security policies. 
 Spain and Turkey experienced drastic changes after Second World War. 
Even Turkey started the democratization process before Spain, with the reforms 
made by Atatürk4, still today the country has continued struggle somewhere 
                                                          
3
  Graham E.  Fuller, "Turkey's Strategic Model: Myths and Realities," The 
Washington Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2004):p. 51. 
4
 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk:  ( Turkish: “Kemal, Father of Turks”) , original name 
Mustafa Kemal, also called Mustafa Kemal Paṣa   (born 1881, Salonika [now 
Thessaloníki], Greece—died Nov. 10, 1938, Istanbul, Turkey), soldier, statesman, and 
reformer who was the founder and first president (1923–38) of the Republic of Turkey. He 
modernized the country’s legal and educational systems and encouraged the adoption of a 
European way of life, with Turkish written in the Latin alphabet and with citizens adopting 
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between full democracy and authoritarianism. On the other hand Spain stands as 
a solid example of democratic consolidation in Southern Europe.5 When it 
comes to the history of republic, the transition to democracy in the case of 
Turkey and Spain have got some similarities and differences. Since the first 
republic of Spain in 1873 politic life of the country was the subject of several 
interruption as restoration, civil war, dictatorship, coup d’état. The history of 
Turkey is not so far away from Spain. Turkey is among the democracies 
established soon after the World War I but the country underwent serious crisis 
in the consolidation process. After the creation of Modern Turkey in 1923, the 
political life was interrupted by several coup d’états because of segmentation 
between seculars and Islamist, left and right, nationalist and separatists and the 
democracy is still not working as it supposed to be. 
 The focus of following dissertation is to analyze the effects of 
democratic transition and consolidation to foreign policy decision making 
process. The idea is the properly examine similar and different cases in both 
states and see the results in decision making. In particular, the main focus is 
Middle East policy of Turkey between 2002 and 2013. The perspective of 
research mainly based on the relations of Turkey with Middle East countries, 
Iran, Iraq, Syria, Israel and  Cyprus. During the research Turkey’s norm 
diffusion policies as a democracy promoter toward the Middle East was 
analyzed.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
European-style names.( http://www.britannica.com/, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/40411/Kemal-Ataturk) 
5
 See, J.Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2011), p. 25-32. 
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 The following dissertation is situated in the discipline of international 
relations as well as in area studies. Key concepts such as, democracy, transition 
to democracy, democratic consolidation, the relation between democracy and 
foreign policy, Islamism and their link to foreign policy were clarified. Also the 
effects of domestic affairs to foreign policy within the concept of international 
relations were analyzed. The importance of Alliance of Civilizations and 
Barcelona Process was clarified in the framework of democracy and peace 
promoters in Middle East region.  
 The dissertation based on specific units of this intertemporal analysis of 
Turkish and Spanish foreign policy. During the study particular periods were 
picked; In case of Spain: foreign policy of Franco Dictatorship, the effects of 
democratic transition to foreign policy decision making and consolidation 
period; In case of Turkey: foreign policy under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk rules 
and Turkeys ongoing transition process as well as AKP’s ‘pro-western’6 and 
‘neo-ottoman’7 foreign policy concepts will be the subjects of the dissertation. 
 
 
3. Scope and Objective 
                                                          
6
 See, Soner Çagaptay, "Secularism and Foreign Policy in Turkeynew Elections, 
Troubling Trends," in Policy Focus (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2007), 
Şaban Kardaş, "Turkey under the Justice and Development Party: Between Transformation 
of ‘Islamism’ and Democratic Consolidation?," Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 
17, no. 2 (2008). 
7
  See, Tarik Oğuzlu, "Middle Easternization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Does 
Turkey Dissociate from the West?," Turkish Studies 9, no. 1 (2008), Hakan Yavuz, 
"Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo‐Ottomanism," Critique: 
Critical Middle Eastern Studies 7, no. 12 (1998). 
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 The main goal of the dissertation is to contribute to an academic debate 
with an objective scientific research as regard to Turkey’s Middle East policy 
under AKP rule 2002-2013. Thence, the objective of the dissertation is to 
analyze new direction of Turkish foreign policy under AKP governance within 
their “Secular Muslim”8 character. Within the content of the dissertation 
political, economic, trade, commerce, military, diplomatic, and security related 
foreign policy issues between Turkey and its eastern neighbors, as well as 
international actors is circumstantiated. 
 Aside from analyzing Turkey‘s foreign policy practices with a deep 
focus on internal and external determinants influencing the decision making 
processes under the AKP rule, the dissertation also examines the 
democratization process of Turkish Republic. Also, the whole dissertation built 
upon the questions like; is Turkey a democratic country? Could Spain be an 
exemplar for Turkey’s undone transition to democracy? Could Turkey’s 
interpretation of democracy be an inspiration for Muslim majority countries? 
Is there any change in Turkey’s tradition foreign policy? What drives 
Turkey’s new foreign policy actions, what are the criteria? Can Turkey and 
Spain really have an international impact by using soft power tools like 
Alliance of Civilizations or Union for Mediterranean? 
 Alternately, the dissertation purpose is to comprehend the fundamental 
characteristic of Turkey‘s foreign policy under AKP rule. Within this scope, it 
analyzes three government periods of AKP; the main idea is to conceptualize 
                                                          
8
  See, Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Oxford University Press, 
USA, 2003), Hakan Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
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new directions of Turkish foreign policy and to analyze eastern direction of 
Turkish foreign policy. 
 
 
4. Literature Overview  
 The dissertation- Foreign Policy of Turkey and Spain versus Middle 
East, after 2002. Transition to Democracy and New International Agents- 
explains wide range of relation from political diplomatic, economic, commerce 
issues to trade, military, culture and religious perspective.  
 Subsequently, in consistency with the primary objectives of the 
dissertation, essential resources in related fields are properly examined. As an 
indispensable part of the research and data collection throughout the preparation 
process of the dissertation, library resources, including first and second 
literature sources, books, academic journals, periodicals, newspapers releases, 
articles are utilized to a great extent. Over and above, internet resources, on-line 
books, periodicals, newspapers, articles are explored along with the official 
websites of political parties, Foreign Affairs Ministries, embassies; state 
departments research and think thank centers. Hereafter, the direct sources like 
party and government programs, election manifestos, and bilateral agreements, 
memorandum of understandings, press briefs and releases constitute primary 
source of the dissertation in terms of literature. Also interviews with Turkish 
people from different political ideas, academicians, policy makers and deputies 
took part. 
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5. Organization of the Dissertation 
 The dissertation is organized in 5 chapters. The first chapter is the 
introduction of the dissertation. In this chapter I explain the reason why I 
choose this particular subject to study, the objective and the hypotheses, as a 
well as the methods used during the research. 
 The second chapter bears an introductory character focusing on 
theoretical framework of Turkey’s and Spain’s foreign policy along with its 
historical background focusing on transition to democracy and its effects to 
decision making process. 
  The third chapter provides information with respect to AKP’s political 
identity and its foreign policy concepts.  It explores the history of political Islam 
in Turkey, including critical analysis of National Vision Movement. The 
chapter also examines the birth and development period of AKP along with the 
dynamics which determine its foreign policy concept. This chapter focuses on 
the questions of how Turkey’s foreign policy changed with the AKP by taking 
the Davutoğlu doctrines as the main unit of analysis, “change” in the AKP’s 
foreign policy was investigated at the theoretical and practical level. 
 The Eastern direction of Turkish foreign policy from 2002 to 2013 
examined in the fourth chapter. The chapter is organized under five subtitles; 
Turkish - Iraqi, Turkish - Syrian, Turkish - Iranian, Turkish - Israeli relations 
and Cyprus issue. This chapter clarified the reaction of Turkey towards the Arab 
Revolution in selected countries.  
 The fifth chapter analyzes foreign policy interactions of AKP rule and 
Spanish governments from a comparative manner.  In the last chapter analyzed 
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the two international initiatives; Alliance of Civilizations and Barcelona Process 
that created for to promote peace especially in Middle East basin. 
 
 
6. Introduction Générale 
 Le bassin du Moyen-Orient est considéré comme un point de rencontre 
de différentes cultures et religions et peut, en cela, être source de conflits de 
portée internationale. Lorsque Kofi Annan envisagea la possibilité d'un choc des 
civilisations en Juin 2005,  comme l'explique Huntington, c'est vers l'Espagne et 
la Turquie qu'il s'est dirigé pour laisser leurs dirigeants co-présider l'Alliance 
des Civilisations. En effet, les deux pays disposant d'expériences sans pareil de 
coexistence de différentes cultures en leur sein, ils se sont présentés comme les 
plus à même pour conduire une telle initiative. 
 La Turquie a une position géostratégique fondamentale aux intérêts de 
l'Europe et du monde occidental. D'une part, sa situation géographique entre Est 
et Ouest offre un accès facile et stratégique aux principales ressources 
énergétiques, et de l'autre, en tant que pays démocratique et moderne, la Turquie 
s'est construite comme un modèle pour les pays de majorité musulmane. Elle 
partage avec l'Espagne, de par leurs positions géographiques respectives, la 
place de porte d’entrée vers le Nord de l'Afrique et vers le bassin méditerranéen, 
et s'inscrit ainsi dans les zones européenne, africaine et asiatique. Les deux pays 
convergent également au sujet de problématiques régionales, notamment 
concernant le développement de la paix au Moyen-Orient et dans le Caucase. Ils 
sont aussi membres de l'OTAN, de l'ONU, de l'OCDE, du FMI et de l'Union 
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pour la Méditerranée. La Turquie, avec une population majoritairement 
musulmane, est par ailleurs candidate à l'adhésion à l'Union Européenne et 
compte en cela avec le soutien de l'Espagne. Les différents points signalés ci-
dessus montrent que le multilatéralisme est au cœur de la politique étrangère et 
des politiques de sécurité des deux pays. 
 Par ailleurs, en ce qui concerne l’histoire politique interne de la Turquie 
et de l'Espagne, il est possible d'observer des similitudes et des différences. En 
ce qui concerne la transition démocratique, depuis la première république 
d'Espagne en 1873, la vie politique du pays a été à plusieurs reprises secouée, 
par la restauration, la guerre civile, la dictature et le coup d'État. Pour sa part, 
après la création de la Turquie moderne en 1923, plusieurs coups d'État ont 
interrompu la vie politique turque, fruits de la segmentation entre les séculiers et 
les islamistes, la gauche et la droite ou encore les nationalistes et les 
séparatistes. Turquie a initié son processus d’occidentalisation grâce aux 
réformes menées par Atatürk, de nos jours, le pays se partage toujours entre 
autoritarisme et démocratie. L'Espagne s'érige au contraire comme un exemple 
de la consolidation démocratique au sud de l'Europe. 
 Cette thèse se propose d'analyser les effets de la transition et de la 
consolidation de la démocratie sur les prises de décisions au sein de la politique 
extérieure, et ce, en travaillant sur des cas similaires au sein des deux pays, la 
Turquie et l'Espagne. Plus particulièrement, l'objectif principal de cette 
recherche est d'étudier en profondeur la politique extérieure de la Turquie au 
Moyen-Orient à partir de l'année 2002. Aussi, la perspective développée porte-t-
elle principalement sur les relations de la Turquie avec les pays du Moyen-
Orient que sont l'Iran, l'Irak, la Syrie, Israël, ainsi qu'avec Chypre. 
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 Cette recherche se situe dans la discipline des relations internationales. 
Les concepts-clés de démocratie, transition à la démocratie, consolidation 
démocratique, relation entre démocratie et politique extérieure, islamisme et 
relation avec la politique extérieure sont travaillées en son sein. L'influence des 
organisations internationales sur la définition de la politique extérieure est 
également analysée. Pour chaque pays, des périodes déterminées ont été 
choisies sur lesquelles porter attention. Dans le cas de l'Espagne, c'est la 
politique extérieure durant la dictature franquiste, la transition démocratique et 
la période de consolidation de la démocratie qui a été au cœur des recherches. 
Concernant la Turquie, l'étude s'est concentrée sur la politique extérieure menée 
sous le régime de Kemal Atatürk, sur le processus de transition démocratique 
aujourd’hui en cours, ainsi que sur les nouveaux concepts mobilisés par l'AKP, 
pro-occidentaux et néo-ottomans. Finalement, les révolutions arabes récentes 
sont également analysées. 
 L'objectif principal de cette thèse est de contribuer à un débat 
académique grâce à une recherche scientifique objective sur la politique du 
Moyen-Orient menée par l’AKP en Turquie entre 2002-2013. De plus, elle 
propose une analyse de la nouvelle direction prise par le gouvernement de 
l'AKP dans sa définition de la politique extérieure et plus particulièrement son 
caractère « séculier musulman ». Les relations de la Turquie avec ses voisins de 
l'Est et avec les acteurs internationaux sont étudiées, en termes politique, 
commercial, militaire, diplomatique et de sécurité. 
 En plus de cette analyse de la politique extérieure de la Turquie qui se 
focalise sur les déterminants internes et externes qui influencent les processus 
de prise de décision du gouvernement de l'AKP, est également examiné le 
processus de démocratisation de la république Turque. La thèse se construit en 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
FOREIGN POLICY OF TURKEY AND SPAIN VERSUS MIDDLE EAST, AFTER 2002. TRANSITION 
TO DEMOCRACY AND NEW INTERNATIONAL AGENTS 
Gozde Demirel 
Dipòsit Legal: T 957-2014 
 
I n t r o d u c t i o n  | 31 
 
 
effet autour de questions telles que : La Turquie est-elle un pays démocratique ? 
L'interprétation que fait la Turquie de la démocratie peut-elle être source 
d'inspiration pour d'autres pays musulmans ? Quels facteurs impulsent les 
nouvelles actions de la politique extérieure turque et quels sont les critères 
décisifs ? Y a-t-il un changement dans la politique extérieure traditionnelle de la 
Turquie ? La transition démocratique de l'Espagne peut-elle être un exemple à 
suivre pour la Turquie ? L'Espagne et la Turquie peuvent-elles réellement avoir 
un impact à échelle internationale en mobilisant le « pouvoir mou » que 
représentent par exemple l'Alliance des Civilisations ou l'Union pour la 
Méditerranée ? De plus, le propos de la thèse est de comprendre les 
caractéristiques fondamentales de la politique extérieure de la Turquie pendant 
la période du gouvernement de l'AKP, et d'observer les changements que celle-
ci a connu. 
  La thèse est structurée en cinq chapitres. Le premier se concentre 
sur la construction et la justification du sujet de recherche et présente objectifs, 
hypothèses et méthodologie. Le second chapitre se concentre sur le cadre 
théorique mobilisé dans cette étude, lequel fait une introduction à l'histoire des 
politiques extérieures espagnoles et turques. La transition démocratique et ses 
effets sur les processus de prise de décision y sont ainsi examinés. Dans le 
troisième chapitre, l'identité politique de l'AKP est expliquée en profondeur 
ainsi que les concepts que ce parti développe pour construire sa politique 
extérieure. Est alors travaillée l'histoire de l'Islam politique en Turquie, laquelle 
inclue une analyse critique du Mouvement National de Vision (Milli Görüs), 
ainsi que de la période de naissance et de développement de l'AKP et des 
dynamiques qui déterminent sa politique extérieure. Le quatrième chapitre est 
consacré à la politique extérieure turque vers le Moyen-Orient entre 2002 et 
2013, et s'intéresse aux relations avec l'Irak, la Syrie, l'Iran et Israël, ainsi que le 
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conflit chypriote. Enfin, le dernier chapitre s'arrête sur une analyse de l'Alliance 
des Civilisations et du Processus de Barcelone en tant que promoteurs de la paix 
au Moyen-Orient.  
 
 
7. Introducción General 
 La cuenca del Medio Oriente puede ser considerada como un punto de 
encuentro de diferentes culturas y religiones, lo que también significa una 
fuente de conflictos mundiales. Cuando Kofi Annan se desconcertó, por la  
posibilidad de un choque de civilizaciones, como especifica Huntington, él se 
dirigió a los líderes de España y Turquía para co-presidir la Alianza de 
Civilizaciones. Debido a sus antecedentes de tener diferentes culturas que 
coexisten en paz y armonía, tanto en iberia como en Anatolia, no habrían otros 
países que tuvieran suficiente conocimiento para conducir tal iniciativa. 
 Turquía es un punto geoestratégico fundamental que es vital para los 
intereses de Europa y del mundo occidental. Su ubicación geográfica entre el 
este y el oeste, ofrece un fácil acceso a los principales recursos energéticos de 
manera estratégica. Gracias a su carácter como un país moderno y democrático, 
Turquía se erige como un ejemplo para los países de mayoría musulmana. 
Debido a su posición geográfica, España como Turquía pueden ser considerados 
como un portal hacia el norte de África y en general al resto del mediterráneo. 
Así mismo, pertenecen a las zonas europea, africana y asiática. Ambos países se 
encaminan hacia la misma dirección en temas regionales como el progreso de la 
paz en el Medio Oriente y el Cáucaso. Por otra parte, son miembros de la 
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OTAN, la ONU, la OCDE, el FMI y la Unión por el Mediterráneo. Turquía con 
una población predominantemente musulmana, es el único candidato a la espera 
de la UE que cuenta con el apoyo de España  para su  plena adhesión en la UE. 
Estos puntos comunes significan que el multilateralismo es la piedra angular de 
la política  
 Turquía y España experimentaron cambios drásticos después de la 
Segunda Guerra Mundial. Turquía inició el proceso de occidentalization por las 
reformas hechas por Atatürk. Hoy en día, el país aun continua su lucha entre la 
plena democracia y el autoritarismo. Por otro lado, España se erige como un 
sólido ejemplo de la consolidación democrática en el sur de Europa. Cuando se 
trata de la historia de la república, la transición a la democracia en el caso de 
Turquía y España ha tenido algunas similitudes y diferencias. Desde la primera 
república de España en 1873, la vida política del país fue objeto de varias 
interrupciones incluyendo la restauración, la guerra civil, la dictadura y el golpe 
de estado. Por su parte la historia de Turquía no se encuentra  tan lejos de la 
española. Después de la creación de la Turquía moderna en 1923, la vida 
política se vio interrumpida por varios golpes de estado, debido a la 
segmentación entre los seculares y los islamistas, la izquierda y la derecha y los 
nacionalistas y los separatistas. De hecho, la democracia todavía no está 
funcionando como debería ser. 
 Esta tesis se enfoca en analizar los efectos de la transición y la 
consolidación de la democracia en la  toma de decisiones en la política exterior. 
Se pretende  investigar casos similares de ambos estados y ver los resultados en 
la toma de decisiones. En particular, el objetivo principal es estudiar en 
profundidad la política exterior de Turquía hacía el Medio Oriente después de 
2002. Principalmente, la perspectiva de la investigación se basa en las 
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relaciones de Turquía con los países del Medio Oriente tales como Irán, Irak, 
Siria, Israel así como Chipre.  
 La tesis se sitúa en la disciplina de las relaciones internacionales. Se 
aclaran conceptos claves como la democracia, la transición a la democracia, la 
consolidación democrática, la relación entre la democracia y la política exterior, 
el islamismo y su relación con la política exterior. Además se explica la 
influencia de las organizaciones internacionales en la política exterior. Durante 
el estudio han sido elegidos determinados períodos de cada país. En el caso de 
España el estudio se centró en la política exterior de la dictadura franquista y en 
los efectos de la  transición a la democracia en la política exterior y el periodo 
de consolidación. Por su parte, en Turquía se centró en  la política exterior bajo 
las normas de Kemal Atatürk,  el proceso de transición de la democracia en 
curso, así como los nuevos conceptos de la política exterior del AKP- pro-
occidental y neo-otomana. Finalmente las revoluciones árabes también fueron 
analizadas. 
 El objetivo principal de la tesis es contribuir a un debate académico con 
una investigación objetiva científica con respeto a la política de Medio Oriente 
de Turquía conforme a la regla del AKP entre el 2002 y el 2013. Además se 
pretende analizar la nueva dirección de la política exterior turca bajo el 
gobierno del AKP dentro de su carácter "secular musulmán". Dentro del 
contenido de la tesis se examinan las relaciones entre Turquía y sus vecinos del 
este, junto con los actores internacionales en términos políticos, comerciales, 
militares, diplomáticos y  de  seguridad. 
 Aparte del análisis de la política exterior de Turquía con un profundo 
enfoque en los determinantes internos y externos que influyen en los procesos 
de toma de decisión en el gobierno del AKP, también se examina el proceso de 
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democratización de la república turca. La tesis se construye sobre preguntas 
tales como: ¿Es Turquía un país democrático?, ¿Podría ser la interpretación de 
la democracia de Turquía una fuente de inspiración para los países 
musulmanes?, ¿Qué impulsa las nuevas acciones de la política exterior de 
Turquía y cuáles son los criterios?,  ¿Hay algún cambio en la política exterior 
tradicional de Turquía?,  ¿Podría la transición a la democracia de España ser un 
ejemplo para Turquía?, ¿Pueden realmente Turquía y España tener un impacto 
internacional utilizando el “poder blando” como por ejemplo la Alianza de 
Civilizaciones o la Unión por el Mediterráneo?. Adicionalmente, el propósito de 
la tesis es comprender las características fundamentales de la política exterior de 
Turquía durante el periodo del gobierno del AKP, así como entender de que 
manera la política exterior turca ha cambiado.  
 La tesis se estructura en cinco capítulos. En el primero se explica la 
razón por la cual se eligió el tema en particular de estudio, se describen los 
objetivos e hipótesis, así como los métodos utilizados durante la investigación. 
El segundo capítulo se centra en el marco teórico, el cual tiene un carácter 
introductorio de la política exterior de España y Turquía, junto con sus 
antecedentes históricos. También, se trata la transición a la democracia y sus 
efectos en el proceso de toma de decisiones. En el tercer capítulo se explica en 
profundidad la identidad política del AKP y sus conceptos de la política 
exterior. En él se explora la historia del islam político en Turquía incluyendo el 
análisis crítico del Movimiento Nacional de Visión (Milli Görüş). Del mismo 
modo es examina el  período de nacimiento y desarrollo del AKP junto con la 
dinámica que determina su concepto de la política exterior. En él cuarto capítulo 
se indaga sobre la política exterior de Turquía hacia el Medio Oriente entre el  
2002 y el 2013. A su vez en el capítulo se explora  las relaciones turco-iraquíes, 
turco-sirias, turco-iraníes, turco-israelíes, además del conflicto chipriota. 
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Finalmente, en el último capítulo  se analizan la Alianza de Civilizaciones y el 
Proceso de Barcelona como promotores de la paz en el Medio Oriente.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
FOREIGN POLICY OF TURKEY AND SPAIN VERSUS MIDDLE EAST, AFTER 2002. TRANSITION 
TO DEMOCRACY AND NEW INTERNATIONAL AGENTS 
Gozde Demirel 
Dipòsit Legal: T 957-2014 
 
  
 
 
  Chapter II 
 
 
 
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY AND 
FOREIGN POLICY: THE CASE OF 
TURKEY AND SPAIN 
 
The basis of a democratic state is liberty. 
Aristotle, the Politics 
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1. Introduction   
 The issue of democratic transition and consolidation is trend topic of 
academic debate among modern-day historians. Especially after the changes in 
the Arab countries caused by popular uprisings, all types of researchers deepen 
their studies on the issues related to democracy. The chapter starts with the 
definitions given on democracy to clarify what is democracy and what are the 
criteria of consolidation. In the same vein, it clarifies the key concepts like 
democracy, transition to democracy, consolidation of democracy and the 
relation between democracy and foreign policy. 
 The main idea of the chapter is to analyze the general framework of 
Turkey’s and Spain’s foreign policy in the period of transition and consolidation 
of their democracies from historical perspective, along with the main 
determinants shaping it and the characteristics of both countries external policy 
concept. It also considers internal dynamics in order to sketch out the basic 
principles and theoretical framework of Republic of Turkey‘s and Spain’s 
foreign affairs. 
The chapter concentrates on n the transition to democracy in the case of 
Turkey and Spain, the reference period for Spain start with the dictatorship of 
Franco in 1936 since 2003 the government of Zapatero, for Turkey my start 
point is the creation of Modern Turkey 1923 since 2002 AKP government. The 
idea is the find the similarities and the difference between two countries and 
sees the effects of this transition to foreign policy decision making process. The 
example of Spain and Turkey is a clear case for to understand how a democracy 
survives and become stable. 
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2. Defining Democracy, Explaining the Transition to 
Democracy and Democratic Consolidation 
 
2.1. What is Democracy? 
 Democracy literally means “rule of people”. The etymological origins of 
the term democracy is derived from the Greek dēmokratiā, which was coined 
from dēmos “people” and kratos “rule” in the middle of the 5th century B.C to 
denote the political systems then existing in some Greek city-states, notably 
Athens.
9
 Throughout history the content of democracy became more than a 
simple definition of “rule of people”. Contemporarily definition, determinants, 
functions and quality of democracy is still an ongoing debate among 
academicians.  To avoid the questions on the concept of democracy, principally 
I want to explain what I mean by “democracy” and then the necessary 
conditions that might move the regime from transition to consolidation. 
 The definition of democracy used in whole dissertation built upon 
Robert Dahl conceptualization. According to Dahl center of democracy is the 
nation of political equality. For him political equality requires the same rights 
and opportunity to everyone who wants to have her preferences take place into 
                                                          
9
 Dahl R.A., Democracy  in Encyclopedia Britannica Online (source: 
www.britannica.com,< http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/157129/democracy>, 
20.May.2011)  
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government policy.
10
 In his book “On Democracy” Dahl gives five criteria for 
ideal democracy. These requirements can be summarize as: 
1. Effective participation: Equal and adequate opportunities of all citizen 
for questioning and forming public agenda before a policy is adopted by 
the associations. 
2. Voting equality: Each citizen must have an equal and effective 
opportunity and right for voting and all votes must be counted as equal 
in weights to the judgments of others. 
3. Enlightened understanding: Each citizen must have equal opportunities 
for discovering the relevant alternative policies that would best serve 
their interests. 
4. Control of the agenda: People must have exclusive opportunity to decide 
what political matters to be placed on the agenda. 
5. Inclusion of adults: All permanent residents within the state should have 
the full rights of citizens that are implies by the first four criteria.
11
 
 From this point of view democracy can not consist of small group of 
elites and others must be allowed to insert their desires onto political agenda. At 
the same time he added other seven criteria that together help meet these 
requirements of political equality:  
1. “Control over governmental decisions about policy is constitutionally 
vested in elected officials. Elected officials are chosen and peacefully 
removed in relatively frequent, fair and free elections, in which coercion 
is quite limited. 
                                                          
10
 Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (Yale University Press, 2000), p. 36. 
11
 ibid., p. 38. 
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2. Practically all adults have the right to vote in these elections. 
3. Most adults also have the right to run for the public offices for which 
candidates run in these elections. 
4. Citizen have an effectively enforced right to freedom of expression, 
particularly political expression, including criticism of the officials, the 
conduct of the government, the prevailing political, economic, and social 
system, and the dominant ideology. 
5. They also have access to alternative source of information that is not 
monopolized by the government or any other single group. 
6. Finally they have an effectively enforced right to form and join 
autonomous associations, including political associations, such as 
political parties and interest groups , that attempt to influence the 
government by competing in elections and by other peaceful means.”
12
 
 Furthermore Larry Diamond strengthens the definition of democracy 
with other determinants that makes a regime move towards consolidation. First, 
he affirms that elected officials must have the full control of the decision 
making process without any pressure from the undemocratic actors and foreign 
powers and at the same time elected government should not have the 
institutional power to become tyrannical after winning elections. Second, all 
types of minority groups should have legally and practically equal rights for 
expressing their interests in political life. Third, freedom of belief, opinion, 
discussion, speech, publication, assembly, demonstration and petition should be 
ensured by executive power. Fourth, judicial system must be independent and 
nondiscriminatory. Finally, citizens in a democratic regime must be equal under 
the law and the rule of law should protect all citizens from unjustified detention, 
                                                          
12
 Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (Yale University Press, 1989), p. 233. 
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terror, torture and undue interference in their personal lives.
13
 Larry Diamond 
believes that there is a powerful association between democracy and liberty,
14
 
and he says that in the absence of any one of these features, the democratic 
credentials of a regime need to be question.  
 
 
2.2. Transition to Democracy 
 The theme of transition to democracy divided into two approaches: 
genetic approach and functional approach. Most theoretician those taking 
‘genetic’ approach focuses on the role of economic development and 
modernization. For example in his  famous article Seymour Martin Lipset 
explains the necessity of an industrial society, stable economy with a large 
middle class and high educational level for further involvement  in political 
decision-making  via democratization.
15
 In some extent, this idea makes logical 
sense because the majority of stable democracies are the countries economically 
developed. On the other hand according to ‘genetic approach’ there are other 
factors that can bring change from authoritarianism to democracy. Some of 
these factors can be resumed as death or defeat of a dictator, the installation of 
democratic institutions by foreign powers, restoration of democratic regimes 
                                                          
13
 Robert Agranoff, "Federal Evolution in Spain," International Political Science 
Review 17, no. 4 (1996): p. 12. 
14
 ibid., p. 5. 
15
 See, Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic 
Development and Political Legitimacy," The American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 
(1959). 
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after external conquest.
16
 O’Donnell and Schmitter explain the transition like 
“the interval between one political regime and another…Transitions are 
delimited, on the one side, by the launching of the process of dissolution of an 
authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the installation of some form of 
democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a 
revolutionary alternative”.
17
  But how is it possible to consolidate or to deepen 
the democracy? 
 
 
2.3. Democratic Consolidation 
 Democratic consolidation is the process of maturing democracy. In other 
words, while undemocratic regimes suffers from formalized but intermittent 
elections and clientelism, in mature democracies the actors in a system follow 
the formal rules of democratic institutions.
18
 Once transformation from 
authoritarian rule in a country has reached a point where free, fair and 
competitive elections held, it does not mean that this country has a full 
democracy. Moreover it does not exist clear or unique definition of 
consolidation. As Richard Gunther explains “no clear consensus has emerged is 
                                                          
16
 M. Lauren McLaren, Constructing Democracy in Southern Europe: A 
Comparative Analysis of Italy, Spain and Turkey (Taylor & Francis, 2008), p. 4. 
17
 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian 
Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986), p. 6. 
18
 See, Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, "Endogenous Democratization," World 
Politics 55, no. 4 (2003). 
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that scholars have used different definitions of consolidation”
19
. The definition 
of democratic consolidation that I will use in my dissertation is the 
conceptualization of Juan Linz and Stephen Alfred. 
  According to Linz and Stephan “… a democratic transition is complete 
when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to 
produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the 
direct result of a free, fair, and popular vote, when this government de facto has 
the authority to generate new policies and when executive, legislative and 
judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power 
with other bodies de jure.”
20
 It should be noted that consolidation and transition 
are two different phases of democratization process. Linz and Stephen gives the 
more common definition of consolidation. They defined that consolidated 
democracy is a political situation in which democracy has become “the only 
game in the town”.
21
 But what does it mean being only game in the town, and 
what will determine whenever new democracies became stable?  
 In a nutshell, according to Linz and Stephen consolidated democracies 
have some features such as:   
 “No significant political groups seriously attempt to overthrow the 
democratic regime or secede from the state. 
                                                          
19
 Kenneth A. Bollen, "Political Democracy and the Timing of Development," 
American Sociological Review 44, no. 4 (1979): p. 5. 
20
 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, p. 3.  
21
 ibid., p. 6. 
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 Even in the face of sever political and economic crises, the 
overwhelming majority of the people believe that any further political 
change must emerge from within the parameters of democratic formulas. 
 All actors become habituated to the fact that political conflict will be re 
resolved according to established norm.”
22
   
 
 
3. Democracy and Foreign Policy 
 According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that signed at 
Vienna in 1993 with the presences of 111 countries, “all humans are free and 
equal in dignity and rights”. Also the freedom of individual to think, believe, 
worship, freedoms from torture, arbitrary arrest and unlawful detention are 
recognized as inalienable human rights.
23
 Admittedly there is a powerful 
connection between democracy, liberty and rights. Their protection and 
promotion is the first responsibility of elected governments. 
 There is a wide range of theoretic arguments and empiric findings on the 
attitude of democratic and undemocratic states in the time of internal and 
international crisis.
24
 The most common and debated thesis based on the idea 
                                                          
22
 ibid., p. 5. 
23
 See, E. Roosevelt, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Applewood Books, 
2001). 
24
 See, Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Alliance, Contiguity, Wealth, and Political 
Stability: Is the Lack of Conflict among Democracies a Statistical Artifact? 1," 
International Interactions 17, no. 3 (1992), Bruce M. Russett and John R. Oneal, 
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that the democracies do not fight each other. And also in general they are more 
peaceful than the authoritarian states. As Patrick James and Seung-Whan Choi 
clarify democracies are less likely to go to war against each other because of 
cultural and structural constraints.
25
 The source of the theoretic arguments based 
generally on Kant’s Perpetual Peace
26
.According to Kant peace could emerge 
among the states with: 
1. Representative democracy 
2. Economic interdependence  
3. Joint membership in international organizations and adherence to 
internal law. 
 The empirical analysis of Bruce Russet and John Oneal shows that states 
in highly trade or financial interdependent economic relationship tend to avoid 
the conflict with their common partner. At the same time, participation in 
international organizations has got major effect on the attitude of states. The 
more international organizations state join, its government avoids taking violent 
action against the member state of the organization. These finding affirm that if 
the number of democratic states augments in the world, there will be less war. 
  On the other hand, what is the difference between democratic and 
undemocratic states in decision making process? According to Maoz and Russet 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations 
(Norton, 2001). 
25
 Seung-Whan Choi and Patrick James, Civil-Military Dynamics, Democracy, and 
International Conflict: A New Quest for International Peace (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 
p. 7. 
26
 See, Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay (Cosimo Classics, 2010). 
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undemocratic states can act faster in the time of crisis.
27
 In other words the 
structure of democracies slows down the process of decision-making.
28
 But let 
the citizens be part of the decision making process. 
  In the post-cold war era concept of threat shifted from communism to 
terrorism but the methodology to fight against the threat did not change. Great 
powers of the world politics, especially United States of America built its 
foreign policy on democracy promotion and encourage the middle size 
countries to promote democracy. The idea of promoting democracy or exporting 
democracy accepted as the suitable method to fight against the threat.  
 
 
4. Overview of Transition: the Case of Spain and Turkey  
 The civil war ended with the Nationalists as victor in 1939 and General 
Francisco Franco set up a traditional dictatorship that lasted until his dead in 
1975.
29
 Shortly after his dead, Spain entered the period of transition (1976-81) 
which has been often taken as a model for other process of political change 
                                                          
27
 Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic 
Peace, 1946-1986," The American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993): p. 48. 
28
 Choi and James, Civil-Military Dynamics, Democracy, and International Conflict: 
A New Quest for International Peace, p. 8. 
29
 Laura Desfor Edless, "Rethinking Democratic Transition: A Cultural Critique and 
the Spanish Case," Theory and Society 24, no. 3 (1995): p. 362. 
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form authoritarian to democracy.
30
 Principally death or defeat of a dictator can 
be considerate as one of the most significant reason of transition but it does not 
guarantee the reveal of democratic regime. In Spanish case, before his death 
Franco declared old king’s son Juan Carlos as his successor and the process of 
democratization realized under the guidance of the kingdom. Spain learned well 
from its previous experiences, especially the trauma of Civil War of the late 
1930s helped the political actors to find a common ground during the process. 
 In Turkey, the transition towards democracy was initiated by Kemal 
‘Atatürk’ who is the founder and the first president of the modern Turkish 
Republic. Principally Ataturk was aiming to build a new republic that would 
connect citizens to government. His ideas created an ideology so called 
Kemalism. Westernization, modernization, secularization of Turkish Republic 
is the key components of his ideology. Kemalism built upon six ‘isms’ (which 
symbolize by six arrows): Republicanism, Populism, Secularism, 
Revolutionalism, Nationalism, and Statism.
31
 Kemalist state was trying to create 
new Turkish citizenship with limited resources. After the war of Independence, 
Ataturk realized multiple reforms. The idea was to eliminate the legacy of 
Ottoman Empire over the new Turkish Republic and create western styled 
modern and secular state. The common point of transition in the case of Turkey 
and Spain was the process that initiated by the elite, corporatist, and rational 
actor models. Since the first republic of Spain in 1873 politic life of the country 
was the subject of several interruption as restoration, civil war, disaster, 
                                                          
30
 Carles Boix, "Spain: Development, Democracy and Equity," in World 
Development Report 2005 (Washington: World Bank, 2004), p. 5. 
31
 McLaren, Constructing Democracy in Southern Europe: A Comparative Analysis 
of Italy, Spain and Turkey, p. 22. 
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dictatorship, coup d’état. On the other hand the history of Turkey is not so far 
away from Spain. After the creation of Modern Turkey, the political life was 
interrupted by several coup d’état and the function of democracy was not 
working as it supposed to be. Spain achieved to consolidate its democracy in 
short time period but Turkey today still fighting for its democratic rights and 
struggle somewhere between full democracy and something told to be that it is a 
democracy. 
By the way today’s government achieved to realize some development 
especially with the democratic openings on the other hand the recent 
developments showed that the democracy that AKP promised exists only for 
their supporters. Other important point that should be noted is that AKP slow 
down the democratization process after they achieved to neutralize the Turkish 
Armed Forces. To that point it main question is that, AKP only wanted to 
neutralize army to govern more freely? 
 
Table 1: Chronology of Kemalist Reforms 
1922 1 November: Abolition of Sultanate 
1923 24 July: Treaty of Lausanne signed. 
1924 3 March: Abolition of Caliphate and Millet system 
Closure of traditional schools; 
Abolition of Sharia law; 
Adoption of Constitution. 
1925 Abolition of Dervish Groups; 
Abolition of  Fez and veiling of women discouraged; 
Western attire and for men and for women encouraged; 
Adoption of Gregorian calendar. 
1926 Adoption of new civil, commercial, and penal codes based on European 
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legal systems. 
Ending of Islamic polygamy by new civil code: introduction of civil 
marriage 
1928 Adoption of new Turkish alphabet (modified version of Latin alphabet); 
Turkish State declared to be secular; 
Removal of constitutional provision establishing Islam as official 
religion. 
1933 Islamic call of worship and public readings of Kuran (Quran) to be held 
in Turkish rather than Arabic 
1934 Grating of right to vote and right to hold office for women; 
Law of Surnames adopted; Grand National Assembly gives Mustafa 
Kemal the name of Kemal Atatürk ( Father of Turks); İsmet Pasha takes 
the surname of Inonu 
1935 Sunday made the legal weekly holiday 
Source: Second Grade School text book 
 
5. Characteristics, Similarities and General Evolution of 
Decision Making Process and Control of Foreign Policy: 
the Case of Turkey and Spain. 
 
5.1. The Case of Spain: Main Principles of Spain’s Foreign 
Policy  
 Autarky, fascism, conservatism, transition to democracy, consolidation, 
universalization and Westernization are some of the terminologies used to 
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describe this specific period of Spanish foreign policy. In April 1939 Spanish 
history opened a new page call Franco era, which dured thirty-six years long. 
The social and economic history of Francoism consists of the transformation of 
Spain from agrarian country in 1939 to modern and urban in 1975. After the 
World War II, while Western Europe countries started to established 
democracy, Spain remained a culturally and diplomatically isolated country, 
governed by authoritarian institutions.
32
 After protracted authoritarian rule, in 
the last sixty years Spain has undergone successful political and economic 
transformation from authoritarianism to wealthy democracy. 
 
 
5.1.1.1. The Limits of Foreign Policy in Authoritarian Rule: 
Franco Dictatorship 
 On 18 July 1936 General Franco launched a coup and divided Spain in 
two parts, who had supported Franco—Monarchists, fascist Falangists
33
, 
conservative Catholics, business owners and military officers and who had 
                                                          
32
 Boix, "Spain: Development, Democracy and Equity," p. 1. 
33
 The Falange: José Antonio Primo de Rivera founded the Falange in 1933 and 
became its main leader. The Falange originally combined traditional patriotism with 
modern authoritarianism. Its objective was to create a National Socialist state free from 
class struggle. The Falange was mainly inspired by Italian fascism and defended the ideal 
of creating a bigger Spain through territorial expansion in the north of Africa and, above 
all, the recovery of strategic Gibraltar. The Falangists respected the Catholic Church, but 
demonized Marxism and capitalism. At the same time, they pressed for the introduction of 
land reform and for the nationalization of the banks and railways. See, Monserrat 
Guibernau, Catalan Nationalism: Francoism, Transition and Democracy (Taylor & 
Francis, 2004), p. 37. 
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sided with Republicans— Socialists, Communists, anarchists and liberals. After 
three years of military conflict the Civil War ended on April 1, 1939 with the 
defeat of Republican government. The Nationalist won because of they had 
internal unity, a better-led army and enduring foreign support from Nazi-
Germany and Fascist Italy.
34
 After his victory General Franco established a 
traditional authoritarian regime that lasted until his death in 1975. Humanitarian 
result of the Civil War was shocking: over half a million dead and another half a 
million in exile. Furthermore many thousands more were to die in the postwar 
repression.
35
 
 Civil war and break out of the World War II literally depressed Spanish 
economy. At the same time autarkic and statist policies of Franco regime was 
slowed down recovery process of Spanish economy. As Carles Boix explains 
“Franco’s regime generalized a system of price controls and rationing and 
regulated foreign trade through quantitative controls.”
36
 On the other hand, 
agricultural production was a third below prewar levels and the number of 
livestock reduced by 30 to 40 per cent. Transportation had been destroyed: a 
tenth of shipping and about 40 per cent of railway equipment had been 
devastated. Industry, which basically established on military needs and was 
suffering a shortage of raw materials, especially in the Republican zone, was 
disrupted. Real per capita income would not regain its prewar levels until 
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1952.
37
 France, Germany, Italy and Great Britain were waiting for repayment of 
the debts.  Franco dictatorship is one of the largest and polemical eras of 
Spanish history, which had among its goals the creation of unitary Spanish 
national-state and recovery of the power of Spain before the Civil War. For its 
duration, it is logical that all facets of Spanish society suffer one gradual 
transformation.  
 Turbulent and changing international context between 1939 and 1975, in 
which we see from the outbreak of a new world war up oil crisis and also the 
ideological crisis, the Cold War was cruelly affecting all the actors of global 
society and Franco dictatorship as well.
38
 Considering the international 
environment and the nature of Franco dictatorship, we should examine this 
period in two phases, first between 1939 and 1959 which characterize by the 
survival of Franco regime, temptations of fascism and legitimization of Franco 
in international scene. After between 1959 and 1975 which can be called as 
years of consensus, the late Franco years and Apertura. 
 
 
5.1.1.1.1. 1939-1959 Survival of Franco Regime and Temptations 
of Fascism  
 Civil War finished just in time. After five months of peace Second 
World War started. As of the date April 1939 the Generalísimo had achieved 
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the most important key objective to ensure the continuity of his Regime. The 
enemy inside the country had been completely removed before to initiation of 
hostilities in Europe making a belligerent.
39
 During the Civil War Franco was 
very impressed by the strength of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. It was the 
Italo-German cooperation that rescued the Nationalists. Hitler with his 
impressing aircrafts demonstrated his power after he said that: ‘Franco ought to 
erect a monument to the glory of the Junker 52. It is this aircraft that the 
Spanish revolution has to thank for its victory.’ Hitler was openly helping 
Franco during the Civil War because from the beginning his aim was to prevent 
a victory for Communism in Spain.
40
 On the other hand Franco did not always 
accord public prominence to the friendship between Nationalist Spain, Nazi 
Germany, and Fascist Italy, and the great debt owed by Franco to his two 
allies.
41
 But he did not hesitate to call Germany as a “fraternal nation” and Italy 
as a “friendly nation”.
42
 In real terms, Spain had sympathy towards Italy more 
than Germany. Catholic heritage, cultural similarities and the pleasant attitude 
of Mussolini concerning the civil war debt fostered these feelings.
43
 At the 
beginning of Second World War, principally Spain followed the example of 
Germany in the politics. Franco formed a single totalitarian and fascist party 
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promoting antidemocratic and anticapitalist sentiments with strong accent on 
anticommunism. But at the middle of Second World War, Spain changed its 
attitude. As Javier Tusell explains: 
 “In the midst of World War II, the point of comparison for the Franco 
dictatorship was never Germany; instead, the closest model was Italy and 
even more so the semi-, pseudo-, or para-fascist regimes that proliferated 
at  the  time.  Franco’s  dictatorship  was,  without  doubt,  more  like  
Vichy France  or  certain  Eastern  European  countries  than  the  Hitler  
regime.  In Spain, for example, there was a struggle for power between 
the Army and.”
44
 
 In early 1939 Germany, Italy and Spain was considering themselves as 
allies. As a result of close relations and anterior aids Hitler and Franco signed a 
secret treaty of cooperation on 31 March 1939. Spain also joined Anti-
Comintern Pact
45
 on 6 April. The signature of Anti-Comintern Pact showed 
clearly ideological path of Franco dictatorship and recognition of its debt to 
Axis powers.
46
 Also on 8 May Franco ended Spain’s membership of the League 
of Nations. Yet at the same time Franco endured the political and especially the 
economic overtures of Britain and France.
47
 The economic needs of Spain, force 
the dictatorship to signed important trade agreements with France in January 
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and with England in March of 1940.
48
 The turning point of relations with 
Germany was the Nazi invasion of Catholic Poland on September 1, 1939.  
 During the Second World War, Spain’s foreign policy was deeply 
marked by the immediate impact of recent conflicts. After the Civil War the 
resources of Spain was in no condition to undertake any other war. For this 
reason in general Franco was adopted a kind of “wait-and-see policy”.  In long 
turn Spain was hoping that German victory might bring the return of Gibraltar 
to Spanish control. At the beginning of the Second World War Spain declared 
its neutrality but by January 1939 Hitler had explained to Propaganda Minister 
Joseph Goebbels that Spain could do more than remain neutral.
49
 In April 1940 
Mussolini entered the War. Continuously France had been defeated by 
Germany. After Germany’s victory, Spain’s place in Axis power become 
stronger and immediately Germany started to pressure Spain to join in World 
War II. According to Javier Tusell’s explanations: 
 “In mid June 1940, the caudillo sent General Jorge Vigón to hold talks 
with Hitler and express Spain’s willingness to become a participant in the 
conﬂict. On this occasion Spain for the ﬁrst time made substantial 
territorial demands. These consisted – and remained so for some months 
– of the extension of its possessions in the Sahara and Guinea and, above 
all, of the occupation of the whole of Morocco and the part of Algeria 
that had been colonized by Spaniards.”
50
  
 Truly Germany very little appreciated Spain and Franco for Hitler was 
an unsubstantial, catholic and conservative. In June 1941 Germany attacks to 
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Russia united Francoist leadership, for a time, all agreeing that, as Serrano put 
it, “Russia was guilty” of causing Spain’s troubles in the 1930s.
51
 Yet Spanish 
army formed a unit of Spanish volunteers, the Spanish Volunteer Division 
(División Española de Voluntarios) named as Blue Division (Division Azul) 
among the Falangist, which served in the German Army. Approximately 
eighteen thousand men are selected for the division and left Spain in July 
1941.
52
 Due to the close relations of Franco with Hitler and Mussolini, 
Roosevelt and Churchill gave concrete support to exile groups, economic 
sanctions and other actions against the Franco regime. The results of the 
economic sanctions towards Franco dictatorship was fruitful, Spanish 
government move to actual neutrality, in October 1942 Franco withdrew Blue 
Division and shifted from nonbelligerency to actual neutrality.
53
 But the 
sanctions not only that Allies also excluded Spain from membership in the 
United Nations in July 1945. 
 As a result of the position of Spain in Axis powers, between September 
1939 and at the end of the 1944, the Allies consider Spain as a potential enemy. 
During the summer and fall of 1943 the Allies had showed that Axis forces 
were about to lose the war. For this reason from November 1943 on, Franco 
noticed the necessity of changing his foreign policy priorities in a manner more 
favorable to Allies
 
.
54
 On the other hand Britain’s existing policy was based on 
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the maintenance of Spanish neutrality by economic aid to Franco's regime.
55
 
Additionally the policy of Roosevelt administration towards Spain was marked 
by the desire of United States to help Great Britain in its project of keeping 
Franco from being part of the war alongside the Axis.
56
Finally Franco regime 
remained neutral during the Second World War, an important point in Spain’s 
non-intervention was the lack of unity among the leaders and the lack of 
resources. 
 The first Francismo was fighting for survival of his regime. During 
Second World War, between 9 Agust 1939 and 20 July 1945, Franco had four 
different ministries of foreign affairs: Juan Beigbeder, Serrano Suñer, Gomez-
Jordana y Jose Felix de Lequerica. In the Spanish history the difficult years of 
forties defined by gaps, shortages and autarky.
57
 Finally on 20 July 1945, 
Franco designated a new government that shows the cooperation of the politic 
Catholicism. That is, in contrast to what one might imagine, its regime was not 
a dictatorship but “an unprecedented, social, catholic and Spanish solution”.
58
 
Precisely between 1945 and 1948 Franco was faced with the most difficult 
years of his governance, he was trying to legitimate his regime to international 
community. 
59
 But the outbreak of Cold War in 1947 changed course of the 
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events. U.S. forgot the antidemocratic components of Spanish regime and 
realized that anticommunist Spain might be a good ally. The policy of give-and-
take that Franco followed during the war was to continue.
60
 At  the  end  of   
1947 Spain has got  three  main  objectives in field of diplomatic  strategy:  to  
benefit  from  the  Marshall  Plan
61
   funds;  to  gain access to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization; and to bring the 1946 United Nations resolution to an 
end.
62
 After the war Spain was an isolated country of international community, 
Franco demand to be a founder member of the United Nations was rejected.
63
 
Because of the isolation Spanish economy suffered so badly. 
   By the help of international conjuncture the gradual recognition of 
Franco dictatorship had started. First in February, 1948 the French government 
had re-opened the border. In 1950 the North American Congress approved the 
credit concession of Spain. UN revoked its previous condemnatory resolution 
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against the participation of Spain in UN. Additionally the agreements that 
signed on September 26, 1953, with The United States, were not fruitful for 
Spain. They were neither agreements nor alliance: they were a few agreements 
(of defense and economic aid) that permit United States to use military bases in 
Torrejón, Saragossa, Moron and Rattan: in return Spain would receive 226 
million dollars (then rose up to 1.183 millions). But the agreement was 
excellent for Franco. Moreover he created a new model for Spanish foreign 
policy. He made agreements with Portugal, built special links and security 
agreements with America, created friendly relation with the Arabic countries.
64
  
On December 15, 1955 the General Assembly of the UN voted for the revenue 
of Spain in the organization. In December, 1959 U.S president Eisenhower 
visited Spain. In 1959 Franco's Spain was already a member of right wing of the 
international community. 
 
 
5.1.1.2. 1959-1975, Years of Consensus: 
  The last twenty-five years of regime were the time of the wealthy 
sustained economic development and general improvement in living 
standards.
65
 Undoubtedly, major changes in Franco regime occurred in this 
period. This era of Spanish history was marked with the political opening of the 
regime, the economic transformation of the country and better planification of 
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foreign policy. As always Franco was the key element of decision making 
process. He was the person who always controlled, decided and ordered the 
execution of foreign policy until almost the last days of his life.
66
 Until 1969 
foreign policy priorities of Spain built on the recognition and legitimization of 
Franco regime by great powers and participation of international organizations. 
The reason behind great all those efforts towards the integration were coming 
from the needs of international politics and economic preoccupations. Between 
1957 and 1969 Spain became member of 40 international organizations.67 
Actually momentum of this process started in 1958 when Spain became the 
member of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and in 1959 
in the European organization for Economic Cooperation (OECD). 
 The question of Gibraltar has always been an important issue in Spanish 
foreign policy and in 1957 becomes one of the cornerstones of Fernando 
Castiella’s action plan but until 1966 he could not achieve to open to talks with 
Britain. Sadly the first negotiations with Britain, was a real failure that resulted 
in the closure of the border with Gibraltar and cutting all kinds of supply and 
communications.68 In 1948, Spain did not want to recognize the State of Israel 
and supported the Arabs in the war against Israel.69 This attitude helped Spain to 
shine in Middle East. The first diplomatic tour of the regime to the Arab world 
realized in 1952, Spain consolidated its friendship with various cultural 
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cooperation and diplomatic agreements. By 1970 Spain started to sign important 
economic agreements especially Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Iraq. 
 In 1973, the regime had lasting economic and cultural ties with Arab 
world.70 Other complicated and halting point of Spanish foreign policy was 
Morocco and the situation de Ifni and Sahara providence. Until 1968 Ifni was a 
Spanish territory, in 1968 Spanish and Moroccan authorities started a series of 
conversations after they signed the Treaty of Fez on 4 January 1969 and Spain 
cedes Ifni to Morocco. The situation of Sahara and Sahara Occidental occupied 
important place in foreign policy, because this region had a great economic 
value and it was a center of big interest for Spanish economy. During the 
Franco regime the first most concrete solution regarding to Sahara situation   
was the liberation of Guinea on 12 October 1969 and the last treaty was the 
Declaration of Madrid which signed between Spain and Morocco and 
Mauritania on 14 November 1975. The treaty spread the Saharawi territory 
between these three states. The dead of General Franco was the biggest crisis of 
the Spanish foreign policy because it was the beginning of the huge changes 
inside the country. 
 
 
5.1.2. Normalization and Universalization of Spain’s Foreign 
Policy 
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 The dead of General Francisco Franco on 20 November 1975 influenced 
deeply Spain’s internal and external policy. This part of the dissertation 
attempts to clarify general outlook of Spanish foreign policy after the death of 
Franco until Zapatero government. 
 
 
5.1.2.1. Transition to democracy and Spanish Foreign Policy (1975-
1986) 
 Without any doubt transition to democracy can be described as the 
milestone of contemporary Spanish history. In world politics, encounter the 
peaceful transition from an authoritarian rule to wealthy democracy is a rare 
situation. Previous experiences like; overcoming a difficult economic crisis in 
parallel with political changes, overcoming the international isolation, inserting 
Spain in a complete and even privileged  international organizations and also 
the maturity of Spanish people, the consensus among different political actors 
and harmony of  traditions with values helped Spanish people to find common 
ground during the transition process. Above all social transformations 
throughout a rapid process of modernization transformed Spain as one of the 
advanced countries of the European continent and change the image of the 
country.  
 In the first place when we speak about transition in international politics 
it is equal to the change in every aspect of political life, and it affects the 
political structure of the state. In other words, when the autarkic structure of the 
decision making process changes it directly affects action plan of foreign 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
FOREIGN POLICY OF TURKEY AND SPAIN VERSUS MIDDLE EAST, AFTER 2002. TRANSITION 
TO DEMOCRACY AND NEW INTERNATIONAL AGENTS 
Gozde Demirel 
Dipòsit Legal: T 957-2014 
 
T r a n s i t i o n  t o  D e m o c r a c y  a n d  F o r e i g n  P o l i c y :  T h e  C a s e  
o f  S p a i n  a n d  T u r k e y  | 65 
 
 
policy. At the same time actors “internal” experiences are also shaped by the 
external situation.71  In this situation it is natural that surges the question of 
continuity in foreign policy and what will be the limits of change in foreign 
policy or does it exist democratic foreign policy? Indeed there will be some 
changes but continuity of foreign policy is also very important. In the case of 
the Spanish transition, new foreign policy and democratization are two 
inseparable dynamics, and the democratization is equal to the Europeanization 
and integration to the rest of the Western world.72  
 As it is known, the priority of Franco dictatorship was to maintain public 
order (at all costs), domestic tranquility and integrate his regime to international 
system. Admittedly before the death of Franco, Spain secured its place in 
international system and he also in his last days rebuilt the monarchy. The 
transition process started under the guidance of Juan Carlos. As Paul Preston 
describes very well “Juan Carlos was the prince born to bring Spain back to 
democracy and a democratic monarchy back to Spain.”73 His first big decision 
was to use his power and position to convince Arias Navaro to include the 
young Adolfo Suárez in his cabinet as Minister-Secretary of the Movimiento. 
During the transition, the king kept a relatively low profile and accepted that if 
the reforms planned by Torcuato Fernández Miranda and Suárez were to be 
successful. He made remarkable effort to make contact with members of the 
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opposition. Finally in 1978 the new democratic Constitution was being 
elaborated.74   
 During the transition process Spain face with several difficulties like 
military coup and terrorism. Between 1976 and 1980 ETA75 was the responsible 
for 70 percent of terrorist acts committed76. It was an extremely difficult 
terrorist situation and military attempted to make a coup d’état in 1981. In the 
same period Portugal and Greece were two other countries which were 
transforming its political structure. European Community has played a major 
role in promoting and generalizing this specific pattern of political values in 
three historically and geographically dissimilar southern European countries. 
Without doubt, when the transition to democracy happens, the internal politics 
took priority over foreign affairs. In the case of Spain the situation was quiet the 
same as in the definition. In this period Spain entered into NATO and started its 
relations with other states as a democratic state. First Spain and U.S. developed 
balanced relationship and Spain refuse to store American nuclear weapons and 
U.S decreased the number of personnel located in Zaragoza. The most 
important aim of Spanish foreign policy was to enter the Common Market, 
especially the Spanish public related the modernization as to be part of a 
European organizations. Initially France was putting obstacles in the way of 
Spain and it also did nothing to collaborate in the ﬁght against terrorism. The 
approval of constitution changed the line of Spanish foreign policy and 
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 See, ibid., p. 37-34. 
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 ETA: abbreviation of Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (“Basque Homeland and 
Liberty”), Basque separatist organization in Spain that used terrorism in its campaign for 
an independent Basque state.  
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 Tusell, Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy, 1939 to the Present, p. 286. 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
FOREIGN POLICY OF TURKEY AND SPAIN VERSUS MIDDLE EAST, AFTER 2002. TRANSITION 
TO DEMOCRACY AND NEW INTERNATIONAL AGENTS 
Gozde Demirel 
Dipòsit Legal: T 957-2014 
 
T r a n s i t i o n  t o  D e m o c r a c y  a n d  F o r e i g n  P o l i c y :  T h e  C a s e  
o f  S p a i n  a n d  T u r k e y  | 67 
 
 
facilitated the entrance to the international organizations. Finally in 1980 British 
government agreed to hold talks on all questions relating to Gibraltar. 
Regarding to Sahara question; Spain applied a kind of shuttle diplomacy or 
foreign policy zigzagged between the different countries of North Africa but at 
the end of 1977 it broke off relations with Algeria and in 1980 seemed instead 
to align itself more with Morocco. Also in 1977, Spain and the Soviet Union 
finally established diplomatic relations.77  
 Spain’s first attempt to apply for associate membership in the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1962 was rejected. As it stated in Birkelbach 
Report “only states that guarantee in their territories truly democratic practices 
and respect for fundamental rights and freedom” should be eligible for the 
union. After the report Spanish people noticed that only a fully democratic 
Spain would be accepted as a full member.78 As Angel Viñas indicated “The 
transition aimed at creating a fully-fledged, Western-type pluralistic democratic 
system.” 79 During the transition process, on 26 July 1977 Spanish Government 
presented the demand for membership of the EEC (now the European Union), 
eight years later, on June 12, 1985, with the signature of the Accession Treaty in 
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 See, Paredes, Historia Contemporánea De España (Siglo XX), Pereira, 
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Madrid, Spain started the integration process into the Economic Community on 
1 January 1986.80 
 
 
5.1.2.2. Spain in a Changing World: the Quest for International 
Influence (1986-2002) 
 Due to its geostrategic situation and its history, Spain had good relations 
with Mediterranean countries.  Spain was supporting Palestinian cause and 
when Iraq invaded Kuwait, Spain participated to the Gulf War with a frigate 
and two corvettes. This advantage was served for the interests of European 
Union. As a result in 1991 Madrid was chosen to host Madrid Peace Conference 
on Near East. It was a grand success of Spanish diplomacy. During the 
conference main issues were Arab -Israeli negotiations (1991) and participation 
in Gulf War (February 1991) which was discussed by the participation of 
various international actors.81  
 In 1992 some prestigious events were held in Spain - Barcelona Olympic 
Games, V Centenary of the Discovery of America, Seville World Expo- which 
enhanced the international importance of the country. At the same year Spain 
was elected as a non-permanent member of the Security Council of the United 
Nations and become the  ninth  largest  contributor  to  the  UN  in  economic  
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 See, Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores y de Cooperación, España y Union Europea, 
http://www.exteriores.gob.es/Portal/es/PoliticaExteriorCooperacion/UnionEuropea/Paginas
/EspUE.aspx, cited 12.September.2012 
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terms82. Spanish Forces participated UN missions in Namibia, Angola, Haiti, 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia. In 1993, during 
the war of Bosnia, Spain sent a contingent of Legionnaires to the former 
Yugoslavia and played a very important role in the foreign intervention in 
Yugoslavia. 
 The other significant achievement of Spanish diplomacy is Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). Spain helped to commit the European Union 
to a region-building project with the aim of ensuring the stability and economic 
prosperity of the Mediterranean.  Spanish initiative here continues to be 
recognized implicitly in the international practice of referring to the EMP 
alternatively as the ‘Barcelona Process’ by leading the Mediterranean countries 
and the European Union partners.83 Morocco, considered as a privileged partner 
of Spanish foreign politics and Spain was trying to mediate the problems 
regarding to Sahara region by supporting the referendum of the Saharan 
Republic and the problems related to the fishing in Moroccan waters. 
 Spain entered to the new millennium as a liability democratic and 
European country, as a member of the European Community (later European 
Union) since 1986. Spain was part of the hard core of European Union countries 
that January 1, 1999 joined the euro, the European single currency. Main 
determinants of Spanish foreign policy in this period can be summarized as; 
participation in humanitarian actions of NATO; finishing the integration process 
of European Union and elevating its position inside the Club; reinforcing the 
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 Richard Gillespie, "Between Ambition and Insecurity: Spanish Politics and the 
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relations with Mediterranean countries and being mediator between Nord and 
South of Mediterranean. 
 
 
5.2. The Case of Turkey: Main Principles of Turkey‘s Foreign 
Policy 
 Continuity, conservatism, caution, status-quo and westernization, 
protectionism, isolationism, autonomy, balance of power, passive, neutrality, 
reactive, bilateral… are some of the terminologies used to describe the 
fundamental principles of traditional84 Turkish foreign policy but only two 
principal concepts can  explain real dynamic of  this policy: Status Quo and 
Westernization. The purpose of this section is to briefly describe main 
principles of traditional Turkish foreign policy as well as the international 
environment that shaped the decision making process.  
 
 
5.2.1. Determinants of Traditional Turkish Foreign Policy 
 According to Alexander Murison the main origins of the traditional 
foreign policy of the Turkish Republic are “the historical experience of the 
Ottoman empire (the tradition of the balance of power); the nationalist Kemalist 
                                                          
84
 The term “traditional” refers Turkey’s foreign policy until the end of the Cold War 
throughout the whole dissertation. 
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revolution and creation of the republic itself (hence, isolationism); western 
orientation expressed in the policy of Europeanization and modernization; the 
suspicion of foreign powers and interests (the Sévres syndrome).” 85 Along the 
history all these components of traditional foreign policy were determined 
under the influence of the actual conjectural and structural factors.86 From the 
establishment of the Turkish until the end of the Cold War continuity was the 
main determinant of the foreign policy. In the post-Cold War era Turkey 
adapted its foreign policy to the changing international environment. 
 
 
5.2.2. Turkish Foreign Policy under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s 
Rule 
 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is the founder of Turkish Republic. With the 
help of excellent diplomacy that he followed, during the National Independence 
war, when the battle and international diplomacy were undertaken concurrently; 
during Lausanne treaty when Turkey gave a diplomatic test for its legitimacy; 
and from Lausanne till his death which corresponds the biggest changes in 
Turkish history, Turkey is a democratic and independent state.   
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5.2.2.1. Independence War (1919-1922) 
 At the end of the First World, on 31 October 1918, the armistice of 
Mudros was concluded between Admiral Calthorpe, commander of the British 
Black Sea squadron, and an Ottoman delegation under Hüseyin Rauf Bey, the 
Navy Minister. The armistice marked the end not only for Ottoman 
participation in the First World War but also the end of one of the long- lasting 
empires in history.87 From Ottoman perspective the armistice of Mudros had 
harsh terms. The Allies demanded that the Ottomans renounce Arab provinces. 
Moreover the 25 articles contained provisions such as the military 
occupation of the Straits, control by the Entente of all railway and telegraph 
lines, demobilization and disarmament  of  the  Ottoman  troops,  except  for  
small  contingents  needed  to keep  law  and  order.  The  most dangerous  
clause  from  the  Ottoman  point  of  view  was  article  seven, which stipulated 
that the Allies had the right to occupy any place in the Ottoman Empire itself if 
it considered its security to be under threat.88  
 Ottoman leaders did not protest against the armistice but the conditions 
created resistance movement (The National Movement) against the occupation 
of Anatolia. Atatürk was the leader of the resistance movement. He commenced 
the Independence War of Turkey against England, Greece, France Italy and 
Armenia on 19th May 1919 when he arrived in Samsun from Istanbul. The 
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principles of The National Movement were embodied in a National Pact89 
(misak-ı milli).The text of the pact were prepared and dictated by Ataturk to 
Anatolian deputies who were elected to the last Ottoman House of Deputies. 
National Pact can be accepted as the founding document of modern Turkey and 
Turkey’s foreign policy, in other words Ataturk’s foreign policy.90  
 The first action of Ataturk and the other leaders of National Movement 
were organized an irregular army after they established de facto government 
and opened Turkish Grand National Assembly (1923), soon after they started 
diplomatic relations with other states. The main objective of the National 
Movement is the recognition of new Turkish Assembly as a legitimate leader of 
Turkish people.  
 The collapse of the Ottoman Empire was a direct result of economic and 
political machinations of the Western powers, and loss of imperial status and 
world power is still a very painful and frustrating memory for the Turks.91 And 
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 Misak-ı Milli, or “National Pact,” declared that “the territories inhabited by an 
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top of that Ataturk and his friends obliged to fight against the England, Greece, 
France, Italy and Armenia for integrity of Turkey. 
Figure 1:  Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
 
Place and Date: Before the Battle of Dumplupınar, Afyon/ Kocatepe, 26/August/1922 
Source: www.milliyet.com.tr 
 
 Above all, when Istanbul government signed Treaty of Sévres92 on 10 
August 1920, the fragile relations between Istanbul and Ankara governments 
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Allied powers and representatives of the government of Ottoman Turkey. The treaty 
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was broken. Under the circumstances, Ataturk was trying to develop relations 
with United States and Soviet Socialist in order to wider the maneuver capacity 
of Turkish foreign policy. During the Independence War, Atatürk developed 
promising relations with Soviet Union which may be recognized as a perfect 
example of Ataturk’s politic intelligence and diplomacy practice.  Friendly 
relations with Russia guaranteed Turkey's continued security on its long eastern 
border and in the Black Sea. Russia was, moreover, trustable source of much 
needed manufactured goods and Turkey's default supplier of war material.93 
Meanwhile the Arab provinces would be formally partitioned between 
Britain and France at San Remo in Italy in April 1920.94 Kars and Ardahan, but 
not Batum, would stay in the Ottoman rump after a military campaign against 
Armenia the following year and as a result of a diplomatic understanding with 
Russia.95  There were three main problems with respect to a settlement in 
Anatolia: the Armenian question; the conflicting claims of Greece and Italy in 
the West; and the position of Istanbul and the Straits.96 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
and North Africa. The pact also provided for an independent Armenia, for an autonomous 
Kurdistan, and for a Greek presence in eastern Thrace and on the Anatolian west coast, as 
well as Greek control over the Aegean islands commanding the Dardanelles. Rejected by 
the new Turkish nationalist regime, the Treaty of Sèvres was replaced by the Treaty of 
Lausanne in 1923. 
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Map 2: The Treaty of Sevres 
 
Source:  Encyclopedia Britannica 
 
The battle of Sakarya was a turning-point of the Independence War. In 
August 1922, eleven months later the battle of Sakarya, Mustafa Kemal 
launched a general offensive against the Greek lines, forcing the Greek army to 
surrender on 2/3 September.97 The last British troops left Constantinople on 2 
October 1923. Four weeks later, on 29 October 1923, the Turkish Republic was 
formally established as the successor state to the Ottoman Empire, with İsmet 
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Inönü98 as its first prime minister.99 The war of national liberation had been 
won; now it as a question of reaching a consensus on the nature of the new state 
and the society.100 
 
 
5.2.2.2. Lausanne Conference  
 In July 1923 nearly five years after the Armistice of Mudros, the state of 
war which had existed in the Near East since 1914 was terminated by the 
signature of Lausanne Treaty101 between Turkey, on the other hand,  British 
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 İsmet İnönü, (born Sept. 24, 1884, Smyrna, Ottoman Empire—died Dec. 25, 1973, 
Ankara), Turkish army officer, statesman, and collaborator with and successor to Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk as president of the Turkish Republic. Appointed foreign minister in the 
government of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara in 1922, İsmet succeeded, with the 
support of Mustafa Kemal, in gaining most of the Turkish demands in the Treaty of 
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minister. He remained in power until 1937.On Atatürk’s death on Nov. 10, 1938, İnönü 
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Empire, Italy, France, Japan, Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia.102 In short the 
Turkish victory, replaced the Treaty of Sèvres with the Treaty of Lausanne. But 
the long term effects of Treaty of Sevres, generally known as ‘Sèvres-phobia’ or 
‘Sèvres Syndrome’, which can be explain by suspicions  about  European 
intentions  regarding  Turkey’s  integrity  and sovereignty,  continue  to  be  the 
touchstone of  decision making process of Turkish foreign policy.103 It should 
be mention that the Treaty of Sevres, together with the arguments and counter-
arguments about the killings of Armenians during the First World War by the 
Ottomans, formed a basis for subsequent Armenian claims on Turkish territory. 
Furthermore, perhaps the Treaty of Sevres gave inspiration to Kurdish 
nationalism and today Kurdish nationalists still refer to it as an international 
recognition of their aspirations for an independent Kurdish homeland. 104 
 The Lausanne Peace Conference historically marked the start point of 
modern Turkey’s future world relations and outlined general characteristics of 
Turkey’s contemporary foreign policy.105 During the negotiations the head of 
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Turkish delegation was İsmet İnönü as a Minister of Foreign Affairs.106 
Although he was an amateur diplomat107 without any previous experience in 
diplomacy, at the end of the conference Turkey obtained the international 
recognition of the demands expressed in the Turkish National Pact with few 
exceptions. Atatürk did not send any former Ottoman diplomats to Lausanne 
because he did not want that the Ottoman legacy influenced the negotiations. At 
almost every opportunity, İsmet İnönü, clearly mentioned to the conference that 
he was not the representative of the defeated Ottoman Empire, but of victorious 
Turkey, which was determined to negotiate peace on equal terms.108 
 Debates of the Lausanne peace treaty concentrated on: Mosul and Hatay 
question, the status of Stairs, religious and ethnic minorities, the capitulations 
and financial matters, immigration issue, exchange of population and border 
conflicts, and the status Cyrus and twelve Aegean islands.  
 Particularly Mosul question was one of the crucial points of the debates 
on the way to peace.109 One additional point to highlight is the effect of Wilson 
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principles in the awaking of nationalism in Turkey as well as other countries. In 
other words “right of self-determination” has produced positive results in the 
creation of National Pact and the idea of “Turkey for Turks”.110 To this respect 
Turkey included Mosul in National Pact, and claimed that the ‘Mosul  Vilayet' 
bounded to Turkey on ethnic, political, economic, historical, and geographic 
grounds. Also the size of the community of Turkish-speakers known as 
Turkmen—sometimes referred to as “Turcomans”—was the subject of 
negotiations. The question of the Mosul did not conclude at Lausanne. On 6 
August 1924 Britain approached the League of Nations and asked that the 
Mosul Question be shelved in its political agenda.111 The general conclusion 
reaches by the Commission is that the Mosul region is to be made an integral 
part of Iraq, there can be no question of putting an end to the mandatory status 
in four years.112 As a consequence The Treaty of Lausanne thus resulted in the 
former Kurdish subjects of the Ottoman Empire becoming minorities in what 
were to become three nation states: namely Turkey, Syria and Iraq.113  
 Other problematic issue was the capitulations. Capitulations are the 
juridical and fiscal privileges granted to foreigners, especially to France, by the 
Ottoman sultans. In its last years, Ottoman Empire had lost its independence, to 
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a large extent because of foreign intervention, and the Capitulations. The main 
concern of Atatürk's foreign policy was recognition of the Turkish national 
rights and acquiring complete sovereignty of Turkey.114 For this reason Ankara 
government was very sensitive about infringements upon their sovereignty115 
and insisted on “the complete abolition of the capitulation in Turkey from every 
point of view”116. The other important and fervent issue discussed during the 
negotiations was the immigration or the exchange of population between 
Greece and Turkey and the border conflicts. The transition from the Ottoman 
Empire to the Turkish Republic was not an easy process. It should be noted that 
the changes within the country helped the process of international recognition of 
modern Turkish Republic.  Especially abolition of sultanate, caliphate and 
millet system signalizes modern Turkey’s Western inclination. Moreover, civil 
code regulations, the protection of religious- ethnic minorities by law, women 
rights and secularization process via law created positive image of Turkey. 
At the end of the conference Turkey achieved to abolish all sorts of 
capitulations. The treaty of Lausanne leaves Turkey in complete control form 
the Aegean Sea to the Black Sea and the full control of Stairs.117 And Turkey 
solved the border conflicts with Greece. But, at the same time Turkey had to 
leave the Mosul to Britain, Cyprus and twelve Islands to Greece and Italy. 
When we compare Sévres Treaty with Lausanne Treaty , Lausanne can be 
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accepted as diplomatic victory of Turkey’s foreign policy because; Turkey 
obtained most of its demands defined in the National Pact, reinforced its place 
in Western world and accepted as a sovereign state not only economically but 
also politically.  
 
 
 5.2.2.3. Early Republican Years 
 After signature of Lausanne Treaty, Turkey entered the era of 
Westernization and Secularization. Ataturk principally built the foreign policy 
of modern Turkey based on western values.  Modernization, in other words 
imitation of Western culture, as in the Turkish interpretation “Westernization”, 
became the main rhetoric of new republic. In this period Turkey was ignoring 
its eastern neighbors and the main focus was to develop good relations with 
Western countries. From this point of view the most important event, in the 
field of foreign policy was Turkey’s entrance to League of Nations. As a result 
of the membership, Turkey shifted to the West, adopted western-oriented 
policies and introduced liberal and internationalist elements into foreign 
policy.118 The main purpose of the decision making process was to follow a 
peaceful foreign policy principle that based on status-quo principle.119 Turkey 
pursues a foreign policy guided by the principle of “Peace at Home, Peace in 
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the World” as set out by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.120 If randomly we ask any 
Turkish citizen, what is the basic principle of Turkish foreign policy: the answer 
will be “Peace at Home, Peace in the World”. The exact traslation of this motto 
into international relations language is status-quo principle and anti-
revisionism.121 It should be noted that before to die Ataturk also secured the 
eastern borders with Sadabad Pact. Non-aggression treaty called Sadabad Pact 
signed among newly established states of the region, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and 
Afghanistan.122 Also the remaining problems from Lausanne on Straits solved 
with Montreux agreement and Turkey gained a more advantageous position.123   
 The Spanish Civil War began virtually at the same time as the signing of 
the Montreux Convention on July 20, 1936, permitting Turkey to militarize the 
straits. As the safeguard of the straits, Turkey occupied a vital strategic position 
on the supply line from the Soviet Union to Spain.124 During the Spanish Civil 
war Italy and Germany was supporting Franco but England and France was 
trying not to intervene in the conflict. Feroz Ahmad explains very well the 
situation of Turkey:  
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“Hitler and Mussolini were doing on Franco’s behalf and Stalin on behalf 
of the Spanish republic. It continued to support collective security, 
especially when the Italian threat came closer to home with the sinking of 
a Spanish ship in Turkish waters in August 1937. The Mediterranean states 
responded by convening the Nyon conference in September and 
denouncing “Italian piracy.” The Turkish delegation, acting on Atatürk’s 
instructions, went so far as to permit British and French ships to use 
Turkish naval bases to prevent Italian aggression. Prime Minister İnönü 
opposed this policy on the grounds that Italy would and it provocative”125 
 
On the other hand, it should be mention that especially Europe was on the verge 
of Second World War, and with the Lausanne treaty Turkey became neighbor 
with France through Syrian mandate; Italy through twelve Islands; Britain 
through Irakian mandate and Cyprus; and Greece. It was the time to be cautious 
because Turkey was aware of the fact that the country was no longer the world 
power which Ottoman Empire had once been.  
 
 
5.3.2. Second World War and Turkey  
 Five European states, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, Republic of Ireland, 
Portugal and Turkey managed to preserve neutrality and independence during 
the Second World War. Among them, Turkey might be accepted as an example 
of how the governments of small and military weak states can resist the strong 
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pressure of great powers even in the time of crisis.126 The reason of preserving 
neutrality can be explain by the natural outcome of Turkey’s experience since 
1914 and country’s relative power and international position.127 For example, at 
the beginning of the WWII especially Hitler was supporting the neutrality of 
Turkey because it was important that Turkey should remain neutral and the 
Straits closed against the fleets of the Western powers.128 Turkey’s wartime 
diplomacy was a tightrope act. During the WWII Turkey signed the Treaty of 
Mutual Assistance with Great Britain and Friendship and Non-Aggression Pact 
with Germany. In a nutshell Turkey was trying to keep a balance among 
European states, even when Russia signed a friendship treaty with Germany.129 
This policy of preserving neutrality and territorial integrity consisted of a set of 
realistically and understood possibilities, limitations, advantages and handicaps 
which constantly guided the Turkish decision makers.130  
 After Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, second president of the state was İsmet 
İnönü, among other features he was Ataturk’s closest friend and successor of 
Kemalist doctrines.  It should be mentioned that in the years of conflict or in 
time of peace “Sévres Syndrome” occupied an important place in the making of 
Turkey’s foreign policy. It means that Turkish foreign policy makers erect the 
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foreign policy on the idea that Turkey surrounded by enemies. As a natural 
result of this conception the Turkish Armed Forces had power to directly 
influence the making of Turkish foreign policy. The influence of Turkish 
Armed Forces continued until the neutralization of army by the democratization 
reform made by AKP. That is the reason why Turkish Commander in-Chief, 
Marshal Çakmak, was nearly equal to İsmet İnönü in the formation of foreign 
policy and in questions of national defense.131  
 During WWII Turkey was in the process of Westernization that 
initialized after Lausanne conference. At the same time İsmet İnönü was to 
arrive at a security pact with the Soviet Union that would not be incompatible 
with Turkey’s engagements toward the West.132 After Germany declared war 
against the Soviet Union, Turkey found itself in a complicated situation. Russia 
and England was repressing   Turkey to declare war against the Japan and 
Germany. But during the final phase of war preoccupations of Turkey was 
basically concentrated on the post-war political order 133 and froze the 
diplomatic relations with Berlin and Tokyo in order to guarantee its place in 
Western block in post-war era. 
   As William Hale point out “while Turkish diplomacy may have been 
successful in keeping Turkey out of the war, it can be also argued that it ended 
with one significant failure, since it left the Soviet Union in a dominant position 
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in south Eastern Europe.”134 On 18 July 1945, just after WWII, the Cold War 
began. 
 
 
5.3.3. Turkey, the Cold War and Transition to Democracy  
 After the WWII the concept of threat shifted from Germany to Soviet 
Union. Same as before, during the Cold War maintaining national security and 
territorial integrity remained as Turkey’s foremost foreign policy.135 On the 
other hand, admittedly, in a bipolar world “balance and neutrality” was difficult 
polices to follow. Cold War became the scene of East-West strategic 
competition and Turkey geopolitically situated on the line of conflict between 
the zones of two military superpowers and their respective alliances.136 
Moreover, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, theocratic regime in Iran and Iran-
Irak War made Turkey to fell threaten. Additionally Turkish-Soviet relations 
after the WWII showed that Soviet demands and pressure on Turkey was 
forcing Ankara to seek Western support and to become an active participant in 
the Cold War along with Western Block.137  Adnan Menders138 was aware of the 
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fact that Turkey urgently needed to develop its economy and modernize the 
society. As a result of the realpolitik, Turkey approached to the U.S.A and 
developed the relations to the large extent which originally took foreign aid 
extended under the Truman Doctrine139 and Marshall Plan, eventually results in 
Turkey’s membership (together with Greece) in NATO in 1952.140 In this 
respect, Turkey became the member of IMF and adjusts its system newly 
evolving order; it means that Turkey had to pay more attention to the instruction 
of IMF and other institutions in determining economic policy.141  This situation 
made Turkey more dependent to its western allies. As Tarık Oğuzlu explains 
that it was somehow normal to view Turkey as a Western/European country 
during the Cold War era, when Turkey assisted the West in its efforts to contain 
and defeat the Soviet threat.”142 During the Cold War, Turkey belonged to the 
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'Western security community.' Thus the illusion of seen Turkish identity as part 
of Europe in that period centered on the issue of security.143  
 Also internal dynamics was affecting the decision making process. As I 
mentioned earlier Turkish Armed Forces had power to influence the internal 
and external politics of Turkey. They were and still ‘they are’ the guardians of 
Kemalist Regime and Westernization process of Modern Turkey. On 27 May 
1960 a group of “young officers” from Turkish Armed Forces who feared that 
democratically elected government of modern Turkey threatened the principles 
of the secular progressive Kemalist state, they realized coup-état, deposed the 
government and Adnan Menderes was arrested along with the leading party 
members. After coup-état Adnan Menderes along with Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and 
Hasan Polatkan was hanged by military junta. Under these circumstances U.S.A 
preferred to stay quite under the fear that military junta can approach the Soviet 
Union. 
 Turkey’s alliance with the West was nearly unproblematic until the 
Cyprus issue.144 Notably, this conflict caused serious problems between United 
Sates and Turkey and obliged Turkey to revise its relations with Western block. 
Conventionally, Turkey's policy towards the Middle East in the 1950s is 
described as pro-Western in general and pro-American in particular.145 The 
main development in this region was the signature of ‘pro-western’ Baghdad 
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Pact between Turkey, Iraq, Great Britain, Pakistan and Iran. The aim of the pact 
was to prevent communist incursion in the Middle East.146 In addition, Turkey 
lacked a clear new vision and a strategy to cope with the end of the Cold War, 
which necessitated changes in the traditional foreign policy-making.147 
However, when the Cold War came to an end and Turkey’s European partners 
within NATO adopted a Europe-limited strategic outlook, the credentials of 
Turkey’s Western/European identity became diluted.  
 
 
5.3.4. Post-cold War era 
 The post-Cold war period, starts with the collapse of Berlin Wall in 1989 
and the process continues until the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991. 
Undoubtedly this drastic change affected all the spheres of world politics and 
caused a structural shift in international system. In this new world order, Soviet 
Union was not a threat anymore and the bipolar system of Cold War replaced 
by the hegemony of U.S.A.  
 Turkey perhaps the country that has witnessed the most drastic 
transformations around its borders: change of regimes, dissolution of defense 
alliances and ending of ideological confrontations has affected the whole 
                                                          
146
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geopolitical landscape.148 In addition no other Western state has been as much 
affected by the parameter changes in the international system as Turkey.149 
 Firstly, it should be mention that Turkish democracy again interrupted 
with the coup-état of 12 September 1980. Almost ten years after the coup-état 
“Republic of Turkey had experienced dramatic shifts and transformations in its 
political structure, economic system, social strata, cultural patterns, religious 
expressionism, and foreign policy.”150 Turgut Özal151 played a crucial role 
during the transformation period.  
 Turkish policy makers thought that in the new conjuncture the 
importance and the role of Turkey might decrease, but outbreak of Gulf War 
changed the parameters. During the war period the main idea was that Turkey 
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return to strategic forefront.152 The 1990 Gulf crisis was of pivotal importance 
as far as Turkish foreign relations in the post-Cold war era were concerned. 
This was for two reasons, first, it marks the end of the conventional wisdom that 
Turkey need to be an actor in the Middle East subsystem, either as function of 
the Kemalist disdain for the region or as part of the post-Baghdad Pact 
Trauma.153 There has been instability in Turkey’s policy towards the Middle 
East since the establishment of the republic.154 It should be admitted that in 
1990s Turkey went through a process of adaptation to the regional and global 
changes that had fundamentally affected its international setting.155 Especially 
the decisions of President Turgut Özal and the government to allow the United 
States to use its bases in Turkey provoked domestic criticisms in Turkey. It was 
argued that president Özal was changing Turkey's traditional policy in the 
region and pulling Turkey into a dangerous adventure.156 
 On the other hand the dissolution of Soviet Union presented new 
opportunities in the other sensitive regions namely Central Asia and the 
                                                          
152
 Nasuh Uslu, Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period (Nova Science 
Publishers, 2004), p. 4. 
153
 Raymond  Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, The Foreign Policies of 
Middle East States (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p. 141. 
154
 Mesut Özcan, Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the Eu and the Middle East 
(Ashgate, 2008), p.107. 
155
 Mustafa  Aydın, "Between Euphoria and Realpolitik: Turkish Policy toward 
Central Asia and Caucasus," in Turkey's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A Changing 
Role in World Politics, ed. Tareq Ismael and Mustafa Aydın (Ashgate, 2003), p. 140. 
156
 Meliha Benli Altunışık, "The Turkish‐Israeli Rapprochement in the Post‐Cold War 
Era," Middle Eastern Studies 36, no. 2 (2000): p. 173. 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
FOREIGN POLICY OF TURKEY AND SPAIN VERSUS MIDDLE EAST, AFTER 2002. TRANSITION 
TO DEMOCRACY AND NEW INTERNATIONAL AGENTS 
Gozde Demirel 
Dipòsit Legal: T 957-2014 
 
T r a n s i t i o n  t o  D e m o c r a c y  a n d  F o r e i g n  P o l i c y :  T h e  C a s e  
o f  S p a i n  a n d  T u r k e y  | 93 
 
 
Caucasus.157 Turkey became a role model for newly independent Central Asia 
and Caucasus states and played a dynamic role in connecting them to the rest of 
the world and helps them in request for identity.158 The February and August 
1996 military agreements and the February 1997 intelligence cooperation 
agreements between Turkey and Israel, as well as the August and December 
trade and customs agreements, cast further doubt on Damascus' willingness to 
meet some of Ankara's demands with regard to the PKK. Indeed, the tightening 
of the pincers on Syria by Turkey, Israel and the United States suggests that 
conflict rather than rapprochement between the two countries may well be in 
the offing.159 
 
6. Conclusion 
 As it was mentioned in the introduction of the chapter, this part of the 
thesis analyzes the general framework of Turkey’s and Spain’s foreign policy in 
the period of transition and consolidation of their democracies from historical 
perspective. The purpose is to find the similarities and the difference between 
two countries and observes the effects of this transition to foreign policy 
decision making process.  
                                                          
157
 Shireen Hunter, "Bridge or Frontier? Turkey's Post‐Cold War Geopolitical 
Posture," The International Spectator 34, no. 1 (1999): p. 69. 
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 Aydın, "Between Euphoria and Realpolitik: Turkish Policy toward Central Asia 
and Caucasus," p. 141. 
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 Robert Olson, "Turkey- Syria Relations since the Gulf War:Kurds and Water," 
Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 19, no. 1 (1995): p. 191. 
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 First of all, it should be mention that in both cases, the transition to 
democracy was a movement dominated by soldiers and men in public service; it 
can be say that it was a movement with official and authoritarian character.  The 
Turkish revolution and as well Spanish transition to democracy was not a 
grassroot movement, it was an elitist movement imposed from above by official 
and intellectual cadres. The different point is Spain finished its transition in 
short period of time but Turkey still is in the midst of its transition.  
 The other point to mention is the search for the international recognition 
during the construction of their democracies. The overwhelming majority of 
Spaniards and Turkish were convinced that the entry into the economic and 
political structure of Western Europe was essential for the future of their 
countries. Turkey’s ambition to ally with Western world forced the country kept 
low profile in the Middle East introducing the non-interference to inter-Arab 
relations. 
  Until 2002 four foreign policy principles dominated Turkey’s agenda. 
Primarily, external recognition of Turkish Republic, afterwards remain outside 
of WWII, keep territorial integrity of Turkish Republic particularly along the 
Cold War and post-cold war era,  finally integration to E.U. Today, Turkey is 
the unique pending candidate of the EU with a predominant Muslim population 
and Spain supports the full membership of Turkey. 
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1. Introduction 
 The principal idea of the chapter is to appropriately explain the general 
characteristic of current Turkish foreign policy concepts while focusing on the 
political transformation of AKP from political Islam to conservative democracy. 
The chapter analyzes the evolution of Islamism in Turkey through a historical 
perspective, from late Ottoman times to National Vision movement including 
the birth and development period of AKP. The main purpose of the chapter is to 
visualize “new” concepts in Turkish foreign policy decision making process 
during its government periods in 2002-2013. 
 The first section of the chapter aims to analyze the historical roots of 
AKP from late Ottoman times to National Outlook Movement including the 
separation of AKP from National Outlook movement. The second part 
examines the ideological transformation of AKP from political Islam to 
conservative democracy. Lastly, third and final section explores the 
conceptualization of “new” and emerging concepts in Turkish foreign policy 
with an accent on Davutoğlu effect in Turkish foreign policy. The 
conceptualization is based on Davutoğlu’s speeches, his famous book “Strategic 
Depth”, his academic articles and official statements along with election 
manifestos and party program. I made a custom classification during the study. 
The “new” concepts are defining independent to their academic uses. They 
defined as usage of the Turkish foreign policy makers. 
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2. Historical Roots of AKP  
 As Yalçın Akdoğan160 argues, in order to understand the AKP, its 
development and its political identity, concepts such as Islamism and political 
Islam must be discussed. 
 
 
2.1. Politicization of Islam in Modern Turkey 
 The nature of relationship between Islam and politics in modern Turkey 
cannot be understood properly without considering pan-Islamist ideology161. In 
history of Islam, there was a wide range of pan-Islamic ideologies,162 from the 
Ottoman official version to the more radical teachings of the redoubtable Jamal 
aI-DIn aI-Afghani (1839-97)163, the apostle of the Islamic reaction against the 
                                                          
160
 Yalçın Akdoğan : is the author of the book named “Muhafazakar Demokrasi” 
(Conservative Democracy) which is accepted as a legitimization of AKP’s identity. Also 
he is a political scientist and vice president adviser. 
161
 For more information on development of modern Turkey see, Bernard Lewis, The 
Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford University Press, 2002).  
162
 For more information on Pan Islamism see, Valentine Chirol, Pan-Islamism 
(BiblioBazaar, 2009), Dwight E. Lee, "The Origins of Pan-Islamism," The American 
Historical Review 47, no. 2 (1942). 
163
 Jamal  aI-DIn  aI-Afghani : in full Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī al-Sayyid 
Muḥammad ibn Ṣafdar al-Ḥusayn    (born 1838, Asadābād, Persia [now Iran]—died March 
9, 1897, Istanbul), Muslim politician, political agitator, and journalist whose belief in the 
potency of a revived Islamic civilization in the face of European domination significantly 
influenced the development of Muslim thought in the 19th and early 20th centuries. "Jamāl 
al-Dīn al-Afghānī in Encyclopædia Britannica Online (Source: http://www.britannica.com,  
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West.164 The focus in here is to explain pan-Islamism of Ottoman Empire which 
effects today’s Turkey. Pan Islamism was ideological tool to be used for the 
salvation of Ottoman Empire in the wake of Berlin Congress.165 The word Pan-
Islamism in its various forms is apparently of European coinage and was 
probably adopted in imitation of Pan-Slavism, which had become current in the 
I870's.166 In effect, it was an antidote to European Pan Movements based on 
ethnic, nationalist or radical consideration. The objective of the Sultan 
Abdülhamid II (1876–1909)167 who adopted the ideology of Pan-Islamism after 
                                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/299778/Jamal-al-Din-al-Afghani,accessed 13. 
April. 2013) 
164
 Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 342. 
165
 Congress of Berlin, (June 13-July 13, 1878), diplomatic meeting of the major 
European powers at which the Treaty of Berlin replaced the Treaty of San Stefano, which 
had been signed by Russia and Turkey (March 3, 1878) at the conclusion of the Russo-
Turkish War of1877–78.  Officially convoked by the Austrian foreign minister, Count 
Gyula Andrassy, the congress met in Berlin on June 13. The congress solved an 
international crisis caused by the San Stefano treaty by revising the peace settlement to 
satisfy the interests of Great Britain (by denying Russia the means to extend its naval 
power and by maintaining the Ottoman Empire as a European power) and to satisfy the 
interests of Austria-Hungary (by allowing it to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
thereby increase its influence in the Balkans). In acting so, however, the congress left 
Russia humiliated by substantially reducing the gains that it had made under the San 
Stefano treaty. Furthermore, the congress failed to consider adequately the aspirations of 
the Balkan peoples themselves and, thereby, laid the foundation for future crises in the 
Balkans"Congress of Berlin," in Encyclopædia Britannica Online (source 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/62090/Congress-of-Berlin, accessed 15.April, 
2013). 
166
 Lee, "The Origins of Pan-Islamism," p. 280. 
167
 Abdülhamid II (1876–1909) concentrated government investments and reforms in 
the predominantly Muslim parts of the empire. He emphasized Islam as a basis of internal 
social and political stability and solidarity, further stressing his authority not merely as 
sultan but also as caliph in a bid to simultaneously neutralize opposition  from  the varied 
Muslim ethnicities within his dominions and to mobilize support, when  needed,  among 
Muslims beyond his borders. Although he afﬁrmed the principle of legal equality for 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
FOREIGN POLICY OF TURKEY AND SPAIN VERSUS MIDDLE EAST, AFTER 2002. TRANSITION 
TO DEMOCRACY AND NEW INTERNATIONAL AGENTS 
Gozde Demirel 
Dipòsit Legal: T 957-2014 
 
A K P  a n d  “ N e w ”  C o n c e p t s  i n  T u r k i s h  F o r e i g n  P o l i c y  | 100 
 
 
1878168  was to achieve unity among Ottoman Muslims, and to repress the 
liberals, nationalists, reformers, and other opponents of his autocratic power.169 
Sultan Abdülhamid II seized on the Islamist reaction to Western imperialism in 
an effort to strengthen the empire by unifying Ottoman Muslims under the 
umbrella of Islam170. Oxford dictionary of Islamic Studies describes Pan-
Islamism as follows: 
Ideology calling for sociopolitical solidarity among all Muslims. Has 
existed as a religious concept since the early days of Islam. Emerged as a 
modern political ideology in the 1860s and 1870s at the height of 
European colonialism, when Turkish intellectuals began discussing and 
writing about it as a way to save the Ottoman Empire from fragmentation. 
Became the favored state policy during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II 
(r. 1876 – 1909 ) and was adopted and promoted by members of the ruling 
bureaucratic and intellectual elites of the empire. With the rise of 
colonialism, became a defensive ideology, directed against European 
political, military, economic, and missionary penetration. Posed the sultan 
as a universal caliph to whom Muslims everywhere owed allegiance and 
obedience. Sought to offset military and economic weakness in the 
Muslim world by favoring central government over the periphery and 
Muslims over non-Muslims in education, office, and economic 
opportunities. Ultimately failed and collapsed after the defeat and 
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. Resurrected 
during the resurgence of Islam after World War II. Expressed via 
organizations such as the Muslim World League and the Organization of 
                                                                                                                                                                 
minority religions, he felt that Muslims were the only truly loyal Ottoman subjects. For 
this reason, pan-Islamists like Afghani regarded  Abdulhamid as a symbol of Islamic 
solidarity and cohesion.(source: Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World: A - L,  
(Macmillan, 2004), p. 341.) 
168
 Kemal Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, 
and Community in the Late Ottoman State (Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 20. 
169
 Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 342.  
170
 Banu Eligür, The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey (Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), p. 40.  
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the Islamic Conference, which seek to coordinate Islamic solidarity 
through political and economic cooperation internationally. Has also 
served as an important political tool in recruiting all-Muslim support 
against foreign aggressions171. 
 In large measure, Abdülhamid's so-called Pan Islamism was religio-
political ideology, an ideology of self-defense that has left a permanent mark on 
Turkish society and the Muslim world as a whole. He made it clear that in 
making such representations he was acting  as caliph—that is, as the religious 
spokesman of the Muslims in the world—but not as their political leader, 
knowing full well that such representation won him political credit among 
Muslims.172 The movement of Abdülhamid II was pan-Islamic, pro-Ottoman 
and anti-imperialist173. At the same time Abdülhamid was the main force behind 
the Ottoman modernization, also as caliph, its legitimizer and the architect of its 
Islamization174, he prepared ground for the rise of modern Turkey. He began to 
institute western style education throughout the Empire, and significant inroads 
were made in educational and bureaucratic modernization175. In his rein 
                                                          
171
 Pan Islamism, Oxford dictionary of Islamic Studies.( Source: 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1819, accesed 18.April.2013) 
172
 Kemal Karpat, Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles 
and Essays (Brill Academic Pub, 2002), p. 508. 
173
 Peter R. Demant, Islam Vs. Islamism: The Dilemma of the Muslim World (Prager 
Fredericka, 2006), p. 49.  
174
 The Term  Pan-Islam and Islamization used in the same meaning in the K.Karpats 
writing , contrary Serif Mardin uses  the term of islamization as the union force of 
Independence War, See  Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, 
Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State.; Şerif   Mardin, "İslamcılık," in 
Tanzimat‘tan  Cumhuriyete  Türkiye  Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1958), p. 
1400.  
175
 Şükrü Hanioğlu, The Young Turks in Opposition (Oxford University Press, USA, 
1995), p. 25. 
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Ottoman Empire underwent continuous, western oriented economic, social, 
cultural and administrative changes. But Abdülhamid II’s objectionable Pan 
Islamism with his liberal, cultural, and benevolent Pan Islamism bore no fruit176. 
 The theoreticians of the Young Turk177 period first assigned an important 
role to Islam, as a factor of national cohesion which might prevent the 
decomposition of the empire. But having come to the conclusion that the idea of 
an Islamic community (“ümmet” in Turkish, “ummah” in Arabic) was in 
contradiction to that of a nation (“millet” in Turkish), they proceeded to 
criticize Islamism severely and demote religion to the status of a simple cultural 
factor in the national identity mixture178. Paradoxically Abdülhamid never made 
use of the call to jihad except in the war with Greece in 1897.179  
 Right after disastrous 1912–1913 Balkan War, by 1914 the most 
dominant ideology in the Empire was Pan Turkism180. Yusuf Akçura (1876–
                                                          
176
 Şükrü Hanioğlu, Preparation for a Revolution : The Young Turks, 1902-1908 
(Oxford University Press, USA, 2001), p. 127.  
177
 Young Turks: Turkish Jöntürkler, coalition of various reform groups that led a 
revolutionary movement against the authoritarian regime of Ottoman sultan Abdülhamid 
II, which culminated in the establishment of a constitutional government. After their rise to 
power, the Young Turks introduced programs that promoted the modernization of the 
Ottoman Empire and a new spirit of Turkish nationalism. Their handling of foreign affairs, 
however, resulted in the dissolution of the Ottoman state. "Young Turks," in Encyclopædia 
Britannica Online.(source: http://www.britannica.com/EBcheck ed/topic/654123/Young-
Turks,  accessed August. 14.2013). 
178
 Paul  Dumont, "The Origins of Kemalist Ideology," in Atatürk and the 
Modernization of Turkey, ed. J.M. Landau (Westview Press, 1984), p. 30.  
179
 H. Kemal Karpat, “The” Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, 
Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State (Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 
2001), p. 257. 
180
 Yelda  Demirağ, "Pan-Ideologies in the Ottoman Empire against the West: From 
Pan-Ottomanism to Pan-Turkism," The Turkish Yearbook 36 (2005 p. 154. 
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1939)181, ideologue of Turkish nationalism explained in his famous book “Three 
Kinds of Policy”  (“Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset”) the reason why  Pan-Ottomanism, 
Panislamism did not function and Pan Turkism will be the best choice and 
salvation of Ottoman empire would be “to pursue a Turkish nationalism based 
on race.”182. By 1900 Abdülhamid's brand of religious Islamism was being 
overtaken by a new secular Islamic nationalism where religion became just one 
source of cultural identity, though a major one a militant nationalism aimed at 
liberating the Muslims from foreign rule. That liberation finally came, 
beginning with Turkey in 1919-1922183. Mustafa Kemal the leader of Turkish 
War of Independence noted in October 1919 'National Pact' the borders of 
Anatolia. He said that: 
“It is not the line which has been drawn according to military considerations. 
It is national (milli
184
) border. With this border there is only one nation which 
is representative of Islam. Within this border, there are Turks, Circassians and 
other Islamic elements. Thus this Border is a national boundary of all those 
who live together totally blended and are all intents and purpose made up of 
fraternal communities (milletler).”185 
 One of the main strategies of Mustafa Kemal, during Turkish War of 
Independence was his pro-Islamist rhetoric. For example, the opening of 
                                                          
181
 For more information on Yusuf Akçura see Lewis, The Emergence of Modern 
Turkey, p. 326. 
182
 See, Yusuf Akçura, Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset (Türk Tarih Kurumu Basım Evi, 1976). 
183
 Karpat, Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and 
Essays, p. 511.  
184
 A world ought to be said about the Ottoman-Turkish terms millet, milli and 
milliyetçi, terms that are rendered into English as 'nation', 'national', 'nationalist'. But 
during the independence war of liberation and after, the terms were intended to be more 
patriotic than nationalist, inclusive rather than exclusive. See Feroz Ahmad, Turkey: The 
Quest for Identity (Oneworld Publications, 2003), p. 80.  
185
 Ahmad, Turkey: The Quest for Identity, p. 80. 
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National Assembly was a remarkable Islamic demonstration and the main duties 
of National Assembly marked as the independence of fatherland and salvation 
of caliph and sultanate agencies186.  
 During the independence war Pan Islamism of Abdulhamid shifted to 
Islamism or Islam as a common cultural base to mobilize Anatolian people 
against the occupation and suddenly became part of the Turkish internal 
politics187.During the war Islamists, secularists, and nationalist in sum all 
Anatolia who believed in Atatürk fought together for the independence of their 
lands and they achieved. The treaty of Lausanne started on 20 November 1922 
and signed on 24 July 1923. The chief significance of Lausanne Treaty for 
Turkey was the re-establishment of complete and undivided Turkish 
sovereignty in almost all the territory included in the present-day Turkish 
Republic188. Contiguously the Republic was proclaimed on 29 October 1923, 
one year after the abolition of the sultanate on 1 November 1922. With this, the 
earlier subjects of the Ottoman Empire became equal and free citizens of the 
Turkish Republic, regardless of their religion.189 Turkish citizenship depended 
                                                          
186
 Akyol, Ama Hangi Atatürk, p. 137-38. 
187
 During the War of Independence, men of religion in Anatolia played a role of 
mediator between the secularists and the religious people of Anatolia. Mufti of Ankara, 
Börekçizade Mehmed Rifat Efendi, issued fetva (religious opinion), endorsed by 152 other 
Muftis in Anatolia, declaring that fetva issued under foreign duress was invalid, and calling 
on the Muslims to 'liberate their  Caliph from  captivity'. See Lewis, The Emergence of 
Modern Turkey, 252.; Ergün Özbudun, "The  Nature of  the Kemalist Political Regime," in 
Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State, ed. Ergun Özbudun and Ali Kazancıgil (Hamden: 
Archon  Books, 1981), p. 83. 
188
 Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 254. 
189
 Umut  Azak, Islam and Secularism in Turkey: Kemalism, Religion and the Nation 
State (I. B. Tauris, 2010), p. 9. 
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on residence (not birth) within the borders of emerging state defined by 
National Pact.190 
 Especially after the proclamation of Republic, Atatürk and his friends 
started series of reforms to modernize Turkish society. It should be noted that 
modernization and nation building process of Turkish society based on western 
values. Because of this, even today Turkish people still thinks that 
modernization is westernization and to be modern is seen by many Turks as 
membership in the EU. In short, Atatürk’s reforms (1923–38) aimed to bring 
Western culture to the Islamic society. At first hand Atatürk established 
People’s Party based on populist principles in September 1923. The party has 
generally been described as having been born out of an alliance between the 
central, military-bureaucratic-intellectual elite and local notables.191 Populism 
republicanism, nationalism, secularism, étatism and reformism declared as main 
principles of Republican People’s Party by the Third Party Congress in 1931, 
and were symbolized by the six arrows in Party emblem.192 The main reforms 
realized by RPP during Kemal revolution of modern Turkey were as follows: 
 Abolition of sultanate and its agencies and Sharia193 courts in 1924. 
Ankara government established Ministry of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri 
                                                          
190
 Ahmad, Turkey: The Quest for Identity, p. 81. 
191
 Ergün Özbudun, "The  Nature of  the Kemalist Political Regime," in Atatürk: 
Founder of a Modern State, ed. Ergun Özbudun and Ali Kazancıgil (Hamden: Archon  
Books, 1981), p. 82. 
192
 Ibid., p. 89. 
193
 Sharīʿah: also spelled Sharia, the fundamental religious concept of Islam, namely 
its law, systematized during the 2nd and 3rd centuries of the Muslim era (8th–9th 
centuries CE).Total and unqualified submission to the will of Allah (God) is the 
fundamental tenet of Islam: Islamic law is therefore the expression of Allah’s command for 
Muslim society and, in application, constitutes a system of duties that are incumbent upon 
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Başkanlığı) instead of Şeyhül-Islam’s department. Duties of Ministry of 
Religious Affairs were the administration of mosques, convents, &c., the 
appointment and dismissal of imams, preachers, muezzins, and other mosque 
functionaries, and the supervision of the muftis generally.194 Ministry of 
Religious Affairs worked as the hand of Ankara government in order to 
augment state control on religious issues. The idea was to internalize and 
individualize Islam. Law for the Unification of Instruction (Tevhid-i Tedrisat 
Kanunu) in 1924 was the next step of secularization. This law placed all the 
educational institutions under the control of Ministry of Education. The closing 
of medreses195 followed soon after. Private and foreign schools were also put 
under the inspection of the Ministry of Education, and all religious propaganda 
and displays of religious symbols were prohibited all education was made 
secular, which eliminated the traditional Islamic educational system in 
Turkey.196 This was a crucial point towards secularizing the country. 
Continuously In 1928, the Arabic script was replaced by the Latin alphabet, and 
in the 1930 a campaign to turkify the language was launched197. This change of 
                                                                                                                                                                 
a Muslim by virtue of his religious belief. Known as the Sharīʿah (literally, “the path 
leading to the watering place”), the law constitutes a divinely ordained path of conduct that 
guides Muslims toward a practical expression of religious conviction in this world and the 
goal of divine favour in the world to come. “Shari’ah in Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 
(source: www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/538793/Shariah, accessed 12.April. 2013) 
194
 Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, p. 413. 
195
 Medrese (madrasa), is any type of religious school or college for the study of 
the Islamic religion  
196
 Micheal  Winter, "The Modernization of Education in Kemalist Turkey," in 
Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey, ed. J.M. Landau (Westview Press: 1984), p. 186. 
197
 İlter  Turan, "Continuity and Change in Turkish Bureaucracy: The Kemalist Period 
and After," in Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey, ed. J.M. Landau (Westview Press, 
1984), p. 106. 
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alphabet broke the cultural ties of future generation with their Ottoman Islamic 
traditions. In the first half of 1926, the European calendar was adopted, as were 
the Swiss civil code and the penal code from Italy198 . Islamic laws were 
abolished and the constitutional article adopting Islam as the state religion was 
extracted in 1928. Women rights were granted in 1934. Finally, the Turkish 
state was defined as secular in the constitution in 1937. Thus, the aim was to 
achieve secularism at all levels of the state.199 
 Turkish Republic is the heir to the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire that 
lasted for 600 year with 75 different ethnic groups living within its borders200. 
Turkey is the only country in the Middle East –Perhaps in the whole Muslim 
world- where the secularism became the official ideology of the state201. But the 
overwhelming majorities of Turks also consider themselves Muslims and abide 
in various ways and degrees by Islamic customs and values.202  
 Deep-rooted Islamic sentiments together with militant secularism of 
Ankara government caused two important revolts towards Kemal revolution of 
modern Turkey. First one was a Kurdish revolt in the eastern provinces led by 
Sheik Said203 in 1925, second revolt occurred in the town of Menemen near 
                                                          
198
 Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, Revised Edition, p. 173. 
199
 Eligür, The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey, p. 44. 
200
 Ibid., p. 41. 
201
Elisabeth Özdalga, The Veiling Issue Official Secularism and Popular Islam in Modern 
Turkey (Taylor & Francis, 2013), p. 1. 
202
 Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and 
Community in the Late Ottoman State, p. 422. 
203
 Sheik Said: the hereditary chief of the powerful Naqshbandi sufi Islamic order. 
Sheikh Said’s rebellion was both nationalistic and religious as it also favored the 
reinstatement of the Caliphate. After some initial successes, Sheikh Said was crushed and 
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Izmir in 1930 when young Kemalist officer named Kubilay killed by a local 
Nakşibendi204 leader and his followers. Apparently all rebellions were a result of 
shock therapy which was applied to Turkish society through newly emerged 
Kemalist bureaucracy and military elites. As long as the state suppressed the 
Islamic brotherhoods, due to the enact of Tranquility Statement Laws they were 
remained underground. Even opposition parties as the Progressive Republican 
Party in 1924 and the Free Republican in 1930 party are allowed to establish 
soon after they turned into real opposition forces with strong religious elements 
and they were closed down within their first year205. Republican People’s Party 
was the only ruling party until 1945. Nevertheless, Adnan Menderes along with 
Celal Bayar, Refik Koraltan and Fuad Koprülü resigned from the RPP and 
established in 1946 the opposition Democrat Party (DP), which ended 27 years 
of single-party period of the Republic of Turkey. Respectively, Democrat Party 
won elections in 1950, in 1954 and 1957. Democrat Party made some changes 
during its tenure; Ezan (the call to prayer) was permitted in its original Arabic 
version; the tombs of holy saints were reopened for visits; the state radio could 
now broadcast prayers during religious holidays; the budget of the Presidency 
of Religious Affairs was increased; and a number of religious schools and one 
program at the university level were opened to train religious personnel.206 Soon 
                                                                                                                                                                 
hanged. See, Michael Gunter, The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish 
Problem in Iraq and Turkey (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 4.  
204
 Naqshbandi Sufi Islamic Order: is an orthodox Suﬁ order led by Said Nursi (also 
known as Bediuzzaman, or Light of the Times) who was born in Bitlis in eastern Turkey. 
205
 Ronnie  Margulies and Ergin  Yıldızoğlu, "The Resurgence of Islam and the 
Welfare Party in Turkey," in Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report, ed. Joel 
Beinin and Joe Stork (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 152. 
206
 Binnaz Toprak, "Secularism and Islam: The Building of Modern Turkey," 
Macalester International 15 (2005): p. 34.  
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after, the military coup which took place in Turkey on 27 May I960 ousted the 
first civilian government ever directly elected by the Turkish people. The 
justification of coup d’état was the necessity to save the reforms of Kemal 
Atatürk and restore the dignity and prestige of the State.207 
 
 
2.2. Political Islam and National Outlook Movement 
 The 1961 constitution extended civil liberties and nurtured liberal 
democracy and pluralism. As a result of new constitution, political Islamists 
were allowed to take part in public discussion. Mehmet Zaid Kotku, Nakşibendi 
leader of the Iskenderpaşa Cemaati, played fundamental role as the brainchild 
of the political Islamist movement of Modern Turkey. His idea was to create a 
party with an Islamic orientation without being used by other center-right 
parties and where the Muslims could fell at home.208 Necmettin Erbakan was 
favored by Kotku as an auspicious and outstanding personality of first Islamist 
political party in Turkey that aimed the Islamization of cultural and political life 
in Turkey.  
 Undoubtedly, in the history of the Republic of Turkey the most 
important independent Islamic movement is National Outlook (Milli Görüş) and 
                                                          
207
 Kemal Karpat, "Recent Political Developments in Turkey and Their Social 
Background," International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 38, no. 
3 (1962): p. 304. 
208
 Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey, p. 208. 
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Necmettin Erbakan, deserves to be recognized as the most influential Islamic 
Turk politician of 20th century.209  
Figure 2: Necmettin Erbakan 
 
Place and Date: Istanbul, during the opening speech of Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP) 
National Order Party, 8/February/1970. 
Source: http://www.sabah.com.tr/ 
 
Necmettin Erbakan actively participated many associations before his political 
career started; he was a mechanical engineer, university professor, diesel 
factory founder, and Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry president. 
He entered Grand National Assembly from Konya in 1969 from that day on he 
became the voice of Islamist interests in Parliament. His earlier experiences 
                                                          
209
 Ruşen  Çakır, "Milli Görüş Hareketi " in Modern Türkiye'de Siyasî Düşünce: 
İslamcılık, ed. Murat Gültekingil Tanıl Bora (Istanbul: İletişim, 2005), p. 544. 
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helped Erbakan to create ‘National Outlook’ philosophy with the proposition of 
Just Economic Order (Adil Düzen) to eliminate socioeconomic inequality and 
corruption. In addition, it should be noted that depending on the intention of its 
user, the world milli (national) can mean both religious and national. Erbakan 
took the advantage of double connotations of milli in Turkish to give an Islamic 
message within the nationalistic expression. He also published in 1975 as a 
manifesto aftermath.210  
 First Islamist Party of National Outlook Movement ( Milli Görüş  
Hareketi) was National Order Party (MNP:Milli Nizam Partisi) which 
established in 1970. The predecessor of MNP was; the National Salvation Party 
(MSP: Milli Selamet Partisi, 1972–1980), the Welfare Party (RP: Refah Partisi, 
1983–1998), the Virtue Party (FP:Fazilet Partisi, 1997–2001), and the Felicity 
Party (SP: Saadet Partisi, 2001–present). 
 Milli Görüş was not an underground revolutionary movement but a 
legitimate strain thought within a democratic party system.211 Main 
characteristics of National Outlook Movement are; its attitude against the 
monopolistic form of capitalism and the usage of Ottoman-Muslim heritage to 
construct modern religio-ethnic Turkish National State.212  Milli Görüş crucially 
rejected Western imitation and dependency but science and technology is 
readily welcomed through its naturalization by reference to its Islamic roots.213  
                                                          
210
 See, Necmettin Erbakan, Milli Görüş (Dergah Yayınları, 1974). 
211
 Jenny  White, Muslim Nationalism and the New Turks (Princeton University Press, 
2012), p. 39. 
212
 Ibid. 
213
 Ahmet  Yıldız, "Politico-Religious Discourse of Political Islam in Turkey: The 
Parties of National Outlook," The Muslim World 93, no. 2 (2003): p. 109. 
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 1971 military coup, the Constitutional Court dissolved the MNP on the 
basis that the party’s program sought to “establish a theocratic state”214 and 
Erbakan, had been dissolved by the Constitutional court in 1972 for violating 
the prohibition against the use of religion for political purpose.215 
 
Table 2: Political Parties of Milli Görüş Hareketi (National Outlook 
Movement) 
Milli Görüş Hareketi 
(National Outlook 
Movement) 
Leader Period Reason for 
Closure 
 
Milli Nizam Partisi 
(MNP) 
National Order Party  
Necmettin Erbakan            1970-71 Constitutional 
Court 
Milli Selamet Partisi 
(MSP) 
National Salvation Party 
Necmettin Erbakan          1972 – 80        Military coup 
Refah Partisi (RP) 
Welfare Party 
Ahmet Tekdal  1983-87  
Refah Partisi 
(RP)Welfare Party 
Necmettin Erbakan   1987-97           Constitutional 
Court 
 
Fazilet Partisi (FP)Virtue 
Party 
Recai Kutan  1997 – 2001       Constitutional 
Court 
 
                                                          
214
 Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, p. 49. 
215
 Binnaz Toprak, "The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey," in State, Democracy, 
and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s, ed. Ahmet Evin Metin Heper (Walter de Gruyter, 
1988), p. 123. 
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Saadet Partisi 
(SP)Felicity Party 
Recai Kutan  
 
1997 – 2001        
Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi (AKP)    
Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan  
2001 – present 
 
 
 
The leader of the party, Necmettin Erbakan, escaped to Switzerland and stayed 
there until 1972.216 First victory of the Milli Görüş was 1973 election when 
MSP gained 11.8% of votes and was granted 48 seats in the Turkish Grand 
Assembly. MSP made its mark on Turkish politics by participating in a number 
of coalition governments in the highly unstable political environment of the mid 
and late 1970s.217 Once again in 1980 democracy joggled by another coup 
d’état. The economic decline in the 1970s which caused the polarization among 
the society like; Right- left, Islamic vs. secularist, Kurd vs. Turk, and Alevi vs. 
Sunni featured as the leading reason behind the 1980 coup d’état. As a 
consequence Turkish civic politics de novo entered under the influence of 
military regime and MSP National Salvation Party together with other political 
parties was banned from political activities. 
 In 1980, the Turkish military sought to restructure the political landscape 
by introducing a Turkish–Islamic synthesis as a new national glue to combat or 
pacify divisive ethnic and religious forces.218 Anavatan Parti (Motherland Party) 
of Turgut Özal was incarnated form of Turkish – Islamic synthesis. Turgut Özal 
as the founder of Anavatan Partisi(Motherland Party) claimed that his party 
                                                          
216
 Hakan Yavuz, "Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey," 
Comparative Politics 30, no. 1 (1997): p. 66. 
217
 Ziya Öniş, "The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of 
the Welfare Party in Perspective," Third World Quarterly 18, no. 4 (1997): p. 750.  
218
 Yavuz, Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey, p. 50. 
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neither Left nor Right, but represented all the political tendencies in existence 
before 1980 coup.219  
  Third round of multi-party system was started with the rise of 
new actors in Turkish politics. Özal was the winner of 83 elections and he also 
received the support of Nurcu220 movement and Gülen221 Movement.222 
Together with Turgut Özal Turkey entered a new era with a new concepts and 
ideologies. According to Ziya Öniş, Turgut Özal was a critical ﬁgure in 
Turkey’s transition to a neo-liberal development model in the 1980s.223 During 
80s other political parties left in the shadow of ANAP.  
                                                          
219
 Ahmad, Turkey: The Quest for Identity, p. 153.  
220
 The Nur Movement (Nurçuluk) is a Turkish Islamic movement inspired by a 
modern reintepretetion of the Quran in the volumes Risale-i Nur (Epistle of light). The 
risales (epistles) of the leader of the movement, Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (1876–1960), 
were ﬁrst published in 1926. The Nur is not a sect but a social movement mainly because it 
does not have a formal structure and procedures for membership. Like a school, Nur has 
students. The followers of Nur constitute an Islamic community movement that can be 
seen as a set of effective personal networks.See, Mohammad Faghfoory, "Nur Movement," 
in Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World:M-Z, ed. Martin Richard (Macmillian, 
2004), p. 546. 
221
 Fethullah Gülen is the founder of Gülen movement, the largest and most effective 
group that emerged out of Nur. Beginning in the early 1990s, it became organized and 
institutionalized not only in Turkey but also internationally, particularly in the new states 
of Central Asia. Although the Gülen movement inherited the nationalist and modernist 
orientation of Nur, it deviated from its forefathers by the engagements with the secular 
state, and its expansion to the international realm.See, ibid., p. 547. 
222
 Elisabeth Özdalga, "Transformation of Sufi-Based Communities in Modern 
Turkey: The Naksibendis, the Nurcus, and the Gülen Community " in Turkey's 
Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century, ed. K. 
Oktem, C.J. Kerslake, and P. Robins (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 84. 
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 Ziya Öniş, "Political Islam at the Crossroads: From Hegemony to Co-Existence," 
Contemporary Politics 7, no. 4 (2001): p. 285.  
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 Necmettin Erbakan founded the Welfare Party (WP, Refah Partisi)224 in 
1983. During 70s and 80s the voter base of National Outlook Movement 
represented by small independent businessmen, merchants and craftsmen who 
felt threatened by industrialization and in general MGH received its main 
support form underdeveloped eastern and central Anatolian provinces and did 
not do well in the cities. However with the municipal elections in 1994, Refah 
won 28 municipalities including the mayor’s seats in both Istanbul and Ankara 
by getting more than 25 percent of the vote in Istanbul and more than 21 percent 
in Ankara. In 90s WP’s voter base included the urban poor living at the margins 
of cities, particularly small shopkeepers and urban migrants, many of whom had 
previously voted for the center-left social democrats. 225 Refah’s success 
continued in the parliamentary elections of December 1995. The Islamist party 
of Erbakan polled 17.7 percent in of votes in secular Turkey 226 from which the 
party emerged with the highest percentage of votes and he became the prime 
minister227 for the first two years of the coalition government with True Path 
Party 228 (Doğru  Yol  Partisi) in 1996 but coalition government lasted only 11 
                                                          
224
 For more information on  Refah ideologies see: Haldun Gülalp, "Globalization and 
Political Islam: The Social Bases of Turkey's Welfare Party," International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 33, no. 3 (2001), Haldun Gülalp, "Political Islam in Turkey: The Rise 
and Fall of the Refah Party," The Muslim World 89, no. 1 (1999), Öniş, "The Political 
Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective.", 
Yavuz, "Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey." 
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 Jenny White, Islam and Politics in Contemporary Turkey, ed. Reşat Kasaba, 4 
vols., vol. 4, Turkey in the Modern World (Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 336. 
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 Yavuz, "Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey," p. 30. 
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 Binnaz Toprak, "Islam and Democracy in Turkey," Turkish Studies 6, no. 2 (2005): 
p. 172. 
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months. Necmettin Erbakan was the Turkey's first Islamist prime minister in 73 
years of Republican history. 
 Erbakan came up with the significant changes both in internal and 
external politics. During their first six months in power, he and his principal 
foreign-policy staff have travelled only to Islamic countries.229 He allowed 
female bureaucrats to wear headscarves in the office and agreed on adjustment 
of working-hours during Ramadan, the holy month of fasting230 the plans to 
build a mosque right at the city center in Istanbul at Taksim Square.231 
According to Erbakan, modern Turkish history consist “Westernization” of 
traditional values and lifestyle. To change the secular structure of the state WP 
offers a new structure that would be based on “different law for different 
religious communities.” The justification for this was found in an ancient 
document that Prophet Muhammad had drafted in Medina. The new structure 
was similar to the millet system of the Ottomans, and it comes to mean 
‘autonomy of each religious group to practice its own law’. This, in effect 
would mean that those who called themselves Muslims would be subject to the 
shari’a.232 On the other hand as Sakallioğlu explains, there was no mention of 
                                                                                                                                                                 
228
 The True Path Party (Turkish: Doğru Yol Partisi) abbreviated to DYP is an old 
center-right political party established by Süleyman Demirel in 1983. The True Path Party 
was a successor of the Democratic Party of Adnan Menderes which closed by military 
coup.  
229
 Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy under Erbakan," Survival 39, no. 2 (1997): 
p. 88.  
230
 Dietrich Jung and Wolfango Piccoli, Turkey at the Crossroads: Ottoman Legacies 
and a Greater Middle East (Zed Books, 2001), p. 119. 
231
 Öniş, "Political Islam at the Crossroads: From Hegemony to Co-Existence," 286.  
232
 Toprak, "Islam and Democracy in Turkey," p. 182. 
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the “just economic order” or of the intention “to blow away the imperialist-
Zionist system”.233 This evidences exposed the multifaceted character of Refah. 
   White claims that as prime minister, Erbakan tried to implement some of 
his ideas about reorienting Turkey towards the Muslim world.234 The 
Refahyol235 coalition government between pro-islamist Necmettin Erbakan and 
Europhile Tansu Çiller was interrupted by the ‘soft coup’ of Kemalist army on 
28 February 1997. By all manners, the government remained the power until 
Erbakan’s resignation in June 1997.This military intervention which titled in 
different names as; ‘soft coup’, ‘postmodern coup’ or ‘virtual coup’ mostly 
realized through the media, as befits the postmodern times. Soon after the 28 
February coup236, in 1998 the Welfare Party was closed for violating the 
principle of secularism in the constitution237 and has been replaced by the Virtue 
(Fazilet) Party. Also senior officials of Refah were banned from politics for five 
years along with Necmettin  Erbakan.  
 There is a natural tendency to view Fazilet as Refah’s successor. Even 
though the Virtue Party attempted to project a moderate image with its new 
emphasis on the extension of democratic rights and closer relations with the EU, 
                                                          
233
 Ümit Cizre Sakallioğlu, "Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in 
Republican Turkey," International Journal of Middle East Studies 28, no. 2 (1996): p. 237.  
234
 White, Islam and Politics in Contemporary Turkey, p. 367.  
235
 Refahyol is the name of the 54
th
  government of Turkey from 28 June 1996 to 30 
June 1997. It was a coalition government formed by Welfare Party(Refah Party,RP) and 
True Path Party(Dogru Yol Party,DYP), and was known as Refahyol (aportmanteau of the 
Turkish names of the two parties in the coalition).  
236
  For more information on 28 February see: Fulya Atacan, "28  Şubat 1997: Türk- 
Islam Sentezi’nin Sonu," in Mübeccel Kıray  Için Yazılar, ed. Fulya Atacan, et al. (Bağlam 
Yayınları, 2000). 
237
 Chris Morris, "Despatches", BBC News,  16.Jaunary.1998.  
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suspicions concerning the hidden agenda of the FP kept its actuality in the eyes 
of general public. These skeptic ideas were compounded by the series of events 
that occurred during the opening ceremonies of the new parliament in the 
aftermath of the 1999 elections.238 Merve Kavakçı239 from the FP insisted on 
wearing a headscarf in parliament and was enforced to leave the session under 
the protests of opposition deputies. Kemalist- secular elites and army interpreted 
the headscarf issue as a usage of religious symbols like a political instrument 
and an incident against laicism. Therefore The FP was closed down by the 
Constitutional Court, in June 2001 under the allegation of being the successor of 
Welfare Party. One again, another political party of National Vision Movement 
was closed by Turkish Constitutional Court. 
 
 
3. Muslim Secularists: Ideological Transformation of 
AKP from Political Islam to Conservative Democracy 
 
3.1. The Rise of AKP: A “Moderate Party” 
                                                          
238
 Öniş, "Political Islam at the Crossroads: From Hegemony to Co-Existence," p. 
292. 
239
 Merve Kavakçı is a Turkish politician who was elected as a Virtue Party deputy 
for Istanbul in 1999.When the headscarved Merve Kavakçı came to Parliament, she 
created a huge debate on headscarf issue in Turkey.
 Merve Kavakçı lost her seat in the 
Parliament in March 2001. 
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 The “28 February process” was a turning point for both Milli Görüş 
Movement and Turkish politics. It marked the abandonment of the Turkish-
Islamic synthesis which was used as the ‘national glue’ after 1980. In addition, 
Irtica240 together with Kurdish separatism was singled out as one of the main 
threats to Turkish security.241 It should be noted that ongoing struggle between 
secular elites and Islamists is like a vicious circle in Turkish politics. Islamist 
movements always seem as the real threat to secular Turkey. The new 
generations of Milli Görüş was aware of the fact that only way the Islamists 
could succeed was by avoiding a direct confrontation with the secularists and 
deemphasizing the religious agenda.242 The internal problems and conflicts 
inside the Milli Görüş became apparent especially after the establishment of 
Virtue Party under Recai Kutan243 leadership. The dimidiation externalized with 
foundation of the Innovators Group (Yenilikçiler), which defended democracy, 
respect for human rights, and pluralism versus the Orthodox Group 
(Gelenekçiler). Innovators nominated a candidate, Abdullah Gül244, during the 
                                                          
240
 Irtica is a Turkish word to explain “reactionary”. In Turkey the world irtica can 
also be adjective describing religious viewpoints that favor a return Turkish Republic to an 
Islamic state. 
241
 Angel Rabasa and Stephen Larrabee, The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey 
(RAND, 2008), p. 44.  
242
 Ibid., p. 45.  
243
  Recai Kutan is a Turkish politician and the former leader of Felicity Party. He was 
accepted as the Erbakan’s shadow. 
244
 Abdullah Gül was born in Kayseri on October 29, 1950.He was elected from 
Kayseri as a Member of the Turkish Grand National Assembly for five consecutive terms 
from 1991 to 2007.He became Prime Minister and formed the 58th Government on 
November 18, 2002. He was served as Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in the 
59
th
 Government from 2003 to 2007. Abdullah Gül was elected by TBMM as the 11
th
 
President of the Republic of turkey on August 28, 2007. For more information on Abdullah 
Gül see; Biography of Abdullah Gül, http://www.tccb.gov.tr/pages/president/biography/   
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party congress to run against the candidate of the old cadre, Recai Kutan, 
Erbakan’s proxy.245 Abdullah Gül lost the elections against Recai Kutan but he 
won half of the delegates’ votes. This result encouraged the Innovator Group to 
form another political party led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan which became AKP 
on 14 August 2001. Under the circumstances, it is seen that most of the 
founders and members of the AKP came from the Milli Görüş tradition which is 
the source of political Islam in Turkey. On the other hand, it must be noted that 
even their roots came from the most important Islamism movement of Modern 
Turkey; AKP always keeps its secular line with a strong stress on conservative 
way of life.   
 AKP entered the presidential elections in 2002 as a young political party 
and received almost 35 percent of votes. But Erdoğan was unable to become 
prime minister because he was banned from holding political office246 due to the 
poem that he read on 6 December 1997 in Siirt. However Erdoğan claimed that 
the author is Ziya Gökhalp247, he was sentenced to 10 months in jail248, but he 
was freed after four. The poem was like that: 
                                                          
245
 Sebnem Gümüscü and Deniz Sert, "The Power of the Devout Bourgeoisie: The 
Case of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey," Middle Eastern Studies 45, no. 6 
(2009): p. 954. 
246
 Turkey's Charismatic Pro-Islamic Leader, BBC News, 4.November.2002  
247
 Ziya Gökhalp was a Turkish writer, a poet and political activist who advocated 
the imposition of the Turkish language and culture on Ottoman Empire. He advocated a 
Turkification of the Ottoman Empire. His ideas resurgent interest in Pan-Turkism and 
Turanism and his thoughts has been describes as a "cult of nationalism and modernization 
". See: Edward J. Erickson, Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First 
World War (Greenwood Press, 2001), p. 97. 
248
 "Erdogan'a 10 Ay Hapis," Milliyet, 22. April. 1998.  
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“The mosques are our barracks, he domes our helmets, the minarets our 
bayonets and the faithful our soldiers…” 
58th Government249 of Republic of Turkey was formed under the leadership of 
Abdullah Gül and held the power from November 18, 2002 since March 14, 
2003.   The political ban of Tayyip Erdoğan was removed in 2002, after he was 
elected as a deputy with an interim elections held in Siirt. Soon After 59th 
Government formed under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on 14 
March 2003, thence he became the new Prime Minister of Turkey. From 2002 
to 2011 Justice  and  Development  Party constantly  increased  its  vote 
proportion  from 34  %  to 50% . 
 It was a remarkable success history at Turkish political life. Since the 
general election in 1950 it was the first time that a ruling party increased its vote 
percentage up to 50 percent of general poll. 
 
Graphic 1: Results of General Elections 2002, 2007 and 2009 
 
Source: www.akparti.org.tr 
                                                          
249
 For more information on 58
th
 Government see: “Abdullah Gül government, 58th 
government program,” 2002, http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/ambar/HP58.htm. 
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Graphic 2: Results of Local Elections 2004 and 2009 
 
Source: www.akparti.org.tr 
 
3.2. Ideology and Identity of AKP  
 Between 1991 and 2002 Turkey was ruled by 9 different coalition 
governments.250 The absence of strong political authorities, ongoing struggle 
between secular and Islamists elites251, Kurdish separation movements252, strong 
                                                          
250
 20. October.1991/16.May.1993, Doğru Yol Partisi (The True Path Party, DYP) 
and Demokrat Halkçı Parti (The Social Democratic Populist Party, SHP). 16. May.1993/ 
05.October 1995, DYP and SHP. 05.October.1995/30.October.1995, DYP and Minority 
Government. 30.October.1995/06.March 1996, DYP and Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (The 
Republican People’s Party, CHP). 6.March.1996/28.June.1996, Anavatan Partisi (The 
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Party, DTP). 11.January.1999/28.May.1999,  DSP and Minority Gouvernment. 
28.May.1999/18.October.2002, DSP, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (The Nationalist Action 
Party, MHP) and ANAP. 
251
 During 90s one of the main problems of Turkish internal politics was the ongoing 
struggle between secularist and islamists. Especially the Turkish Army stands as the 
guardian of the laic Turkey and had the power to intervene the politics. The 28 February 
Post-Modern Coup Process is the outcome this power. During Feb.28 process The National 
Security Council (MGK) reconstructed the internal balance of the country. 
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economic crisis253, corruption254 and the violation of human right255 was the 
headlines of Turkish political life during 90s. AKP government was the ﬁrst 
single-party government after those turbulent years. The main reason behind the 
success of AKP may be resumes as follow: Since the establishment of Republic, 
Turkey was dominated by the old political cadres. Especially after the death of 
Turgut Özal, political life was full of deadlocks. At the same time, polls realized 
that the coalition governments were not good at managing the crisis in every 
                                                                                                                                                                 
252
 From 1991 the existence of co-called safe havens in Iraqi Kurdistan-established 
following the Persian Gulf-War (1990-91) and protected by U.S and the British forces-
provided new bases for PFF operations. By 1993 the total number of security forces 
involved in the struggle in southeastern Turkey was about 200,000, and the conflict had 
become the largest civil war in the Middle East. For more information on the PKK in 90s 
see: Encyclopedia Britanica, Turkey, The Kurdish Conflict, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/609790/Turkey/275734/Political-
developments-1970s-to-the-90s 
253
 Between 1994 and 2001 Turkey was shaken by two powerful financial and 
economic crises. The first one occurred In April 1994.This crisis deteriorated the real 
sector. After 1994, Turkish Lira was undervalued. On April 5, 1994 the government 
announced a stabilization program. The second one occurred in 2001 also known as Black 
Wednesday. See; Murat Özturk and Osman Nuri  Aras, "Foreign Capital Investments and 
Econimic Crises in Turkey," International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanity 
Studies 3, no. 1 (2011). 
254
 In the late 1990s the Susurluk Scandal that began after a traffic accident, revealed 
the unveiling  relation between; a member of Parliament who held a powerful Kurdish 
clan, the deputy chief of Istanbul Police Department and a fugitive rightist militant.  
255
 On July 2, 1993 o a group of Islamist fundamentalist surrounded The Madımak 
Hotel in Sivas in which many intellectuals were staying for the Pir Sultan Abdal Festival. 
The visible reason of the demonstrations was to protest novelist, Aziz Nesin, who 
translated and published Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses and who criticized Islam. 
Soon after the violent and fundamentalist crowd set fire to the Madimak Hotel. Nesin was 
saved by security forces, but 37 other intellectuals and participants of the festival, who 
stayed inside the hotel, were killed. Security forces and officials were criticized for not 
stopping the massacre. And also the other remarkable violations of human rights in 90s 
were undefined murders of politicians, writers, diplomats and academicians. 
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aspect of political and economic life. AKP as a new born political party with a 
new political formation was like a new breath in Turkish political life and they 
turned out to be hope for Turkish society. According to Özbudun “analyses of 
the voter base of the AKP demonstrated that the party is not a direct descendant 
of any of the older parties; nor do the party leaders claim such lineage”.256  
 On every occasion, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan repetitively reject any 
continuity with the 'national outlook' parties, including both its ethno-nationalist 
and Islamist views and describes AKP as a 'conservative democratic' party257  
and himself as a “Conservative Democrat”258. In his popular discourse he said 
that “we have took off our Milli Görüş shirt”259 indicating the new orientation of 
AKP. 
  Despite the harsh critics of Erbakan who considered the west as 
“Christian Club” and in his way of thinking, “the West is a monolithic entity 
which is anti-Islam, pro-Zionist, and imperialist.”260 AKPs’ party program261 
supports secularism and western ideas more than any the former Islamist parties 
                                                          
256
 Ergün Özbudun, "From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of 
the Justice and Development Party in Turkey," South European Society and Politics 11, 
no. 3-4 (2006): p. 546. 
257
 William Hale and Ergun Ozbudun, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in 
Turkey: The Case of the Akp (Taylor & Francis, 2009), p. 20. 
258
 "Muhafazakar Demokratim," Yeni Şafak. 01. July. 2001.  
259
 Fatma Sibel Yüksek, "Akp'nin Yeni Zarfi," Radikal 26.12.2003.  
260
 Zeyneb Çağliyan İçener, "The Justice and Development Party’s Conception of 
“Conservative Democracy”: Invention or Reinterpretation?," Turkish Studies 10, no. 4 
(2009): p. 601. 
261
 For more information on Party Programme of AKP see 
http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/akparti/parti-programi 
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did.262 Also In the public discourse, there is a strong stress on democracy, 
respect for human rights, and the rule of law. At the same time Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan declared that Islam would not even be a “point of reference” for the 
new party, and his party supported a “conservative democracy,” which 
incorporated pluralism and tolerance. In his words:  
“While attaching importance to religion as a social value, we do not think 
it right to conduct politics through religion [or] to attempt to transform 
government ideologically by using religion … Religion is a sacred and 
collective value … It should not be made a subject of political partisanship 
causing divisiveness.”263 
 Yalçın Akdoğan, who is an academician and political adviser of Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, wrote a manifesto in order to provide a semi-
official definition for AKPs’ modern conservative political theory called as 
Conservative Democracy.264 Akdogan says that “AKP is not trying to generate 
and duplicate problematic past applications of conservatism; rather it seeks to 
reshape the concept of conservatism within the sociocultural structure of 
Turkey”.265 In his book he argued that modern conservatism is almost 
inseparable from liberalism in its opposition to socialism and defense of the free 
market 266  but also the restoration of authority in the social field.267 According 
                                                          
262
 Özbudun, "From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of the 
Justice and Development Party in Turkey," p. 548. 
263
 William Hale, "Christian Democracy and the Akp: Parallels and Contrasts," 
Turkish Studies 6, no. 2 (2005): p. 294. 
264
 See, Yalçın  Akdoğan, Ak Parti ve Muhafazakâr Demokrasi (Alfa, 2004). 
265
 Yalçın Akdoğan, "The Meaning of Conservative Democratic Political Identity," in 
The Emerge of a New Turkey: Democracy and Ak Parti, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz (University 
of Utah Press, 2006), p. 55. 
266
 Ibid., p. 38. 
267
 Ibid., p. 54. 
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to Bekir Beraat Özipek, the definition of conservatism that AKP uses, based on 
the values which are important for society like family, traditions, religion and 
its institutions. Furthermore AKP conservatism generally rejects right or left 
wing political projects and defends moderate and gradual change in politics.268  
 Many scholars and columnist interpreted AKP’s success as a historic 
victory of “periphery” over “center.”269 In this context, the periphery is the 
cultural and political territory of the oppressed and marginalized majority, 
simply the site of (civil) society, while the center is the place of the state, the 
power of which is at the hand of a secular military-civil bureaucracy 
(sometimes shared with the state-created bourgeoisie). Akdoğan indicates that 
“in the AKP’s view, it is more important to bring the demands of the periphery 
to the center than to be considering as “center” party. The electorate includes 
various ideological tendencies as; the center-right, ultra nationalist and Islamist 
also some liberals.270 Ali Yaşar Sarıbey, a Turkish political scientist describes 
identity of AKP as “Islamic in name, liberal in action, democrat in attitude and 
western in path”.271 Also other scholars critics or describes AKP in different 
manners like “Muslim democrat,”272 “pro-Islamist,”273 and “neo-Islamist”274, 
                                                          
268
 Bekir Berat  Özipek, "Muhafazakarlik Nedir? ," Köprü Dergisi 97 (2007): p. 200.  
269
 For more information on Turkey’s periphery and center relations see :Şerif 
Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?," Post-Traditional 
Societies 102, no. 1 (1973).  
270
 Ergun Ozbudun, Türk Siyasal Hayatı (Anadolu Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006), p. 
16. 
271
  Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, "Akp Kimliksizlige Mahkum," Gazete Vatan 15.October.2003.  
272
 See, Gareth Jenkins, "Muslim Democrats in Turkey?," Survival 45, no. 1 (2003), 
Sultan  Tepe, "Turkey's Akp: A Model "Muslim-Democratic" Party?," Journal of 
Democracy 16, no. 3 (2005). 
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“Moderate Islamic Party”275, even some of considers its policies as “Islamo-
fascist.”276  
 When we look at the historical process of democratization, in Modern 
Turkey, two powerful center-right politicians came up Adnan Menderes who 
marked the beginning of a multi-party system and Turgut Özal, who could 
barely break the deep-rooted statism policy with January 24, decisions277.278 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan consider AKP as Turkey's "new center-right party", 
admittedly after 22 July elections in 2007, AKP was registered as so.279280 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
273
 See, Meltem Müftüler-Baç, "The New Face of Turkey: The Domestic and Foreign 
Policy Implications of November 2002 Elections,," East European Quarterly 37, no. 4. 
274
 See, Soner Çagaptay, "Is Turkey Still a Western Ally?," Wall Street Journal 
Europe 22 Jaunary 2009. 
275
 See, Murat Somer, "Moderate Islam and Secularist Opposition in Turkey: 
Implications for the World, Muslims and Secular Democracy," Third World Quarterly 28, 
no. 7 (2007). 
276
 See, Frank Gaffney, "No to Islamist Turkey,," The Washington Times 27 
September 2005. 
277
 Decisions made on Jan. 24, 1980 marked Turkey’s shift dorm “mixed capitalism” 
to “free market economy”. Turkey tapped into neo-liberal economic policies. See; Gökhan  
Kurtaran, "Economists Discuss Milestone of Turkey's Market Economy," Hurriyet Daily 
News 25.January.2011. 
278
      Alper   Gürkan, "Adalet Ve Kalkınma Partisi’nin Muhafazakâr Demokrat Kimliğinin 
Oluşumunda Sosyal Politikanın Etkileri," Opus 1 (2011): 2. 
279
  Mehmet Bekaroğlu,  "Merkez sağ tamam, ya sol? ", Radikal,05.August.2007. 
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4. The Conceptualization of “New” and Emerging 
Concepts in Turkish Foreign Policy 
 The objective of the section is conceptualizing the new rhetoric and 
practice of Turkish foreign policy. Especially, this section based on  the effect 
of Ahmet Davutoğlu who is the chief advisor of Recep Tayyip Erdogan on 
foreign policy since 2003 and Turkey’s foreign minister since 1 May 2009.   
 
 
4.1. The Change in Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision. 
 In general terms Turkish foreign policy until the end of cold war, based 
on two main pillars, Kemalism and status quo principles. Especially, by virtue 
of Kemalism, Turkey neglected Islam world and pursued an exclusively 
Western path.281 By the post-cold war era, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the 
crisis in the Balkans and Caucasus transformed the neighborhood region even 
more chaotic and instable but Turkey maintained its stability amid the chaos 
that affected many of its neighborhoods.282  
 Under Turgut Özal’s guidance, policy of non-interference in inter-Arab 
relations was replaced with proactive policies. Moreover during and after the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Turkey actively took a side within the US blog. Sedat 
                                                          
281
  Ömer  Taşpınar, "Turkey’s Middle East Policies between Neo-Ottomanism and 
Kemalism," Carnegie Endowment For International Peace 10 (2008): p. 2. 
282
 Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007," 
Insight Turkey 8, no. 2 (2007): p. 77. 
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Laçiner, a Middle East specialist said that “the Gulf War showed the clear 
difference between the Republican-Kemalist foreign policy and Özalist foreign 
policy.”283 Özal and his intellectual group known as neo–Ottomanists (Yeni 
Osmanlıcılar) advocated that Turkey needs pursue an active and diversified 
foreign policy in Middle East region because of its historical heritage. 
According to M. Attaman “Neo-Ottomans argued that Turkey should be a 
Euro–Asian (Avrasya) power, not a European state isolated from the East”.284 In 
sum, Turgut Özal aimed to transform the position of Turkey in Middle East. 
Özalism as an ideology which based on civic, democrat, and liberal state 
reconciled with all religious and ethnic minorities of modern Turkey, aimed to 
create a new understanding of Turkish foreign policy Therefore, we can say that 
Özalism is the guidebook of AKP foreign policy activism. From this point of 
view, AKP’s pro-western, neo-ottomanist, multi-dimensional public diplomacy 
was herit from Özal vision of governing. 
 On the other hand foreign policy vision of National outlook parties was 
apparently different from Özal’s and AKP’s foreign policy concepts. Erbakan 
was an anti-American, anti-European and anti-Zionist political leader of Milli 
Görüş Movement. The foreign policy understanding of Milli Görüş generally 
based on the relations with Muslim countries. Developing Eight (D-8)285 trade 
                                                          
283
 Sedat Laçiner, "Turgut  Özal  Period  in  Turkish  Foreign  Policy:  Özalism," 
USAK  Yearbook  of International Politics and Law 2 (2009): p.153. 
284
 Muhittin  Ataman, "Leadership Change: Özal Leadership and Restructuring in 
Turkish Foreign Policy," Turkish Journal of International Relations 1, no. 1 (2002): p. 
134. 
285
 The Developing 8 (D-8) Group comprises eight countries; Egypt, Turkey, Iran, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Nigeria .This group was established at the 
presidential meeting held in Istanbul, Turkey, in 1997 with the aim of fostering 
cooperation and reinforcing economic relations among the eight developing countries. See, 
Ministry of Trade Agreements Sector. 
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agreement which was an economic union project started by Necmettin Erbakan 
among eight Muslim nations like Turkey, Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt,  
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nigeria was an active example of his foreign policy 
itinerary. The other clear example of Erbakan’s Muslim-oriented foreign policy 
came with his visit to the US as the guest of the American Muslim Council in 
October 1994.286 During his speech he was talking about creating a ‘new 
Muslim world order' like an Islamic NATO with a common Islamic currency 
and an Islamic Common Market.287 On the contrary AKP identifies its political 
identity as pro-western conservative political party. Although AKP actively 
participle in decision making process of inter-Arab conflicts, the party pursue a 
multidimensional foreign policy. In other words, close relations with E.U, 
cooperation with U.S.A, friendly relationship with Russian federation, Middle 
Asia, Caucuses and Turkic Republics, efforts towards the achievement of peace 
in Middle East are the missions of AKP’s foreign policy.288As it is seems in the 
party program, election manifestos and government agenda of AKP from 2002 
until the last elections in 2011, the main goal is to make Turkey a regional 
power and global actor in international political economic and security 
relations.289  
 In almost all the official documents, there is a strong stress on the 
importance of geopolitical location of Turkey and historical ties that Turkey has 
                                                          
286
 Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy under Erbakan," 89. Robins, Suits and Uniforms: 
Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War, p. 154. 
287
 Turkish Daily News, 21.October .1994. 
288
 Party Program of Justice and Development Party, (source: www.akp.org.tr, 
<http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html#6>,15.April 2012). 
289
 61th  gouvernement Programme. See : 
http://www.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Forms/pgGovProgramme.aspx 
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got with her neighborhoods. However, E.U process occupies the uppermost of 
the list in Turkey’s foreign policy agenda, the process is quietly becoming 
domestic political affair rather than diplomatic effort. Naturally, Turkey 
redefined its foreign policy priorities for to fulfill the need of the dynamic 
environment that surrounded the country. Currently Turkish diplomatic issues 
are mostly about Middle East, U.S, and Russia.  
 Therefore AKP government adopted pragmatic foreign policy proper 
with the history and geographic location of Turkey. The equilibrium between 
the realities and national interest is at the top of the foreign policy agenda. 
Under Erdoğan leadership and Ahmet Davutoğlu’s guidance, Turkey liberated 
from prejudices towards neighborhood region. The “new” orientation of foreign 
policy based on mutual communication and regional collaboration seems as 
skeptical, but it provided economic development.   
 Particularly, for to understand new orientation Turkish foreign policy 
Ahmet Davultoglu’s effect his Strategic Depth theory needs to be examine 
profoundly. Because after the first government period, the foreign policy 
section of party program, election manifestos and government program, 
generally based on Strategic Depth theory. As Grigoriadis accentuated 
“Turkey‘s foreign policy under the AKP administration has been associated 
with the name of Davutoğlu”.290 
 
 
                                                          
290
 loannis Grigoriadis, "The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy," 
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy 8 (2010): p. 3. 
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4.1.2. Davutoğlu Doctrine and Basic Principles of Turkish Foreign 
Policy after 2002 
  Since 2002, Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu is the backbone of foreign 
policy activism of AKP governments. He started as the chief of foreign policy 
advisor to Prime Minister after in 2003 he was granted a title of Ambassador.291  
On 1st of May 2009, he was named Minister of Foreign Affairs of 60th 
government of Republic of Turkey.  
 Ahmet Davutoğlu is a valuable scholar, his academic background292 
provided him deep understanding both in domestic and external relations of 
Turkey. He is Turkish political scientist, globally recognized diplomat and 
expert in international relations, history of political thought and political 
philosophy.293 His book Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu 
(Strategic Depth: Turkey’s International Position)294, his academic works, The 
                                                          
291
  See: Resmi Gazate 
http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2003/01/20030118.htm#13 
292
 Ahmet Davutloğlu: He graduated from Boğaziçi University (Turkey) with a 
double major in Political Science and Economics. He completed his MA (Department of 
Public Administration) and PhD studies (Department of Political Sciences and 
International Relations) at the same university. In 1990 he became an Assistant Professor 
at the International Islamic University of Malaysia. Between 1995 and 1999 he has worked 
at Marmara University (Turkey) at the Institute for Middle Eastern Studies. He became full 
professor in 1999. Between  1998  and  2002  he  was  a  visiting  lecturer  at  the Military 
Academy and the War Academy. He worked at Beykent University in Istanbul as a 
professor from 1995 to 2004, as Head of the Department of International Relations. Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, (source: www.mfa.gov.tr,   <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/ahmet-
davutoglu.en.mfa>,January 2011) 
293
 Ali   Pajaziti, "Davutoğlu: Thinking Depth and Global Political Activism as New  
Grand Strategy," Contemporary Issues 5, no. 1 (2012): p. 45. 
294
 See, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik   Derinlik;   Türkiyenin   Uluslararası   Konumu  
(Istanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001). 
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Clash Of Interests: An Explanation Of The World (Dis)Order and Self-
perception of Civilizations295, The Global Crisis and Civilizational 
Transformation and the Muslim World296 can be accepted as the theoretical 
framework and also a guidebook for the foreign policy understanding of the 
AKP.  
 Ahmet  Davutoğlu, conceptualized Turkey‘s foreign policy in creative 
ways using concepts as , strategic depth, zero  problems with  neighbors, 
balance between security and democracy, proactive diplomacy, multi-
dimensional foreign policy, rhythmic diplomacy, safety for everyone, liberty 
security balance .297 According to Bülent Aras, Davutoğlu largely changed the 
rhetoric and practice of Turkish foreign policy, bringing to it a dynamic and 
multi-dimensional orientation”.298 In conclusion, Turkey‘s foreign policy under 
the AKP rule, has been oriented by Davutoğlu’s vision. To understand foreign 
policy activism of AKP governments, the new concepts in Turkish foreign 
policy making needs to be properly examine. 
 
                                                          
295
 See, Ahmet Davutoğlu, "The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World 
(Dis)Order and Self-Perception of Civilizations," Perceptions:Journal Of International 
Affairs 2, no. 4 (1997).  
296
 See, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Civilizational Transformation and the Muslim World 
(K.L:Quill, 1994). 
297
  See, Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Fostering a Culture of Harmony," Russia in Global 
Affairs 8, no. 1 (2010), Ahmet Davutoğlu, Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and 
Regional  Political Structuring, Turkey Foreign Policy Breif Series (TEPAV, 2012), 
Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy, May 2010," Foreign Policy 
Journal 20.May.2010, Davutoğlu, "Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 
2007."  
298
 Bülent Aras, "Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy," SETA Policy Brief  
(2009): p. 3. 
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4.1.2.1. Strategic Depth Doctrine  
 Davutoğlu explains in his seminal book, Strategic Depth, the redefinition 
of Turkey’s role in the neighboring region and in the international politics. 
“Strategic depth” defends the thesis that a nation’s value in world politics is 
predicated on the geo-strategic location and historical depth. Following the 
logic of Davutoğlu’s proclaimed theory, Turkey is endowed both because of its 
unique location at the center of many geopolitical areas of influence like 
Balkans, Black Sea region and Arab neighbors, moreover its control of the 
Bosporus, and its historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire.299  
 In his book, he argues that especially In 1990s, in terms of foreign 
policy, there was a lack of strategic planning based on a healthy analysis of 
Turkey’s historical and geographical potential and because of this Turkey 
experienced various problems in Balkans and the Middle East.300 Ahmet 
Davutoğlu criticizes euro-centric vision of foreign policy making. Specially, his 
critics based on the axiom of ‘‘Turkey’s geopolitical signiﬁcance for the West’’ 
for ‘‘denying’’ Turkey its ‘‘natural sphere of inﬂuence’’ and its ‘‘strategic 
depth’’ which he locates in the former Ottoman territories by implicit reference 
to the state-as-organism metaphor. Davutoğlu also underlined that “a strategic 
vision is necessary to guarantee Turkey’s future in Europe.”301 He continues 
that if Turkey failed to have a powerful stance in Asia, it would have very 
limited chances with the EU.302He promotes the idea that Turkey not only 
becomes a regional, but also a global power. Davutoğlu has called for a ‘‘new 
                                                          
299
 Davutoğlu, Stratejik   Derinlik;   Türkiyenin   Uluslararası   Konumu, p. 53-57. 
300
 Ibid. 
301
 Ibid., p. 4-93. 
302
 Ibid., p. 63-551. 
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strategic theory’’ that would help Turkey’s policy-makers to make use of the 
opportunities created by the post-Cold War ‘‘geopolitical and geo-economic 
vacuum’’.303 
Ahmet Davutoğlu claims that in terms of geography Turkey occupies unique 
space and he defines Turkey as a central country and he continues :  
During the cold war Turkey have been consider a frontier country. After 
the cold war in the early 1990s, Turkey emerged as a bridge country. Today, in 
a new era marked by aftermath of September 11th  it should be seen neither as a 
bridge country which only connects two points, nor a frontier country , nor 
indeed as an ordinary country, which sits at the edge of Muslim world and the 
West. Turkey holds an optimal place in the sense that it is both an Asian and 
European country and is also close to Africa through the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Turkey is a central country such an optimal geographic location.304 
 Davutoğlu argues that geographical depth of a country should be seen as 
a part of its historical depth and describes a country with historical depth as:   
          A country that is always at the epicenter of events, whatever they 
may be.…Countries like Turkey, China, and Japan have deep historical 
roots in their regions.… During the transit from the 19th to the 20th century, 
there were eight multi-national empires across Eurasia: Britain, Russia, 
Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, China, Japan and Turkey. As these 
countries possess historical depth they form spheres of influence; if they 
fail to do this they then experience various problems.305 
                                                          
303
 Pinar Bilgin, "“Only Strong States Can Survive in Turkey's Geography”: The Uses 
of “Geopolitical Truths” in Turkey," Political Geography 26, no. 7 (2007): p. 748. 
304
 Ibid. 
305
 Sözen, "A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges," 
p. 109. 
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  As mentioned above, according to Davutoğlu, because of geography and 
history, Turkey was poised to play a major role in the world politics and 
especially in the Middle East. The Ottoman past as well as historical and 
cultural ties with the Arab/ Islamic world naturally assigned a central position to 
Turkey there.306 Before 1990, the center of policy making versus Middle East 
was constructed by prejudices about the Arab image. Thus, according to this 
perspective the new policy should get rid of these prejudices and end Turkey’s 
alienation with the region.307 
 
 
5. Principles of Turkey’s New Foreign Policy 
 Currently, Turkey’s Middle East policy has become subject of debate 
both in internal and external circle. Turkey’s pro-active policies in regional 
problems, especially intervention to inter-Arab relations accepted as 
skeptical308, are called as “neo-ottomanism”309 , also named as “Turkish-
                                                          
306
 Meliha Benli Altunışık and Lenore G. Martin, "Making Sense of Turkish Foreign 
Policy in the Middle East under Akp," Turkish Studies 12, no. 4 (2011): p. 578. 
307
  Ibid., p. 577. 
308
 See, Fuat Keyman, "Üç Tarz Şüphecilik," Radikal 13.December.2009. Ziya Öniş, 
"Conservative Globalists Versus Defensive Nationalists: Political Parties and Paradoxes of 
Europeanization in Turkey," Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans Online 9, no. 3 
(2007). 
309
 See, Yavuz, "Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of Neo‐
Ottomanism." 
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Gaullism”310 and claimed to be a “shift in foreign policy”311 decision making 
process. In the same time AKP accused to have a “secret agenda”. 
 According to Ahmet Davutloglu the objective of Turkey’s “new” foreign 
policy is to become a “Wise Country” in international community. He defines 
functions of wise country as a conflict prevention, meditation, conflict 
resolution and promoter of universal values. Davutoğlu presents three 
methodological and five operational principles to achieve global objectives 
which guides Turkey’s foreign policy.312 Methodological principles can be 
resumed as; “visionary” approach instead of “crisis oriented” attitude. This 
vision embraces the entire region, as in the example of Middle East. The major 
aim is having good relationship with all the countries in the Middle East to 
operate effectively on the ground.313Second principle is “consistent and 
systematic” framework around the world which provides operating across 360 
degree horizon.314 The last principle is the adoption of new discourse and 
diplomatic style which means the spread of Turkish soft power in the region.315 
From these three methodological approaches, five operational principles 
construct foreign policy of AKP governments. Five operational principles are 
“balance between security and democracy”, “zero problems towards 
                                                          
310
 See, Taşpınar, "Turkey’s Middle East Policies between Neo-Ottomanism and 
Kemalism." 
311
 See, Ahmet Sözen, "A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and 
Challenges," Turkish Studies 11, no. 1 (2010).  
312
  Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy, May 2010," p. 3. 
313
  Ibid. 
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  Davutoğlu, "Fostering a Culture of Harmony," p. 98. 
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 Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy, May 2010," p. 3. 
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neighbors”, “proactive and preemptive peace diplomacy”, “multidimensional 
foreign policy”, “rhythmic diplomacy”.316 
 
 
5.1. Balance between Security and Democracy 
  The legitimization of any government comes from stable domestic 
security within the state. One of the indispensable raison d'etre of a state is to 
provide security for the citizens. But, notably in the post September 11, under 
the threat of terrorism, general attitude has been to restrict civil liberties for the 
sake of security.317 The case of Turkey was different, in order accomplish the 
Copenhagen political criteria for E.U, Turkey increase the domain of individual 
freedoms.318 Davutoğlu explains the stria between security and democracy as 
following: 
We don’t see that these two principles are contradictory to each other. If 
you ignore security for freedom you will have anger and chaos.  If you 
                                                          
316
 See, Davutoğlu, "Fostering a Culture of Harmony.", Davutoğlu, Principles of 
Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional  Political Structuring, Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Zero-
Problems Foreign Policy, May 2010." Aras, "Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy." 
Tarik Oğuzlu, "The ‘Arab Spring’ and the Rise of the 2.0 Version of Turkey’s ‘Zero 
Problems with Neighbors’ Policy," SAM Papers, no. 1 (Feb. 2012). 
317
 Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy, May 2010," p. 4. 
318
 Ahmet Sözen, "Changing Fundamental Principles in Turkish Foreign Policy 
Making," in International Studies Association Annual Convention ( San Diego: March 22-
25, 2006), p. 17. 
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ignore freedom for security, you will have an authoritarian, autocratic 
society. We don’t want to ignore either of these two. 319  
The perfect balance between security and democracy, results as a mature 
democracy. As it is understood from Ahmet Davutoğlu’s definition of balance 
between security and democracy; domestic stability is a major element of 
prosperous foreign policy and vice versa. This operational principle of Turkish 
foreign policy aims to reinforce democracy, promote civil liberties without 
undermining security. AKP government, in fact believes that this is the only 
way Turkish soft power can extend to Middle East region.   
 
 
5.2. Zero Problems with Neighbors 
 Turkey’s relationships with many of her neighbors have been turbulent 
over years.  The idea of zero problem policy is to change “Military state” to 
“trading state” identity by decreasing the muscular role played by the military in 
shaping Turkish foreign policy since the founding of the Kemalist republic. 
Davutoğlu believes that the destabilization in the Middle East sufficiently 
affects internal and external relation of Turkey. Thus, this policy aimed to 
                                                          
319
 Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy, Address by H.E. Foreign Minister of 
Republic of Turkey Ahmet Davutoğlu,   SETA Foundation’s Washington D.C.  Branch, 8 
Dec.  2009,  Grand  Ballroom, Mayflower Hotel, Washington D.C. 12.15pm EST. p.8 
http://arsiv.setav.org/ups/dosya/14808.pdf 
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create a new psychology at home for a new neighboring policy and minimize 
spillover effect of regional problems to Turkey in its sense. 320 
  “Zero Problem” Principe is the cornerstone of AKP’s foreign policy 
activism. This principle based on maximizing cooperation and mutual benefits 
with all the neighborhoods, instead of security–oriented paradigms of the Cold-
War area. Thus zero problems with neighbors aims to minimize hostile relations 
by exerting turkey’s soft power in the region. For Davutoğlu; 
In order to achieve this goal the relations needs to be built on several 
principles like “security for all”, “high level political dialogue,” 
“economical interdependence” and “cultural harmony and mutual 
respect”.321 
 
 
5.3. Proactive and Pre-emptive Peace Diplomacy 
 Turkey with multiple identities, cultural and historical depth, as well as 
assuming key role in the resolution of civilizational and regional disputes322 
may use its unique understanding of Middle East to prevent probable crisis 
before they escalate to a critical level. Proactive and pre-emptive peace 
diplomacy provides “Turkey to be on the ground whether it is in the European 
Union, Middle East or the Caucasus, with a Turkish perspective”.323 
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Recently Turkey as a promising actor in its land basin324 developed significant 
interest in Middle East affairs. Especially, Turkey’s meditation between Arab-
Israel, Syria and Israel, Iran-West and the Muslim-Serb can be resumed as the 
practical consequences of the principle. 
 
 
5.4. Multi-dimensional Foreign Policy 
 During the cold war era, foreign policy understanding of Turkish 
governments depended on security oriented policies (mono-dimensional). In 
accordance with dynamic conjuncture of post-Cold war era, Turkey’s relations 
with U.S, E.U and the Middle East have extended beyond security issue. 
 Multi-dimensional Foreign policy predicate on the engagement in 
diverse areas ranging with neighboring regions and beyond. Simultaneous and 
harmonious relations based on friendship, harmony, cooperation between 
different cultures and faith system construct the heart of this foreign policy 
outlook.  The aim is having complementary relationship in international 
relations not to be in competition.325  
 
 
                                                          
324
  In Strategic Depth Turkeys Land Basin corresponds to : Balkan, Caucasus and the 
Middle East, maritime basin corresponds to : Black sea, Estearn Mediterranean,  Caspian 
seas Persian Gulf . 
325
  Davutoğlu, "Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007," p. 82. 
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5.5. Rhythmic Diplomacy 
 Rhythmic diplomacy can be summarized as an effective use of 
international forums and new initiatives in order to increase global and 
international importance of a country. Rhythmic diplomacy considered as a new 
style in foreign policy theory of post-Cold War era. 
  Ahmet Davutoglu argues that, “If the conditions are dynamic and one 
stands static, then one can not adapt to the conditions. One needs to have a 
constantly moving diplomacy. That’s why I call it rhythmic. In other words, 
even if nothing happens, one has to be active when standing” 326 and he 
continuous, “Turkey’s aim is to intervene consistently in the global issues using 
international platforms, which signifies a transformation for Turkey from a 
central country to a global power”327. In recent years, Turkey hosted several 
international organizations as NATO Summit, OIC Summit, observer status in 
the African Union (natural results of Turkey’s opening to Africa in 2005) Arab 
League, special agreements with Arab countries. 
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 In current Turkish politics the issue of Islam and secularism occupies an 
important place. All the new perfectives came with the rhetoric of change from 
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 Ahmet Davutoğlu Special Editorial, CNN Turk, 17.February. 2004. 
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  Davutoğlu, "Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007," p. 83. 
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Islamic wing founded skeptical by elitist wing and almost always Islamists 
accused to have a secret agenda. Indeed the history of modern Turkey generally 
based on the struggle between Kemalist in order words, elitists and Islamists. 
The question of the changing role of Islam in a world challenged by 
modernization and secularization had been on the agenda among Islamist 
intellectuals. Since the time of Özal and also Ismail Cem argues that in a 
changing environment Turkey need to redefine its foreign policy superiorities 
and compose equilibrium between realities and her national interest. In other 
words Turkey needs to change its security base foreign policy.  
 The significant change on Turkish foreign policy during AKP 
government is one of the few subjects that reach consensus on academic level. 
Especially Ahmet Davutoglu considered as the architect of new foreign policy 
practices. He argues that Turkey need consider her historical and geographical 
background to move towards to “bridge country” to “central country”.  
According to him Turkey needs to create multi-dimensional and 
multidirectional proactive foreign policies in order to strengthen its position so 
as to be a regional power. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 The chapter analyzes Turkey’s unstable relations with nearby Middle 
Eastern countries under AKP governments 2002 to 2013. The focus is to 
examine political, economic, military and diplomatic relations of Turkey with 
Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Israel. Also Cyprus conflict was examined. The bilateral 
relation was analyzed in a chronological order and with a historical perspective. 
 As a consequence of its geopolitical position and the new path of World 
politics in Post-September 11, Turkey’s foreign policy has undergone 
significant changes. From this point of view the main purpose is to find an 
answer to the questions like, “If there is a shift in Western oriented foreign 
policy of Turkey?” or “Is Turkey taking advantage of good relations with 
Middle East to become a central country in world politics?”. 
  The chapter divided into five sections. The first section of the chapter 
examines Turkish-Iraqi relations, the second section focus on Turkish-Syrian 
relations, the fourth section analyzes Turkish-Iranian and the fifth section 
focuses on Turkish-Israelian relations with a strong stress on Palestinian issue 
and finally in the last section Cyprus problem will analyzed. 
  
 
2. The Beginning and the Aftermath of Iraq War and the 
Implementation of Turkey’s Foreign Policy 
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 Iraq has been Turkey’s important neighbor not only right along with 
economic, political and trade relations, but also due to presence of long standing 
historical ties. Turbulent relation between two country dates back to conquest of 
Anatolian peninsula by Turks.328 Before the Ottoman domination, Iraq was 
conquest by other Turkic Empires like Seljuqs329 (until Mongol occupation), Ak 
Koyunlu (Aq Quyunlu, White Sheep Turkmens)330 and Safavid dynasty331. Until 
the end of First World War most of the territory of present day Iraq was ruled 
by Ottoman Empire (1533-1918). Ottoman rule over Iraq lasted when British 
Mandate of Mesopotamia was established by League of Nation Mandate. 
During the First World War Iraqis was one of the Muslim peoples who fought 
                                                          
328
 Yılmaz Öztuna, Başlangıcından Zamanımıza Kadar Türkiye Tarihi (Hayat 
Kitapları, 1967), 57.  
329
 Seljuq: also spelled Seljuk, ruling military family of the Oğuz Turkic tribes that 
invaded southwestern Asia in the 11th century and eventually founded an empire that 
included Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, and most of Iran. Their advance marked the 
beginning of Turkish power in the Middle East. “Seljuq” in Encyclopedia Britannica 
Online,(source:www.britannica.com, 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/533602/Seljuq>, 20 June 2012).  
330
  Ak Koyunlu: also spelled Aq Qoyunlu (“White Sheep”), Turkmen tribal 
federation that ruled northern Iraq, Azerbaijan, and eastern Anatolia from 1378 to 1508. 
Ak Koyunlu in Encyclopedia Britannica Online,(source: www.britannica.com, 
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/11309/Ak-Koyunlu>, 18.June. 2011). 
331
 Safavid Dynasty: (1502–1736), Iranian dynasty whose establishment of Shīʿite 
Islām as the state religion of Iran was a major factor in the emergence of a unified national 
consciousness among the various ethnic and linguistic elements of the country. The 
Ṣafavids were descended from Sheykh Safi od-Din (1253–1334) of Ardabīl, head of the 
Ṣūfī order of Safaviveh (Safawiyah), but about 1399 exchanged their Sunnite affiliation for 
Shīʿism. Safavid Dynasty in Encyclopedia Britannica Online, (source: 
www.britannica.com,<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/516019/Safavid-
Dynasty/>, 18.June.2011) 
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against Turkey under British flag, especially during the war of Dardanelles.332 
At the end, on October 3, 1932, Iraq was admitted to the League of Nations as 
an independent state.333 
 
Map 3: Turkey and Its Neighbors 
 
 
 Unproblematic mutual relations between Turkey and Iraq started with a 
nonaggression pact, called the Sa‘dābād Pact in 1937334 and continued with 
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Iraq’s participation in the pro-Western Baghdad Pact Organization which had 
reinforced the mutual relations.335 Especially during the last half of 1950’s both 
sides was dealing with their domestic problems. Throughout 1960s and more 
precisely in 1970s Ankara stared to keep a worry eye on Iraq’s internal Kurdish 
problem because of Barzani’s peshmerga (Kurdish guerilla forces) activity.336 
Moreover the GAP Project (South Eastern Project) which based on efficient 
usage of Euphrates and Tigris rivers, escalated the crisis between two countries. 
According to Aysegul Kibaroğlu and Waltina Scheumann “during the 1970s, 
1980s and 1990s a number of crises occurred in the region, following the 
unilateral development of several water resource projects”.337 After water crisis, 
following crisis was the petroleum crisis in 1973 that made Turkey search for 
alternative policies to provide equilibrium between oil supply and demand. 
Understanding the role of oil in international politics and international political 
economy Iraq and Turkish governments agreed to build Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil 
pipeline. During the Iran-Iraq war which depreciated Turkish economy, forced 
Turkey to play an active role as a peacemaker during the war.  
                                                          
335
 Henri J. Barkey, "A Transformed Relationship Turkey and Iran " in Iraq, Its 
Neighbors, and the United States: Competition, Crisis, and the Reordering of Power, ed. 
Henri J. Barkey, Scott Lasensky, and Phebe Marr (United States Institute of Peace, 2011), 
p. 46.  
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  Ibid., 47. 
337
 Aysegül Kibaroglu and Waltina Scheumann, "Euphrates-Tigris Rivers 
System:Political Rapprochement and Transboundary Water Cooperation," in Turkey's 
Water Policy: National Frameworks and International Cooperation, ed. Aysegul 
Kibaroglu, Waltina. Scheumann, and Annika Kramer (Springer, 2011), p. 282. 
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 Soon after, Gulf crisis occurred, this period marked by drastic changes in 
international relations.338 The Gulf War in 1991, finally nationalized the 
Kurdish question339  and Özal’s  attention  increasingly  shifted  from economic 
to  key  political  and  foreign  policy  issues  such  as  the  Kurdish question and 
Turkey’s role as an active regional power.340 The other chef importance of Gulf 
War was the Özal’s alliance with Western bloc towards Saddam Hussein. 
Ankara opened its air and land bases for the use of American forces against 
Saddam. Subsequent to Saddam Hussein’s defeat, Kurds in north and Shi’ite 
Arabs in the south rose up against his regime.341 This revolt ended with the 
strong suppression by Iraqi National Forces.  As a result hundreds of thousands 
of Iraqi Kurds seeking refuge in Turkey from Saddam Hussein murderous 
onslaughts.342 Iraqi occupation of Kuwait can be accepted as the turning point 
for Middle East region. Inevitably, Turkey and other countries in the region 
were affected by the adverse events.  As a consequence, the war slowly changed 
the equilibrium of the region and prepared today’s situation of Iraq. 
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  In the post-Gulf war era, Turkey mainly pursued security-oriented 
policy towards Iraq. The basic preoccupations were separatist PKK terrorist 
organization, the status of Kirkuk, relations with Northern Iraq, possibility of 
establishment of a Kurdish state in that region under leadership of KDP-PUK 
and the situation of Turkmens. Differently to previous governments AKP 
manage to separate issues related to terror and Iraq. 
 
 
2.1. The Unwillingness to Help USA: ¿ is Turkey, USA Trojan 
Horse, no? 
 Iraq in general, northern Iraq in particular is the top-level problem of 
Turkish foreign policy at least for 25 years. Turkey has been affected negatively 
by the problems arising from the wars, embargoes and international crisis in 
Iraq. Especially after the Gulf War, PKK utilization of Northern Iraq as a 
“logistic center” and “base” for the attacks towards Turkey can not be prevented 
by any Turkish coalition governments during 90s. For this reason Turkey was 
pleased or pretended to be pleased with Baathist regime which was acting as an 
effective bulwark against Kurdish separatism in Iraq.  
 In 2002 AKP came to power after the arrest of PKK leader Abdullah 
Öçalan343 in 1998. When they came to power priorities of Turkish politics were 
mostly dominated with E.U accession. On the other hand, after 9/11 attacks, US 
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 Abdullah Öçalan, also known as Apo is one of the founding members of the 
militant organization the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in 1978 in Turkey, which is 
internationally listed as a terrorist organization. 
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stared to prepare for Iraqi invasion.344 According to Meliha Altunışık “three 
years after defeating its own separatist Kurdish insurgency Ankara worried 
about the prospect of a new wave of violence on its soil.”345 In conclusion AKP 
government was against the war but at the same time Erdogan wanted to 
maintain good relations with Washington.346And for this reason, Turkey’s 
domestic and foreign policy orientation also gained importance for the United 
States.347 Eventually Bush administration asked for Turkey’s “full and complete 
cooperation” in a possible war against Iraq.348 January 2003, United States 
extend demands included; six airbases and airports and 3 Mediterranean ports 
(both military and civilian) for U.S transport without any notification 
requirement, open Turkish territory for passage some 80.000 U.S troops in Iraq, 
the hosting of U.S forces in Turkish base for landing and the deployment of 
12.000 U.S and British combat troops in south-eastern Turkey and also 
deployment of 60.000 U.S special forces in Turkey for five years.349 Especially 
the idea of British military presence on Turkish territory created social unrest 
and the famous Turkish preoccupation so called Sévres-Syndrome rise from its 
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grave. Also there was a serious lack of public support. 90 per cent of general 
public was against the Turkey’s participation to possible war against Iraq.350 On 
the other hand Erdogan’s U.S visit just before Copenhagen 351 made a clear 
impression that he would give full support to U.S. 352 It was difficult to ignore 
people’s will, at the same time AKP did not want to “stay out of the game”. 
Even though Erdoğan made it clear that he wants to give full support to U.S, it 
was also difficult to participate a war without France and Germany approval on 
the eve of E.U accession negotiations. In the meantime on 23 January 2003  
first Istanbul summit on foreign ministers level organized involving Egypt, Iran, 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria as a result of Abdullah Gul efforts to avert a war 
in Iraq. After all regional diplomacy labor of AKP government shifted back as 
observer status in Arab League.353  
 One day before the vote Turkey’s President Ahmet Necdet Sezer called 
for a UN resolution (for which read a second Security Council resolution) to 
legalize the war of Iraq for to prevent adversary effects on its relations with 
both the EU and Middle Eastern countries. Grand Turkish Assembly refused the 
American 4th Infantry Division to traverse Turkey on route to northern Iraq on 
March 1, 2003. A day later war in Iraq had begun. And this situation made Iraqi 
                                                          
350
 Şenol Karakaş, Biz Bu Savaşi Durdurabiliriz: Türk Savaş Karşiti Hareketin Bir 
Yili (Metis, 2005), p. 19. 
351
  During his visit, Erdogan thanked in advance for U.S lobbying effort of E.U 
summit and on Cyprus issue.  
352
 Philip Robins, "Confusion at Home, Confusion Abroad: Turkey between 
Copenhagen and Iraq," International Affairs 79, no. 3 (2003): p. 561. 
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Ibid., p. 563. 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
FOREIGN POLICY OF TURKEY AND SPAIN VERSUS MIDDLE EAST, AFTER 2002. TRANSITION 
TO DEMOCRACY AND NEW INTERNATIONAL AGENTS 
Gozde Demirel 
Dipòsit Legal: T 957-2014 
 
 T o u c h s t o n e s  o f  M i d d l e  E a s t  P o l i c y  o f  A K P :  I r a q - I r a n -
S y r i a - I s r a e l - C y p r u s  | 155 
 
 
Kurds a more pivotal actor in the post-war developments.354 The new Iraq 
emerged, much to the consternation of Ankara, as a federal state composed of 
two entities; Arab and Kurdish. It should be noted that U.S.A entered the Iraq 
guaranteeing the support of Iraqi Kurds. Also, Iraqi Kurds had succeeded in 
obtaining de jure recognition of their status in Iraq.  
 Along the history one of the major fears of Turkey is being neighbor of 
an independent Kurdish state. Under the protection of United States, Barzani 
and Kurdish federation had the power to rule in their territory. This history of 
power and politics caused the first tension between Turkey and United States. 
The Hood event (Turkish: Çuval Olayı), occurred on 4 July 2003 in 
Süleymaniye. A group of Turkish Special Forces personnel operating in 
Northern Iraq were caught by the Americans, led away with hoods over their 
heads, and interrogated by the United States military. Erdoğan called the event 
“a totally ugly incident” and ordered the closure on Harbur gate. The Turkish 
commandos were released 60-hours afterwards and returned to north Iraq by 
helicopter.355  
 It was clear fact that after March 1 bill, Kurds became the most 
important component of U.S.A’s Iraq policy and AKP government wanted to 
neutralize the power of Kurdish forces in Iraq. For this reason Turkey had 
brokered a meeting between Iraqi Sunni groups and the US ambassador in Iraq 
and thus made it possible for them to participate in the 2005 elections, a 
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12, no. 4 (2011): p. 666. 
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significant step for the effectiveness of the political process in Iraq.356 Since 
2007 there has been an improvement in Turkish-Iraqi relations. Turkey 
enhanced more cooperative relationship with all the communities in Iraq, 
including the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).357 
 
 
2.2. Turkey’s Mesopotamian Vision 
 When Davutoglu drew the main lines of Iraq policy, one of his ideas was 
“re-fertilize Mesopotamia basin”. Beyond all question, this vision directly 
related to PKK and all short of terrorist activities which takes part in the basin. 
In such a way that terrorist activities considered to be the major obstacle against 
the permanent peace of the region and anyone who wants to be a part to such a 
vision will need to fight against all sort of terrorism. As of today, the realization 
of this vision does not look like that it would be easier, at least the essential 
steps were been taken. Since 2008 Turkey has accepted Iraqi Kurdish 
autonomy, opening official ties with the KRG, including a Turkish consulate in 
Erbil, and the KRG has cooperated in Turkey’s fight against the PKK.358 In 
addition Ankara agreed to direct and official dialogue with President Massoud 
Barzani. Erdoğan makes his first official visit to Baghdad and the first such visit 
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by a Turkish prime minister in eighteen years.359  According to Jean Marco ´this 
move also had an impact on Turkey’s relationship with the Arab world.´360  
 A good relation with Iraq in general and KRG in particular is very 
essential for Turkish interest in Middle East. Especially on the eve of permanent 
peace with PKK, Turkey needs the support KRG more than ever. Also it should 
be noted that two major the regional dynamics has driven this shift; for 
balancing Iranian influence in Iraq and the  second  and  more  recent  factor  is  
regional instability unleashed by the Arab Spring. 361Maybe it is the first time in 
Turkish history that Turkey is using-positively- Kurdish card to balance the 
power games among Iran, Turkey and Syria. 
 
 
3. Zero Problem Policy to Multi Problem Policy:  The 
Syrian Case 
 Syria and Turkey has got a long history dates back to 8th century. But the 
real contact between two countries started during Seljuk Dynasty when Turks 
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360
 See, Jean  Marcou, Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Shifting Back to the West after a Drift 
to the East?, ed. Şaban Kadaş, vol. 8, Turkey Policy Brief Series (Tepav, 2013). 
361
 Çagaptay and Evans, Turkey's Changing Relations with Iraq Kurdistan up, 
Baghdad Down, p. 9. 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
FOREIGN POLICY OF TURKEY AND SPAIN VERSUS MIDDLE EAST, AFTER 2002. TRANSITION 
TO DEMOCRACY AND NEW INTERNATIONAL AGENTS 
Gozde Demirel 
Dipòsit Legal: T 957-2014 
 
 T o u c h s t o n e s  o f  M i d d l e  E a s t  P o l i c y  o f  A K P :  I r a q - I r a n -
S y r i a - I s r a e l - C y p r u s  | 158 
 
 
settled into actual Syrian territory. Soon after another Turkic state Mamluks 
replaced the authority gap of the region after the destructive Mongolian 
occupations.362  The Ottomans occupied Syrian territories at 16th century and the 
sovereignty continued until the end of the First World War. 
 By the end of the First World War, French mandate was established by 
League of Nation Mandate. According to Philip K. Hitti “…to Syrians French 
control was more direct and more hateful than that exercised by the Turks”.363 
Syria had several grudges against Turkey because of the Ottoman millet system, 
but after the painfully loss of Alexandretta (Hatay) in 1939, Syria claimed 
France who ruled Syria in a border rectiﬁcation agreement, about ceded 
Alexandretta to Turkey. Syria wanted it back364 and but Hatay became the 63rd 
province of Turkey. The current Turkish- Syrian border has 820 kilometers in 
length. Because of the history of sharing the same land for centuries, the solid 
line indicating where the Republic of Turkey ends and the Syrian Arab 
Republic begin is a complicated history.365  Hatay issue stayed as an obstacle to 
improve good relations with Syria.  
 The other significant conflict between Turkey and Syria is water issue. 
During the 1960s, distribution of the downflow of the Euphrates and the Tigris 
from Turkey to Syria emerged as an issue in relations between the two 
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countries.366 Particularly during 1970s and 1980s Syria and Turkey initialized to 
build water dams on Orontes, Tigris and Euphrates rivers. The turning point of 
the problem started when Turkish authorities began building Ataturk Dam, on 
the Euphrates River in 1983. Syria blamed Turkey to abuse its “water card” 
against Syria, Syrian government struck back with “terror card”367 backing the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK/ Partiya  Kerkaran  Kurdistan), granting 
asylum Armenian guerilla groups ASALA  (Armenian  Secret  Army  for  the 
Liberation of Armenia), both of which the Turks considered to be terrorists 368 
and supporting the Turkish radical left (Dev-Sol).369 Indeed, in 1983, Turkey 
publicly announced its aversion with Syria’s support of anti-Turkish 
elements.370In July 1987 under the presidency of Turgut Özal, Turkey realized 
first official meetings with Syria to regulate water share between two countries 
and to solve the security problems. Water became the key element in the 
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balance of power. Syrian prime minister told that 'they would sign the security 
protocol only if Turkey entered into formal water agreement.'371 
 Particularly during the 1990s, Turkey’s two major problems with Syria 
centered on water and the activities of the PKK.372 By 1995, Ankara was 
spending as much as $11 billion a year to fight against the PKK, a part of which 
went to building new military outposts and paying premiums to state workers in 
the region. In addition to Special Forces, police and village guards was the part 
of this bloody conflict. Turkey also deployed some 220,00 troops in the 
region—trying to put a quarter of NATO’s second largest army in a domestic 
battle.373 But despite all the effort that has been made, terrorist attacks of PKK 
did not decelerate. By 1996 Turkish authorities asked Syrian government to 
annihilate the PKK headquarters in Damascus and expel the group’s leader, 
Abdullah Öçalan, after Syria refusal Turkey suspended all governmental 
contacts with Damascus.374 
 In 1998 Turkey entered in a painful period, increasing terrorism was 
affecting all sorts of political and social life. Especially Syrian attitude of 
backing PKK bring both states to a war level. It was the boiling point of mutual 
relations. Ankara asked Damascus to extradite Abdullah Öçalan. Thanks to 
diplomatic attempts of Iran and Egypt, the 1998 crisis was prevented. As Sami 
                                                          
371
 Özden Zeynep Okytav, "Water Dispute and Kurdish Separatism in Turkish-Syrian 
Relations," The Turkish Yearbook 34 (2003): p. 103. 
372
 See, Çarkoglu and Eder, "Domestic Concerns and the Water Conflict over the 
Euphrates-Tigris River Basin," p. 71. 
373
 Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The Pkk and the Kurdish Fight for Independence 
(NYU Press, 2007), p. 248-49. 
374
 Rubin, The Truth About Syria, p. 121. 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
FOREIGN POLICY OF TURKEY AND SPAIN VERSUS MIDDLE EAST, AFTER 2002. TRANSITION 
TO DEMOCRACY AND NEW INTERNATIONAL AGENTS 
Gozde Demirel 
Dipòsit Legal: T 957-2014 
 
 T o u c h s t o n e s  o f  M i d d l e  E a s t  P o l i c y  o f  A K P :  I r a q - I r a n -
S y r i a - I s r a e l - C y p r u s  | 161 
 
 
Moubayed explains “Syria’s  late  president  Hafez  Al-Assad  complied  and 
Öçalan  fled  Syria;  he  was  captured  in  Kenya  in  November  1998  and  
deported  to Turkey where he currently languishes in a Turkish jail.”375 
According to Carolyn C. James and Özgür Özdamar “Turkish-Syrian relations, 
especially during the 1987–1998 periods, are an ideal example   of   how   
domestic   ethnic   conﬂicts   are   internationalized.”376    
 
 
3.1. The resolution in PKK issue and the development of 
mutual relations 
 AKP government is realizing drastic changes in traditional security-
oriented foreign policy concept of Turkey. The development in mutual relations 
with Syria is one of the evident examples of this change. Particularly after the 
resolution of PKK issue, Turkey established closer ties with Syria under the 
frame of zero problem principle with Turkish periphery. Following Adana 
protocol which was signed after the expel of Abdullah Öçalan improved the 
mutual relations. In 2000 Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s participation of the funeral of 
Hafez al-Assad regenerated damaged relationship between two countries and 
marked the initialization of constructive   relations.  United States of America 
highly criticized this historic visit. On the other hand Ahmet Necdet Sezer's visit 
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was vital for Syria which was growingly being dominated over the occurrences 
in Lebanon. Notably after the support of Turkey to Syria, under the threat of 
international isolation because of Syrian culpability in assassination of former 
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, the obstacles in front of the mutual 
relations like Hatay conflict and water issue gradually erased from political 
agenda 
 The conjuncture of world politics after 9/11 was beyond the two 
countries policymaking capabilities. As a result of regional and international 
developments, two countries came closer within the context of realist 
understanding. According to Özlem Tür “For Syria, feeling cornered by 
increasing US – and, to some extent, European –pressure and threatened by 
developments in Iraq, Turkey became a logical partner.”377 
 Relations  began  to  normalize  since  1998,  reinforced  by  the  Turkish  
Prime Minister’s visit to Syria in December 2004 and Syrian President Bashar 
al-Assad’s visit to Ankara in January 2005 to sign  a  trade  cooperation  
agreement.  In 2004, al-Assad's official visit to Turkey is one of the most 
important indicators of Syrian positive tendency towards Turkey Another  point  
that  makes  this  visit  so important  is  that  Al-Assad  is  the  ﬁrst  Syrian  
president  to  visit  Turkey. Therefore, Syria was considering Turkey as an 
important ally in the region and as a gateway to the E.U on the other hand 
Turkey was counting Syria as a gateway for Turkish goods to the Gulf. In 
September 2009, Turkey and Syria ended visa requirements between the two 
states. This, along with a free trade agreement, ensured that people and goods 
                                                          
377
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could pass freely over the same borders that had been sealed for almost eleven 
years earlier. In what marks a signiﬁcant turnaround in relations Damascus and 
Ankara have found themselves increasingly closely integrated over the past 
decade.378As Davutoğlu emphasized “… the economic interdependence and 
diplomatic relations between Syria and Turkey stand as a model of progress for 
the rest of the region.”379  
 
 
3.2. The Syrian uprising and the role of Turkey 
 The evolution in Turkish-Syrian relations in the past decades, from 
enmity to close friendship, changed its facet again from close friendship to 
enmity. Syrian border is the longest land border of Turkey. This reality has 
directly been affected transport and trade potential of two countries.380 Because 
of this reality before the Syrian uprising, relations between Syria and Turkey 
have essentially been driven by pragmatism on both sides. When the first Syrian 
refugees crossed the border into Turkey On April 29, 2011, Turkish government 
did not estimate that two years later, the country hosts some 600,000 Syrian 
                                                          
378
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379
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refugees-200,000 of them living in 21refugee camps with an additional 400,000 
living outside of the camps.381 
Source: AFAD
382  
 
Source: AFAD 
                                                          
381
 Osman Bahadır Dinçer et al., Turkey and Syrian Refugees: The Limits of 
Hospitality (Brookings 2013), p. 2. 
382
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 According to Bülent Aras “…the Arab Spring is the part of a larger 
transformation, which is not likely to end without a re-orientation of the 
political landscape of the countries in Middle East.”383  From this point of view, 
the changes in Arab Middle East are the result this bloody re-orientation where 
the civilians dies for democracy and equal rights. Especially the Syrian uprising 
became the most complicated and bloody transformation since the winds of the 
Arab Revolution started to blow. The uniqueness of the Syrian case is its ability 
to unite even the hostile countries of the world politics. History of this 
complicated power and politics can be seen in the image 3. China and U.S.A, 
U.S.A and Iran, Iran and Israel are hostile to each other. Among these countries 
China, Iran, also leader of Hezbollah publicly declared their support to Bashar 
al-Asad.384 At the beginning of Syrian uprising, in March 2011 U.S secretary of 
state, Hilary Clinton, has said that U.S will not intervene in Syria in the way it 
has in Libya.385 U.S and Israel never said that they are backing up Bashar al –
Asad but maybe because of the Al Qaeda-linked groups in Syrian rebel 
infighting386 they almost stayed quiet against the war crimes committed by 
Syrian regime. When Asad used chemical weapons against the rebels and 
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Declared 
support 
 
 Undeclared    
support 
 
Syrians387 the U.S, U.K and Turkey have warned Syria that its use such 
weapons would trigger military retribution.388 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Newspaper articles and internet news 
 
At the end Asad gave up using the chemical weapons and keep on with 
traditional method to kill civilians. The other important player of this game is 
Russia. Russia and China veto three times U.N Resolution on Syria sanctions.389 
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Figure 3: Power Games in Syrian Civil War 
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 On the other hand there is no secret that Saudis helping the rebels. 390 
Also Turkey has sent a large volume of heavy weapons to all the rebel groups in 
Syrian uprising including al-Nusra Front, also Turkey hosts Syrian refugees and 
helped the Free Syrian Army to form their political unity.391 The Syrian War has 
attracted huge amount of foreign volunteers who fight against the Asad and also 
who are backing the regime. The majority comes from the Arab world, with 
Saudi Arabia, Libya, Tunisia and Iraq. The second-largest grouping is Western 
Europeans, especially from the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands. Conservative estimate would place the number of foreigners at 
5,000 individuals, while a more liberal estimate could be upward of 10,000.392
 Syria’s demographics include Shia, Christian and Kurdish minorities 
encompasses by sixty-percent Sunni Arab majority. Syria’s Shia sects include 
the Alawites, who constitute approximately twelve percent of Syrians but whose 
members include the Assad family.393 This heterogonous demographics 
structure of Syria causes fractures within the society. As a result, there is also 
another civil war within the Syrian Civil War; between Kurdish forces and 
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radical Islamits in the northeast of the country394 and between secular and 
religious Syrians in various rebel-held towns and cities395.  
 Turkey is one of the non-Arab states that is the most affected by the 
Arab Revolutions of 2011. Especially the Syrian Uprising damaged all the 
efforts that have been done to re-generate Turkish foreign policy. As a 
consequence Turkish-Syrian and Turkish-Iranian relations are damaged. Şaban 
Kardaş says that “Turkey conducts its Syria policy very much on the liberal 
principles that underpin the normative bases of the international order”396. But 
the reality shows the actions of Turkish Government caused a lot pain to 
Turkish citizens as in the example of Reyhanlı397. On the other hand, according 
to Ahmet Davutoglu, “From Syria to Iran regional stability depends on 
Washington and Ankara’s continued cooperation.”398 It seems that Ankara’s 
stable, peaceful mutual relations and consolidated economic ties with Damascus 
will only be possible though a new regime.   
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4. Two effective powers in Middle East Turkey and Iran 
 Throughout the history Turkey and Iran have a closer understanding of 
each other. Like other countries of the region; the lands currently named as Iran 
became province of Seljuk Turks while Persians continued to live in their 
culture and sects with a broad of freedom.399 Moreover Turks participated in 
state construction period and military organization in Iran,400 whereas Turkish 
language and culture was profoundly affected by Persian language and 
traditions.401 Even the Ottoman and Safeties empires were formed by nomadic 
Turkish origin tribes402; they had a complex and rival relationship with a strong 
stress on regional power politics. Both empires clashed many times in order to 
capture Baghdad, Tabriz, and Karbala. The War of Çaldıran which took place 
on 24 August 1514 between Yavuz Sultan Selim and the Safavid Shah Ismail 
ended with Ottoman victory and prevented Safavid expansionism to the 
Ottoman Empire.403 At the end of more than two centuries of unsolved conflicts 
between Ottomans and Safeties, they  signed the Treaty of Qasr-i  Shirin (17 
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May 1639) which  were to survive  with  little  change  into  modern  times.404 
The struggle between two powerful empires of Middle East continued until the 
decline of Ottoman Empire without any supremacy for both sides and every 
border conflict solved based on Treaty of Qasr-i Shirin. 
  After  the  collapse  of  Ottoman  Empire,  Turkish  - Iranian  relations  
started  to  develop as two  secular  neighbors. Even though Reza Shah Pahlavi 
declared that he did not want to follow Ataturk’s anti-Islamic path of 
secularization405, secularity interpretation of both states pulled Mustafa Kemal 
and Reza Shah Pahlavi together.406 Additionally, the Kurdish population settling 
both in Iran and Turkey, on the other hand the Soviet imperialism treating both 
states, caused to develop similar co-operative security policies. As a result of 
the chaotic environment, Iran and Turkey signed Turkish - Iranian Friendship 
and Security Treaty to reinforced mutual understanding and to recognized 
borders along with sovereignties of the states. Soon after non-aggression pact 
named as Sadabat Pact signed among Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan.  
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During the Cold War years Turkey was essential neighbor of Iran 407 against 
increasing Soviet threat. 
 The Islamic revolution of Iran headed by Imam Khomeini changed the 
dynamic of mutual relations. Ecevit administration which was in power at that 
time pursued a cautious foreign policy during the revolution period.408Main 
concern of the Ecevit administration was that Iran would break apart because of 
internal chaos and be exposed to Soviet intervention and this power vacuum 
could strengthen the Kurdish nationalist movement.409 Thus, two days after its 
establishment Turkey recognized the new regime in Iran on 13 February 1979. 
After the revolution the ideological rivalry become milestone of the relations. 
The following crisis was Iran-Iraq war. Turkey declared that it would adhere to 
neutral policy in the Iran-Iraq War410 but tried to develop its economic relations 
with Iran.411 Especially Turgut Özal thought that close economic relations with 
Iran were vital for Turkish interests. Therefore Turkey and Iran became regional 
allies as the member of Baghdad Pact, Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) 
and Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD).412 Yet, those relations were 
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not only limited to commercial relations. Following Gulf War brought Iran and 
Turkey together to prevent the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in 
Northern Iraq. 
 Throughout the history the relations of Turkey and Iran as non-Muslim 
countries of Middle East followed a fluctuating line. The headlines of the 
relations were; trade, energy, the Kurds and PKK, export of the revolution, 
Iranian opponents living in Turkey and Turkey’s efforts at mediating the war. 
Even though mutual economic interests have always constituted an important 
factor, the mutual relations between Iran and Turkey characterized by both 
conflict and collaboration.413 
 
 
4.1. Is Turkey mediator or provocateur between Iran and the 
world? 
 It should be said that the relationship between Turkey and Iran was never 
been easy. Geopolitics, ethnic minorities, economic ties and trade are the factors 
that have shaped Turkish-Iranian relations since the establishment of Turkish 
Republic. Before AKP era, Turkey had already breached relations with Iran 
based on common economic interest and Kurdish uprising threating the 
territorial integrity of both states. The nature of Turkish-Iranian relations until 
2002 basically shows two main trends. One is the political, economic 
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cooperation. The other is a trend of disagreement and strife. Considering the 
fact that both countries with their multi-ethnic character have been considered 
gate ways to Central Asia and Caucasus and above all they have high trade 
volume which makes them natural shareholder of the region.414 Notably, the 
chaotic environment of Middle East after the invasion of Iraq started to make 
Ankara and Tehran get closer.415 Furthermore Turkey’s rejection of support for 
the Iraqi invasion lessened Turkey’s image as U.S ally in the eyes of Iranians.416 
 In 2002 Turkey entered to a new era in the terms of foreign policy, and 
as well Turkey’s internal politics underwent a radical change. Likewise, AKP 
gradually changed traditional mindset of Turkish foreign policy with a novel 
worldview of Turkey being a central player in world politics, thus emphasizing 
greater regional activism and trade-driven foreign relations.417In addition, good 
relations with Iran become one of the most important goals. June 17, 2002, 
Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer for the first time paid a high-level visit 
to Islamic Republic of Iran. He said that "no one prevents Turkish-Iranian 
relations to improve. Turkey and Iran have been neighbors for ages. Improving 
political, trade, economy relations is beneficial for both sides" and Khamtemi 
                                                          
414
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declared that "they support Turkey’s EU membership and their mutual interests 
is to fight terrorism”418 
  After Ahmet Necdet Sezer’s historical visit to Iran, Turkish - Iranian 
trade capacity notably increased. As a result, by 2008 Turkey’s export to Iran 
reached two billion US dollars. In addition Iran has become Turkey’s second-
largest supplier of natural gas after Russia, and Turkey’s fifth-largest trading 
partner.419   
Table 3: Official Visits between Iran and Turkey since 1990 
Date Turkish Leaders Iranian Leaders 
Jul 1994 Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel  
August 1996 Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan  
December 1996  President Ali Akbar Hashemi 
Refsanjani 
July 2002 President Ahmet Necdet Sezer  
July 2004 Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan 
 
August 2008  President Ahmadinejad 
January 2009  Speaker of Parliament Ali 
                                                          
418
 "Sezer:No One Prevents Turkkish-Iranian Relations to Improve," Hurriyet Daily 
News 19 June 2002. 
419
 Bülent  Aliriza, Jon B.  Alterman, and Andrew C. Kuchins, The Turkey, Russia, 
Iran Nexus Driving Forces and Strategies (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
2013), p. 5. 
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Larijani and meets with 
President Abdullah Gül 
November 
2009 
 President Ahmadinejad 
May 2010 The presidents of Turkey and Brazil 
attended the Group 15 summit in 
Tehran. 
 
May 2010 Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu  
December 2010  President Ahmadinejad 
February 2011 President Abdullah Gül  
May 2011  President Ahmadinejad 
January 2012  Speaker of Parliament Larijani 
January 2012 Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu  
October 2013  Foreign Minister Mohammed 
Cevad Zarif 
Source: Newspaper articles and internet news 
 
The other substantial cooperation was against PKK and PJK420. At the 
end of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit in July 2004 the two countries signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding on Security Cooperation421 and they agreed to 
fight against the terrorism.  
                                                          
420
 PJK: Party of Free Life in Kurdistan is the Iranian branch of PKK which created 
after the capture of Abdullah Ocalan.  
421
 Altunışık, "Turkey's Changing Middle East Policy," p. 155. 
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 The most significant issue on Turkish-Iranian relations was the Turkish 
attitude vis-á-vis Iranian nuclear programme. Notably, the debates on Turkish 
drift from the West started when Iran signed nuclear fuel-swap deal with 
Turkey on May 17, 2010.422 Under the deal, Iran would ship 1,200kg of low-
enriched uranium (LEU) which corresponds to 3.5percent of Iran’s LEU423 to 
Turkey in return for the fuel rods.424 The agreement signed in Tehran between 
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula 
da Silva and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. As Graham Fuller 
explains “These two medium-size powers, Brazil and Turkey, have just 
challenged the guiding hand of Washington in determining nuclear strategy 
toward Iran; they undertook their own initiative to persuade Iran to accede to a 
deal on the handling of nuclear fuel issues.”425  
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have been defending Iran’s right to develop peaceful 
nuclear technology, even offering to meditate between Iran and the West.426 
Turkey also used its seat on the UN Security Council to vote against imposing 
additional sanctions on Iran.427 In conclusion Brazil and Turkey have resisted 
                                                          
422
 "Iran Signs Nuclear Fuel-Swap Deal with Turkey," BBC News May.17.2010. 
423
 "Iran Signs Nuclear Fuel Swap Deal with Turkey and Brazil," Telegraph 
May.17.2010. 
424
 Julian Borger, "Iran-Turkey Nuclear Swap Deal 'Means New Sanctions Are 
Unnecessary'," The Guardian May.17.2010. 
425
 Graham E. Fuller, "Brazil and Turkey Shift Global Politics," New Perspectives 
Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2010): p. 23. 
426
 Özcan and Özdamar, "Uneasy Neighbours; Turkish Iran Relation since the 1979 
Islamic Revolution," p. 114. 
427
 Sinan  Ulgen, "A Place in the Sun or Fifteen Minutes of Fame? Understanding 
Turkey’s New Foreign Policy," Carnegie Endowment For International Peace 1 
(December 2010): p. 2. 
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US-led efforts to push through new sanctions against Iran to stop uranium 
enrichment activity. Turkey believed isolating Iran form the international 
community did not mean controlling   Iranian nuclear programme and it should 
better be applying diplomatic methods in lieu applying embargos. As a result of 
to the efforts that have been done by Turkey to integrate Iran to the international 
arena and to diminish economic sanctions against Iran, they stared to co-operate 
 
Figure 4:  Iran, Turkey and Brazil celebrate the nuclear fuel swap deal 
 
Place and Date: Tehran, 17/May/2010, From left to right, Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso 
Amorim, Brazilian President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, Iranian Foreign Minister 
Manouchehr Mottaki, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Turkish Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, joined hands after 
signing a nuclear fuel swap deal. 
Source: The Guardian 
 
in regional issues like Iraqi neighborhood countries conference  and the meeting 
of Friends of Democratic Pakistan. Consequently, Western powers and US was 
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skeptical on the agreement428 and after the pressure that have been made to 
Brazil and Turkey by US, they have broken the deal with Iran.429 
 Arab Revolutions changed the regional dynamics; Turkey and Iran have 
found themselves supporting different political factions in Syria and Bahrain. 
As a result of its immediate foreign-policy interests, Turkey re-started to 
cooperate more with its tradition Western allies and US. Meanwhile Ankara and 
Washington agreed that nuclear-armed Iran is dangerous for the Middle East 
and their own interests. 430 Even Turkey and Iran seeks for power in Middle East 
along with powerful Saudis and Qataris, economic relations between Iran and 
Turkey remains its acceleration, for example the volume of trade transaction in 
the first eleven months of 2013 reached over $ 13.5 billion. 
 
 
5. Israel and Turkey, Enemy or Friend? 
 Since the end of the Cold-War, one of the most significant 
rapprochements within the Middle East was Turkish-Israeli alignment. The 
historical roots of this relationship dates back to the expulsion of Jews from 
Spain in 1492. Subsequent to expulsion, Jews incorporated into Ottoman 
                                                          
428
 David Sanger and Slackman Michael, "U.S. Is Skeptical on Iranian Deal for 
Nuclear Fuel," The New York Times May.17.2010. 
429
 Stephern Kinzer, "Iran's Nuclear Deal " The Guardian May.17.2010. 
430
 Philipp C. Bleek and Aaron Stein, "Turkey and America Face Iran," Survival 54, 
no. 2 (2012): p. 27. 
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Empire.431 According to Amikam Nachmani notes “Historically the Jews never 
suffered  persecution  in  Turkey,  and  no  Jewish  blood  had  ever  been 
spilled there by Turks”432 and he continues “Turkish Jews who freely  migrated 
to Israel did not leave as a result of persecution or deprivation, although they 
left in their masses.”433 It should be pointed out that history of Turkish-Jew 
relations based on mutual understanding. 
 Turkey is the first Muslim majority country that recognized Israel in 
1949 shortly after its establishment. The good reciprocal relations between 
Israel and Turkey gained acceleration during the government periods of Adnan 
Menderes and Ben Gurion.434 On the other hand “Turkey established official 
relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1975 and also 
recognized the Palestinian State established in exile on 15 November 1988”.435 
Thus Turkey became the first country cooperating with Israel recognizing the 
existence of Palestine state. Throughout the Cold War and since then successive 
Turkish political and military leaders of the Kemalist (secular) establishment 
                                                          
431
 Joshua Walker, "Turkey and Israel's Relationship in the Middle East," 
Mediterranean Quarterly 17, no. 4 (Fall 2006): p. 62-66. 
432
 Amikam  Nachmani, Israel, Turkey, and Greece: Uneasy Relations in the East 
Mediterranean (Frank Cass, 1987), p. 147. 
433
 Ibid., p. 48. 
434
 See, Ofra Bengio, The Turkish-Israeli Relationship Changing Ties of Middle 
Eastern Outsiders (Palgrave Macmillian 2010), p. 46-42. 
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have viewed links to Israel as a pro-western non-Arab Middle Eastern state in 
terms of Turkey’s historic Western orientation in foreign policy.436 
 In the 1990s, relations between Israel and Turkey were quiet perfect. In 
1991, the number of high-level state visits increased, following in 1997 free 
trade agreement was signed437. Also they realized a sophisticated military 
cooperation process in 1996 unusual in the history of Turkey’s relations with 
any Middle Eastern country.438 Further to that Israeli companies became 
involved in the modernization efforts of the Turkish military, a growing number 
of Israeli tourists visited Turkey’s southern costs. Until the end of 90s the 
relations between Israel and Turkey greatly expanded and reached an 
unprecedented degree of closeness. Both states signed enough trade, tourism 
and cultural agreements that can created an affiliation between Ankara and Tel 
Aviv. In conclusion Israel together with Turkey has become a determinant 
element in the politics of the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean areas.439 
Also it should not put aside the positive effect of ‘soft coup’ of the June 1997 
against Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan and his Welfare (Refah) 
Party colleagues in terms of domestic considerations such as public support for 
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 Michael B. Bishku, "How Has Turkey Viewed Israel?," Israel Affairs 12, no. 1 
(2006): p. 177. 
437
 Amikam  Nachmani, "The Remarkable Turkish - Israeli Tie," The Middle East 
Quarterly 5, no. 2 (1998): p. 25.  
438
 Tarik Oğuzlu, "The Changing Dynamics of Turkey–Israel Relations: A Structural 
Realist Account," Mediterranean Politics 15, no. 2 (2010): p. 274.  
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the Palestinian struggle.440 According to Daniel Pipes “The events in Sincan 
point up an extremely significant strategic development: a budding Turkish-
Israeli alignment with the potential to alter the strategic map of the Middle East, 
to reshape American alliances there, and to reduce Israel's regional isolation.”441 
Conversely, to the pragmatic relations built in 90s, over the last decade 
Turkish–Israeli relation going through a cooling-off period.442 Especially the 
violent policies of Ariel Sharon government towards Palestinians caused 
unforeseen reaction of three party coalition government led by Bülent Ecevit. 
He told that “…genocide was being committed against the Palestinians and that 
the administration of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon had chosen the path of 
occupation and war.”443 The complex nature of Turkish-Israeli relations based 
on pragmatic policies stayed as usual after Ecevit’s ‘genocide’ declaration but it 
should be noted that under AKP governance the mutual relations has become 
more complex than before. 
 
 
                                                          
440
 See, Hakan Yavuz, "Turkish–Israeli Relations through the Lens of the Turkish 
Identity Debat," Journal of Palestine Studies 27, no. 1 (Autumn 1997): p. 27-31.;Bülent 
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5.1. The Relationship between Israel and AKP 
 Justice and Development Party victory in 2002 initially did not change 
the nature of mutual relations between two states. Notwithstanding Israeli 
authorities publicly put into words their worries about the Islamic past of AKP 
government and also Israeli preoccupations “… that relations with their closest 
friend in the region might cool.”444 The first serious tension between Israel and 
Turkey broke out in 2004 when Israeli army assassinated Sheikh Ahmed 
Yassin, the spiritual leader of militant Palestinian organization Hamas.445 
Erdogan accused Ariel Sharon of “state terrorism” against Palestinians and 
associated it to their bad treatment under Spanish Inquisition.446 The speech of 
Erdogan made tremendous impact both in national and international level. 
Moreover it helped Erdogan to recuperate bad reputation of Turkey among Arab 
neighbors. At the same time the international conjuncture was quiet complicated 
for Turkey. In 2004 AKP government was facing with serious crisis like, the 
resumption of PKK activities in Northern Iraq, the need for international 
support against the Armenian genocide drafts law and the critical process of 
Annan Plan towards Cyprus peace. On the other hand, relations with United 
States were damaged because of the March 1 bill. Therefore Turkey chooses to 
soften its relations with Israel. Due to this perspective the normalization of 
relations gained acceleration. First a delegation headed by Justice and 
Development Party Foreign Affairs Council director Şaban Dişli, Egemen Bağış 
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Ömer Çelik and  Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu visited Israel on September 2, 2004.447 
After, Abdullah Gül as the Foreign Minister of Republic of Turkey paid another 
official visit. 448 Eventually, on May 1, 2005 Turkish Prime Minister undertook 
an official visit to restore economic and politic ties with Israel.449 During his 
visit, Recep Tayyip Erdogan offered to serve as a peace mediator in Middle 
East conflicts. 
 The significant change in Israeli politics came with Hamas victory in 
2005 elections.450 Hamas was accepted as a terrorist organization according to 
E.U blacklist 451 and this situation caused worries among western countries and 
Israel. At the same time Hamas’s was refusing to recognize Israel. This 
situation lunched as the main concern of international community.452 Above all 
Turkish Prime Minister mentioned that international community should respect 
free will of Palestinians.453 Soon after the elections AKP also took a huge step 
and invited Khaled Mashel, the leader of Hamas’ political wing based in 
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Damascus, to Ankara.454 The idea of AKP was to serve as a third party in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This invitation was harshly criticized by Israel, 
United States and secular elites of Turkey and interpreted as an unfriendly 
action that would damage Turkish-Israeli relations. Moreover Davutoğlu met 
twice in Syria with Khaled Mashel.455 In spite of hard critics over Turkey’s 
meditation initiatives in Israeli-Palestine conflict, from the  other side of river 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s request for help from Erdoğan. Turkey was 
acting like a spokesperson of Hamas in the international arena. As Bülent Aras 
explained so clearly, “in this sense, Turkey has started a mediation process 
between HAMAS and international actors while maintaining regular contacts 
with Fatah, the Palestinian Authority and Abbas. Ankara’s contribution at this 
point has been to motivate HAMAS to take pragmatic steps and ensure a 
rapprochement among the Palestinian factions.”456 Turkey’s eagerness to play 
mediator role in Middle East conflicts opened a new horizon in its relations with 
neighboring states. Meanwhile Ankara was searching for possibilities of 
mediation between Israel and Syria. The talks started in February 2008 when 
both sides became ripe. Turkey conducted ﬁve rounds of indirect talks in 
Istanbul until December 2008.457 5 days after the last meeting, on 27 December 
2008 Israel attacked Gaza. During Israel’s three-week offensive in the Gaza 
Strip in December 2008 and January 2009, 1,417 Palestinians, including 926 
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civilians killed.458 Turkish government was feeling angry, and with a sense of 
betrayal because shortly before the attacks, Israeli officials visiting Turkey 
guaranteed that there would be no resort to a military option.459 Continuously 
Turkish government announced that they put an end to their honest broker role 
in Israeli-Syrian conflict. The  result  was  that  Erdogan  described  the  Israeli 
operation in Gaza using statements like: ‘crime against humanity’, 
‘disrespectful behavior  against  Turkey’,  ‘we’ll  not  take  side  with  the  
oppressors’.460 
 Turkish disgruntlement with Israeli policies came to a head when 
Erdoğan exchanged vitriolic statements with Shimon Peres on the sidelines of 
the World Economic Forum meetings in Davos in late 2008. Erdogan thought 
that Peres was simply trying to help legitimize the use of disproportional force 
by Israel’s defense forces against Hamas.461 In the last minute of meeting he 
said “one minute”  and turned to the Shimon Peres and he continued “Mr. Peres, 
you are older than me,” he said. “Your voice comes out in a very loud tone. And 
the loudness of your voice has to do with a guilty conscience. My voice, 
however, will not come out in the same tone.” Resisting efforts by Mr. Ignatius 
to end the session, Erdoğan continued, saying President Peres, “When it comes 
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to killing, you know well how to kill.” Finally he declared that Davos is over for 
Erdoğan.462 
Figure 5:  Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey, left, and 
President Shimon Peres of Israel at a discussion on Gaza in Davos, 
Switzerland. 
 
Place and Date: Davos, 29/January/2009 
Source; The New York Times 
 
 After Davos Erdoğan became the rising star of the Middle East. He 
integrated himself so much to Palestinian issue that Arab leaders have had to 
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declare that the Palestinian issue was an internal Arab matter.463 It should be 
mention that whatever happened in Davos Conference was less important than 
how it was interpreted. In pursuit of Davos the main concern was Turkey’s 
reorientation in Muslim world. The skeptical ideas on AKP’s conservative 
Islam identity consolidate after Davos. 
 The most serious development in relations between Israel named as Mavi 
Marmara incident. In June 2010, the Israeli navy stormed the Turkish vessel 
Mavi Marmara that carries humanitarian aid to Gaza. Israeli navy killed nine 
people whom were majority Turkish and injure other civilians onboard. Israel 
described the incident as normal self-defense, whereas Turkish statesmen called 
it an act of “piracy,” “murder by a state” 464 and “state terrorism.”465 Turkey was 
waiting for an official apology and an objective jurisdiction on the issue. UN 
report which said Israel's blockade of Gaza was a legal security measure, 
Turkey expelled the Israeli ambassador.466 Three years after the incident, in 
March 2013 Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a phone call of 
apology to his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan.467 The positive step 
can be considerate as the re-generation of Turkish-Israeli relations. 
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6. Why Cyprus is so important for Turkey and for the 
Middle East 
 Cyprus is the third largest island which situates in maritime crossroads of 
the Eastern Mediterranean basin. The island is neighbor with Greece, Turkey, 
Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Egypt. Its location at the crossroad of three 
continents (Asia, Europe and Africa) and the entire Mediterranean civilizations 
made it natural stopover and natural place to clam as strategic base. The 
population of the island-about 1,120,489-is composed of 77% Greeks, 18% 
Turkish and 5% Armenians, Maronites, and Latins. 
 For more than five decades the ongoing ethno-religious conflict between 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, which characterized by a continuing 
tension and mistrust between two communities affected all the spheres of daily 
and political life in physically and demographically divided island of 
Mediterranean Sea. Protection of their own collective identities and attachment 
to their ‘mother lands’ elaborates the dynamic and complicated nature of 
identity and border conflict in Cyprus. 
 Almost 60 years have passed since the internationalization of the Cyprus 
Question. The United Nations , European Union , the various players in the 
international scene and the two ethnic communities of the island, Greek 
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are still working to solve the Cyprus problem 
with a serious examination of its peacekeeping and peacemaking operations but 
even today there is no certain solution, the island still remains physically, 
demographically and culturally divided and the atmosphere of mistrust between 
communities keeps its actuality. Several studies have been conducted, all 
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aiming the identification of the causes and suggest possible scenario towards the 
resolution of the conflict.468The ongoing decades-long physical and cultural 
separation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots has resulted to what 
Bryant described as ‘ethnic estrangement’. Ethnic estrangement has been 
reinforced by intensive processes of ‘nation-building’ in both communities, 
heightening their respective ‘Greekness’ and ‘Turkishness’, while constructing 
the other community as the ‘ethnic-Other’ and ‘arch-enemy’ of the ethnic 
self.469 From this point of view, it is clear that the case of Cyprus is totally 
shaped by the image of the ‘other’ and ‘self’. Sometimes in the mind of Greek 
Cypriots identifies, Turkish identity in the case of ‘difference in mentality’ as 
the element of Turkish identity , which they integrated into a larger explanatory 
framework of West equal to civilized versus East which equal to uncivilized. 
This story has produce a world of spate peoples each with their culture and each 
organized in a society which can legitimately be isolated for description as an 
island itself.470 
 In the case of Cyprus both ethnic membership and nationalism have 
played a key role in the process of boundary formation between Greek Cypriots 
and Turkish Cypriots. Especially after 1963, Greek and Turkish nationalisms 
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 Arax-Marie Yildizian and Anoush Ehteshami Ehteshami, "Ethnic Conflict in 
Cyprus and the Contact Hypothesis: An Empirical Investigation," in Interdisciplinary 
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had become the matters of official policy. The ongoing propaganda war gained 
more ground in the absence of contact between the two communities. In the 
process of ‘nation-building’ two communities use their ‘Greekness’ and 
‘Turkishness’ and their attachment of their ‘motherland’. Because of this ethnic 
policy we could not talk about the common ‘Cypriotness’ that can unify the 
state and the people. 
 Many invaders, settlers and immigrants have come here over the 
centuries, and the island has seen Egyptians, Phoenicians, Assyrians, Ptolemies, 
Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Crusaders, Lusignans, Venetians, Ottomans, and, 
of course, the British Empire–before gaining its independence in 1960. Among 
all these rulers, only the Greeks and Turks have had a significant and long-
lasting demographic impact on modern Cypriot society.471 Thus, the Island´s 
fate has always been intertwined with coming and going, rising and fading of 
external powers and passage of time.472 
 During the 12th and 11th centuries B.C Achaean Greeks come to settle on 
the island bringing with them Greek language, their religion and customs so 
called ‘Hellenization of the Island’. There are two separates assumption to be 
Hellenization: 
1. There were since the coming of the Greek , Cyprus culture has been 
Greek or part of a Greek culture 
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2. Cyprus ever since has become and reminds, a part of Greek world and 
(what is considered to be similar) of the Greek nation.473 
 More specifically, the Greek brand of nationalism, which became 
endemic among the Greeks, developed though the Romantic tradition that was 
rooted in the works of the Jean Jacques Rousseau. Nationalism though the 
romantic route capitalized on the common ethno-cultural and the folkloric 
elements of Greeks: the common spoken language (albeit with its great variety 
of dialects), shared customs and traditions, and the Greek Orthodox religion.474 
Besides Greek culture, the most important “ingredient” of Greek-Cypriot 
identity is seen to be The (Greek) Orthodox religion and Greek language. It is 
again assumed that once Cyprus became a part of the Byzantine world, Greek 
culture combined with Christianity (Greek Orthodoxy) so that Cyprus was 
henceforth even more securely (ethnically) Greek - and this Greekness, it 
managed to maintain  under the various conquerors that followed (Franks, 
Venetians, Ottomans  and British). In brief, the assumption is that the Greek 
national identity of Cyprus was maintained, despite centuries of enslavement, 
through Greek culture and Orthodoxy.475  
 The division between ethnic groups of Cyprus started at 1571.The cause 
was the Ottoman Empire’s millet administrative system which divided subjects 
of the empire on their religious beliefs. The millet, or religious group, operated 
                                                          
473
 Nicos  Peristianis, Between Nation and State: Nation, Nationalism, State, and 
National Identity in Cyprus,, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis (Middlesex University 2008), p. 
48. 
474
 Anastasiou, The Broken Olive Branch: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and the Quest 
for Peace in Cyprus. Nationalism Versus Europeanization, p. 22. 
475
 Peristianis, Between Nation and State: Nation, Nationalism, State, and National 
Identity in Cyprus, p. 48. 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
FOREIGN POLICY OF TURKEY AND SPAIN VERSUS MIDDLE EAST, AFTER 2002. TRANSITION 
TO DEMOCRACY AND NEW INTERNATIONAL AGENTS 
Gozde Demirel 
Dipòsit Legal: T 957-2014 
 
 T o u c h s t o n e s  o f  M i d d l e  E a s t  P o l i c y  o f  A K P :  I r a q - I r a n -
S y r i a - I s r a e l - C y p r u s  | 192 
 
 
as a civil unit that was semi-autonomous, allowing the separate exercise of 
legal, fiscal and educational functions, though final authority rested with the 
Sultan and his government. The Orthodox Church on the other hand held a 
strong position among the Greek- Cypriots and helped them preserve their 
political ethnic and religious identity under all the years of Ottoman rule.476 
Cyprus just before the Turkish conquest had been an almost “empty” island. 
Only around 180,000 inhabitants are presumed to have lived there in 1570, 
140,000 of whom seem to have been rural serfs and poor peasants in scattered 
villages. Only 40,000 dwellers lived in the two main Venetian fortified urban 
centers, namely the capital and main city of Nicosia477 and the fortress of 
Famagusta (Magosa in Turkish). To these could be added some minor towns 
and harbors along the coasts, such as Limassol (Limosa), Girniye (Kyrenia), 
Tuzla-Larnaka (Larnaca) and Baf (Paphos).478 The  Turks  tried  to  respond  to  
this  demographic  crisis  by  transferring  peasants  from Anatolia to Cyprus.479 
The first immigrants were the soldiers who took place in the conquest. In 1571 
the Sultan issued a firman for the resettlement of Cyprus to transfer people 
skilled in a variety of professions and crafts. Apart from these, banishment of 
nomadic tribes (Yörüks) from Anatolia and conversion to Islam of non-Muslim 
Cypriots continued to form the main elements of the Muslim fabric on the 
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 M. Constantinou Costas, "Aporias of Identity and the ‘Cyprus Problem’," in ECPR 
Joint Sessions of Workshops (Nikosia: 25-30 April 2006 ), p. 10. 
477
 Nicosia was the only town located in the interior of the island, which came to be 
called Lefkoşa under Ottoman rule 
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 Particularly since the times of Mehmed the Conqueror forced population transfers 
were an important part of Ottoman social and economic policy 
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island throughout the Ottoman period.480 Thereafter, all peasants could be 
mixed under the general category of Turkish subjects, re’aya.481 
 The Ottoman Empire ruled by Islamic law (Sharia) which did not 
distinguish between ethnicities -"The law knows no Turk, Arab, or Kurd" - but 
only between believers (Muslims) and non-believers (zimmis). Thus, in court, 
Ottoman kadis had to "apply the same standard of justice for both zimmis and 
Muslim". It must be point out that religion was the only criterion of 
differentiation. Thus, in court, Ottoman kadis had to apply the same standard of 
justice for both zimmis and Muslim. It should be pointed out that religion and 
not ethnicity was the only criterion of differentiation: "In the court [of Nicosia] 
the name Greek Orthodox (Rum) was never used; those groups were always 
called zimmis. Although other zimmis - the minorities -were often identified as 
Armenian (Ermeni), Maronite (Süryani), or Jew (Yahudi), those distinctions 
had no significance in regard to legal rights, only for administrative 
organization".482 In Cyprus after the Ottoman conquest, however, Muslims were 
a minority group; but Kadi court registers show that they lived peace-fully side 
by side with the majority of Orthodox Greeks and with smaller groups of Jews 
and Catholics. Religious difference was not a source of conflict but acted as a 
barrier against social integration. Intermarriage of Christian women to Muslim 
men was a rare phenomenon but nevertheless occurred. Marriage of a Christian 
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man to a Muslim woman was not regarded as permissible.483 During the late 
period of Ottoman Empire, emerged an informal social-economic division 
between Muslims and non-Muslims. As it is known the zimmis were not 
required to serve in the army, for this reason they engaged in commerce while 
the Muslims, as representatives of ruling power, talked place in the bureaucracy 
and the military and the Turks on the Island were engaged in the farming as 
their principal economic activity. 
 The British colonialism, who took over the administration in 1878 from 
Ottoman Empire, changed the identity politics in Cyprus. When they arrived, 
the Island was still structured according to the Ottoman millet system. The aim 
of the colonial authorities was to ‘westernize’ the millet system not to abolish 
therefore the religious division stay as it was but the authorities progressively 
shifted it to ethnic divisions which modern state could be exercised. Meanwhile 
they were creating the necessary conditions for a strategy of divide-and-rule. 
However every colonizer country had their colonization policies, British policy 
was "preserving native culture". It means that, native customs, believes and 
behaviors among local population should be stay the same as it was before the 
colonization. This, "civilizing mission" that the British authorities used in their 
colonies was about helping them to transform themselves from their more 
traditional or backward stage of development, to a higher and more progressive 
stage of civilization, in the case of Cyprus this transformation corresponded to 
‘secularization’. The idea of separating church and state while limiting the 
traditional rights of the local Church in Cyprus, emerge an intense anti-British 
campaign among the Greek population of Cyprus. In the Ottoman practice of 
millet system, the archbishop of the Church of Cyprus was recognized as 
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ethnarch (millet leader) thus he was representing the Orthodox population in 
secular matters as well.484 
 The British census of 1881 estimated population at 136,629 Greeks, 
46,389 Turks, 691 English and 2,400 other which includes Arabic-speaking 
Maronite-Catholics, mostly from Lebanon (now from Syria), and Armenian, 
who arrives near the end of nineteenth century, and also  the island´s population 
included Muslim-Christians called Linobambaki485.486 In the census of 1925, 
membership increased to 24, out of which 12 were Greeks, 3 Muslims and 9 
officials.487 Communal representation was, in many ways, a new version of the 
millet system. City and village council representation was distributed 
proportionally, and representatives were elected through separate electoral rolls 
by their co-religionists. The crucial point is that the bi-ethnic system of 
governance that established by the British colonial authorities forced individuals 
to choose between religious, social and cultural aspects of their identity and 
repress those aspects that transgressed or contradicted the official definition of 
who they were or ought to have been.488 
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 The powerful idea of “nation” emerged in the 19th century, and came to 
reinforce confessional identity by linking it with other closely connected 
factors, such as language and ethnic origin. Later, as Bernard Lewis has 
underlined in more general terms, this peculiar combination of religious 
superiority and tolerance that gave way to new conflicts. Causes were the 
combination of two factors: the emergence the nation-state, with their multiple 
identities. In the mid of nineteenth century Greek revolution broke out and 
ended with the liberation of Greece. In the length of time, the British’s forget 
their noble purpose of ‘civilization mission’; all they want was the stability in 
the Island. First of all they needed to prevent the nationalist vague of enosis and 
they were fostering Cypriot patriotism. However, when the local population, 
especially the Greek Christians, used their nationality as a way of challenging 
the British presence on the island, the British policy tried to promote the idea 
that (Greek) Cypriots were really a mélange culture, a Hybrid community with 
only dubious connections to ancient Greek culture as well as modern Greece.489 
During the colonization period two ethno-religious communities of Cyprus 
developed their national identities in different ways and directions. Furthermore 
they grew "walls of demarcation" between them, and until today they keep their 
walls. 
 
 
6.1. Neither Enosis nor Taksim: Peacemaking in Process  
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 It is difficult to talk about a common “Cypriot Identity” in Cyprus. When 
the Turks ceded Cyprus to Britain in 1878, the bicommunal character of Cyprus 
had already been formed. A census in 1832 recorded 198 Christian villages, 92 
Muslim and 172 mixed villages. The Greek-Cypriot community was 80% and 
the Turkish-Cypriot 20%, and both communities were divided linguistically, 
religiously, ethnically and culturally.490 The Turkish-Cypriots identified with 
Turkey, the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim religion and the Greek-Cypriots 
identified with the Byzantine Empire, the Greek language, culture and the 
Orthodox religion.491 The Turkish nationalism in Cyprus developed in different 
way; Cypriot Muslims started adopting Turkish nationalist ideas from the 1920s 
on. The escalating conflict in the 1950s and 1960s made Turkish nationalism 
the predominant ideology within the Turkish Cypriot community.492 The first 
nationalist movement in 1920 among the Muslims of Cyprus was a more elitist 
movement than mass action, Kemalism was the source of this movement. It was 
the first time that the two sides of the conflict acted together against colonial 
power; Turks with Greeks and they had a chance to had their sovereignty. The 
head agent of the nationalist movements among the Turkish Cypriots was Asaf 
bey. He was helping the nationalist groups to create Turkish nationalism and he 
wanted that the Turks in the Island immigrate to Turkey.493 The major 
characteristic of the Turkish nationalism was: 
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 Anti-Britannic 
 Anti-Traditional, Muslim and Laic 
 Close to Helen pollution of the Island.494  
The confusing point was: how these anti-colonial movements among the Turks 
turned to eternal friendship with Britain Empire and took this place against the 
Hellenic Nationalist movements? Simply in 1930’s, the common interest in The 
Mediterranean politics of Turkey and England was threatened by the fascist 
Italy this danger pushed two country to work together. On the other side at the 
end of 1930´s eνωσις (Enosis), political union with motherland Greece, changed 
its structure to mass movement. The common social and political interest of 
Turkey and England played an important role in the development of the Enosis. 
The first clash between Church and British colonial administration was the no 
recognition of the Church privileges. The no recognition of the privileges 
panicked the Church and Church created the “Enosis” movement and supported 
it with education system .The Church used the education system as a weapon, it 
means that they teach “Enosis”, “Megali Idea” to their community. 
  At the end of the Second World War the Greek Cypriots expected that 
their old national aspiration of Enosis would be granted in return for having 
fought on the side of the Britain’s but war changed the entire world. England 
lost a lot of power and Cyprus as the one of the critical point that they did not 
want to lose. On the other hand the strategies of new imperialist power U.S.A 
was different than England. US encouraged colonial states to create independent 
anti-Soviet states. Hence U.S.A took up seriously “Enosis” plans 495, for this 
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reason England come close to Turks leadership .The mid 1950’s was an 
important historical period for the Cyprus conflict. It is identified as 
decolonization and self-determination for the Greek Cypriots and the 
internationalization of the Cyprus problem. U.N took place in the negotiations 
to solve the problem. At that time England needed Cyprus more than before.  
Because for England “NO Cyrus=NO Oil” and it means that unemployment and 
hunger.496  From 1955, the Greek Cypriot enosis assumed the form to an arm 
insurrection led by EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston - National 
Organization of Cypriot Fighters) and in 1958 Turkish Cypriots  set up their 
own armed organization TMT(Turkish Resistance Organization).497 In the late 
50’s the policy of imperialist power in Cyprus was “Divide and Rule” or 
“Divide and Exploit”. This rule has effected physical and demographic 
separation of Cyprus. The ravages of “divide and rule” policy showed itself 
among the Turkish population as campaign of “Turk to Turk”. This movement 
had three main characteristic 
 Animosity of Hellenism 
 Violence 
 Anti-communism 
The idea was to avert exploitation of Turks. The purpose was to avert to buy 
any goods from Helen population of the Island.498  After the radicalization of 
Greek Cypriots and first clashes between Greek and Turkish Cypriots in 1955, 
in January 1959, the Church of Cyprus organized a referendum, which was 
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boycotted by the Turkish Cypriot community, where over 90% voted in favor of 
enosis.499 Nationalist movements showed its effects especially after the 
foundation of bicommonual Republic of Cyprus on 16 August 1960 with Zurich 
and London Agreements. It was the time when Cyprus attained independence 
with the negotiations between the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. The 
UK retained the two sovereign bases areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia while 
government posts and public offices were allocated by ethnic quotas giving the 
minority Turkish Cypriots a permanent veto, 30% in parliament and 
administration, and granting the three mother-states guarantor rights. In 1960 
independent state of the Republic of Cyrus created as a compromise solution 
reflecting the opposed interest of two antagonistic ethnic-groups. The RoC 
propagated the colonial mentality of dividing and segregating the population.500 
 The only difference with the Turkish-Cypriots compared to Greek-
Cypriots was that during the years 1963-1974 their only aim was to be 
identified with Turks and did not recognize themselves as Turkish-Cypriots. 
Their political aspiration in contrast to the Greek- Cypriots’ was Taksim 
division of the island and the denial of the existence of Turkish-Cypriots as such 
was a way to legitimize the division of Cyprus. It was seen as treason towards 
the Turkish nation to look at the Turkish-Cypriot community as different from 
the Turks.501 
 These ideological tensions have produced intractable conflict in the 
politics of the region that came to be known as the ‘Cyprus Issue’: first, 
                                                          
499
 Frank Hoffmeister, Legal Aspects of the Cyprus Problem: Annan Plan and Eu 
Accession. (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006), p.  9. 
500
 Costas, "On the Cypriot States of Exception,", p. 18. 
501
 Zingi, "Language and the Construction of Identity in Cyprus,", p. 3. 
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
FOREIGN POLICY OF TURKEY AND SPAIN VERSUS MIDDLE EAST, AFTER 2002. TRANSITION 
TO DEMOCRACY AND NEW INTERNATIONAL AGENTS 
Gozde Demirel 
Dipòsit Legal: T 957-2014 
 
 T o u c h s t o n e s  o f  M i d d l e  E a s t  P o l i c y  o f  A K P :  I r a q - I r a n -
S y r i a - I s r a e l - C y p r u s  | 201 
 
 
between 1963 and1967 the Turkish Cypriots were the weaker party; during 
1964, the UN came to Cyprus to maintain the peace and then has stayed ever 
since. The period between 1963 and 1974 can be described as the period of 
Turkish suffering. The Turkish Cypriots were forced to live enclaves on their 
own and during that period, they controlled no more than 5 percent of the 
islands territory, whereas they had owned 35 percent at the time of the 
establishment of the Republic of Cyprus.502 In 1974, after failed military coup 
by the Greek junta to unify Cyprus and Greece, the Turkish invasion imposed 
the de facto partition of the island in two ethnically homogeneous parts which 
caused the forced displacement of Greek-Cypriot (about 200,000) and Turkish-
Cypriot (45,000) populations to the south and north parts of Cyprus, 
respectively. Declaration of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ in 1983 
(considered legally invalid by the UN and recognized only by Turkey), created 
two rival states in situ503 , without any sort of substantial contact.  
 
 
6.3. AKP and Cyrus Issue 
 Since 1974, significant international efforts have been done to solve or to 
find a solution to Cyprus problem. In April 2004, the Annan Plan was perhaps 
the longest and most complicated technical document ever drawn by the UN, as 
it involved not only the two sides of Cyprus but also Greece, Turkey, Britain, 
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 Vamikv D. Volkan and Itzkowitz Norman, Turks and Greeks: Neighbours in 
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and the EU.504  Two side of the island voted for Annan Plan. AKP supported the 
referendum. Turkish Cypriots expectation was different from the Greek 
Cypriots. They voted yes in order to end the uncertainties created by their 
economic and political isolation, mass emigration, and control of Turkey. For 
them, the Annan Plan represented an end to the deadlock of Cyprus and a move 
towards more certain and prosperous future but RoC said no to Annan Plan 
because it was against to their enosis plans. A few days later RoC entered the 
EU and TRNC stayed out. In the spring of 2003 after the failure of Annan Plan 
the permission granted by the Turkish-Cypriot side for unfettered access across 
the dividing ‘Green Line’ rekindled hopes for a settlement of the Cyprus issue, 
yet despite on-going diplomatic efforts, the partition remains in place.505 Finally 
after thirty years of separation Greek and Turkish Cypriots could cross the 
‘Green Line’ without special permission. In contrast to the old nationalist 
warning that ‘Greeks and Turks will kill each other if the border falls’ almost no 
incidents between inhabitants from both communities appeared, on the contrary, 
most visitors were first welcomed in the respective other community.506  
 Along the years a lot of wealth research has been done about the Cyprus 
Conflict concerning the two ethnic communities. Especially after the opening of 
Green Line serious activities of peacemaking have been done to find a way 
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towards the peace.507 Firstly it is better to indicate that Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish Cypriots as two different opposing ethnic groups in relation to one 
another, or to the various players in the international scene and live side by side 
several hundred years and they were not integrated. As a result of longstanding 
social conflict characterized by a continuing tension and mistrust between two 
ethnic communities constructed barriers between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. 
Those barriers fostered by language differences, historical myths, and religion. 
 Rauf Denktaş, who was the Turkish Cypriot nationalist leader and 
president of the TRNC until April 2005, characterized himself on a conference 
in 1995 as follows: 
I am a child of Anatolia. With all of mine I am a Turk, and my roots are in Central 
Asia. With my culture, my language, my history and my whole personality I am a 
Turk. […] There are neither Turkish Cypriots, nor Greek Cypriots, nor Cypriots. […] 
the only Cypriot  living  in  Cyprus  is  the  Cyprus donkey.
508
  
 In the Turkish nationalist perspective the immigrants from Turkey were part of 
the greater ‘Turkish nation’, in accordance with the famous remark attributed to 
Rauf Denktaş, who is said to have described the parallel processes of Turkish 
Cypriot emigration and Turkish settlement in Northern Cyprus with the words 
‘Gelen Türk, giden Türk’: ‘Those coming are Turks and those leaving are 
Turks.. Consequently, the nationalist administrations after 1974 considered all 
inhabitants of Northern Cyprus with no difference as citizens of the TRNC.509 
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 Since until 2004 administration of the TRNC was dominated by parties 
and politicians with an explicitly nationalist agenda, the reference to Turkey and 
the ‘Turkish nation’ became part of the state ideology, and this ideology was 
also reflected in the national symbols.510 In December 2003, for the first time in 
a TRNC election, a left party with a Cypriotist tradition, the Republican Turkish 
Party (CTP), reached a majority in parliament and formed a coalition 
government. The Republican Turkish Party (CTP) is a supporter of a Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot federal state and EU membership. Therefore, it is possible to 
say that the political hegemony of Turkish nationalism in the Turkish Cypriot 
community ended after nearly 50 years, but still there is no change. Even if 
today after the several developments in Cyprus conflict there is no certain 
solution. It should be noted that in post Annan era, the process of resolving the 
Cyprus issue has lost its momentum.511 Furthermore EU did not end the 
isolation of Turkish Cyrus as it has promised. After Annan Plan, de novo peace 
negotiations started on 18April 2008.512 Taye-Brook Zerihoun, head of the UN 
mission on the island said that "The aim of the fully-fledged negotiations is to 
find a mutually acceptable solution to the Cyprus problem, which will safeguard 
the interests of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots".513 By the end of 2010 
Cyrus had a new campaign for peace; “Cypriot-led, Cypriot-owed”.  As UN 
Secretary Ban Ki-moon explains:  
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Both leaders must take responsibility for the course of the talks, for their 
success or their failure. No one else can do this. Cypriot leadership means that 
it is leaders who must propel the process forward and defend it against those 
who would seek to derail it.
514
 
 By 2010 Turkey changed the rhetoric that has been used in last 60 years. 
In May 2010, Davutoğlu underlined that “Turkey would open all of its ports to 
Greek Cyprus if the world and the EU opened two ports and an airport to 
Turkish Cyprus.” It was clear that Turkey was using this position as a 
bargaining chip, yet neither Greek Cyprus nor the EU agreed to Davutoğlu’s 
suggestion. Continuously in September 2010 Recep Tayyip Erdogan said that 
“We want a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus issue by year’s end,” and 
continued “Efforts to solve it can’t continue forever.”515 It should also be 
mentioned that Northern Cyprus affected by the Arab Revolutions. In Marc 
2011 anti-Turkish demonstrations took place in the Northern Cyprus. In 
November 2011Turkey offered “Taiwanese-style” of diplomatic arrangement 
between Northern Cyprus and World. The aim was to help drive Cypriot 
reunification talks resuming on Monday under U.N. pressure for a 
breakthrough.516 At the end in 2012 the peace talk again failed. Above all, in 
last years another issue added to Cyprus agenda; discovery of natural gas 
reserves around the Cyprus. There are two communities on the island: the Greek 
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and Turkish Cypriots, both claiming to have their own sovereign states.517 As it 
is known Cyprus is the most important barrier in front of Turkey’s EU 
candidacy.  Even AKP demonstrates a lot of willingness to compromise on 
Cyprus issue, for now there is no absolute solution. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 This chapter analyzed Turkey’s unstable relations with nearby Middle 
East countries under AKP governments 2002 to 2013 and tried to find answers 
to the following questions: If is there  any  shift in Western oriented foreign 
policy of Turkey?, or Is Turkey taking advantage of good relations with Middle 
East to become a central country in world politics? According to Tarık Oğuzlu 
Turkeys foreign policy practices in the Middle East is very much European and 
this might further bring Turkey and EU closer to each other. It is true that in 
various occasions E.U and U.S asked for Turkey’s contribution to the peace 
negotiations in Middle East, but the negotiations remained inconclusive. In the 
same vein U.S though to promote Turkey as a peace builder in Middle East 
region and as a model of the “Islamic democracy”.  
  It should be noted that in comparison to traditional foreign policy 
practices of Turkey, AKP took serious initiatives in regional politics. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the changes in Middle East permit 
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Turkey to play a decisive role in the region. The most significant change 
happens in the relations with Israel. When it comes to Ankara‘s attitude toward 
the Revolutions occurred in this area, AKP mostly applies pragmatist foreign 
policy rather than ideological. The exception happened in the relations with 
Syria. 
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1. Introduction 
 The events of September 11, the second Intifada, the Iraq war and Arab 
Revolutions have completely changed the conditions for cooperation in the 
Middle East. In parallel with the needs of changing international conjuncture, 
peace mediation or peacebuilding and democratization is increasingly becoming 
a very important issue to bring to a large and challenging audience at the UN, 
and other international organizations. For that purpose the initiatives working 
for the global peace become a new phenomenon of research. In this chapter I 
examine two important international organizations that work for pluralistic 
integration in order to achieve peaceful change in their region and in the world 
and also where Turkey and Spain cooperates together with other international 
actors; Union for the Mediterranean and Alliance of Civilizations.  
 This chapter analyzes the development of Europe’s Mediterranean 
policy; the Alliance of Civilizations and its politico-military dimension in 
particular, an evolution which was driven by growing awareness of the 
European interests in the Mediterranean.  
 
2. Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean 
 Mediterranean can be considered as a carrefour of civilizations; as a 
meeting point of the ‘North’ and ‘South’ and of different cultures in the area; as 
an interface between three continents, North Africa, Europe and Asia: as a 
‘region’ with diversity and as a complex case which presents challenges – 
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perhaps more than other areas.518 Considering the geographic centrality and the 
complexity of the Mediterranean area, it is not surprising to encounter ethnic 
and religious differences, differences in development, differences in lifestyles 
and forms of government. According to Fernand Braudel description the 
Mediterranean is a thousand things together. It was, he said, not one landscape, 
but numerous landscapes; not one sea, but a complex of seas; not one 
civilization, but a number of civilizations piled one above the other.519 For this 
reason, along the history Mediterranean basin has been analyze from many 
different perspectives and has been defined in many ways. Main criteria of the 
definition based on geographic as well as geo-strategic or geo-economic terms. 
After all, the Mediterranean is dominated by deep differences and divided by 
lasting conflicts.520 
 Actually, the roots of European Mediterranean policy can be traced to 
Rome Treat (1957).521 The effort that has been done for the development of 
relations between two shores of the Mediterranean was not good or successful 
enough until the signature of Barcelona Process. For example in 1992 the EU 
approved a Euro-Maghreb Partnership framework that envisaged economic and 
political co-operation and dialogue. The partnership concentrated on free trade, 
balance of payments loans, human rights and the creation of a Euro-Maghreb 
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Bank.522  But, the initiative could not succeed. Three years after on 27 
November 1995, ﬁfteen members of the European Union and twelve 
Mediterranean states523 met in Barcelona, Spain, with the idea of integrating the 
Mediterranean region into the broader EU political-economic partnership.524 
The Barcelona Process marked the beginning of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP) and often argued to be the millstone of collective initiative 
towards creating peace, prosperity and stability in the Mediterranean. General 
objectives of Barcelona Process described in the Barcelona Declaration as:  
"Turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange 
and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires 
a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, 
sustainable and balanced economic and social development, 
measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding 
between cultures, which are all essential aspects of partnership."525 
27 Euro-Mediterranean partners were structured the Barcelona Declaration on 
the three main objectives of the partnership: 
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 “The definition of a common area of peace and stability through the 
reinforcement of political and security dialogue (political and security 
chapter). 
 The construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and 
financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free trade zone 
(economic and financial chapter). 
 The rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural and human 
partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and 
exchanges between civil societies (social, cultural and human 
chapter).”526 
 The participation of 27 governments and respectable relations with wide 
range of non-governmental actors provide the Declaration an extensive 
maneuver capacity. After all, at that time, Barcelona Process was the unique 
international forum that Israel, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority and Syria can 
sit together at the same table. For this reason the declaration was also dealing 
with critical subjects such as arms control, democratization reforms and human 
rights in a format resembling that of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).527 Additional reasons behind those efforts were 
the need to redefine the position of the EU in the Mediterranean basin following 
the end of Cold War, and the so-called second regionalization wave. 
 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership complex includes, two international 
“regimes” (Western Europe and the Middle East) and three sub-regional 
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groupings: Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, 
Cyprus, and Malta); the Mashreq (Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Egypt, and the 
Palestinian Authority); and the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia).528 The 
Mediterranean relations of EU were left to the responsibility of southern 
European countries, especially Spain, France529 and Italy. 
 Historically, in the Mediterranean, countries such as Tunisia, Algeria and 
Morocco remained dependent on France for both their currency and their 
military security.530 On 23 October 2007 during a speech in Tangier presidential 
candidate Nicolas Sarkozy advanced the idea of a ‘Mediterranean Union’. His 
vision was to reassert French influence in the EU. The proposal encountered 
criticism at the highest levels. With this vision Nicolas Sarkozy was aiming to 
shift Turkey from candidate for EU accession to member of a looser framework 
for regional cooperation. In his discourse Sarkozy described Turkey as a «Great 
Mediterranean country » moreover affirmed that Turkey can help Europe to 
progress in this cause of "Mediterranean Union". From Turkish perspective, a 
central role in the Mediterranean could not any way compensate for the lack of 
role in Europe.531  And as well,  Italy, Spain and Germany expressed their 
concerns that the project should not undermine the Barcelona process, but 
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strengthen it.532 The reality check came during the meeting between Sarkozy 
and the Angela Merkel in March 2008. Berlin had clearly highlighted the 
strongest opposition to the project, though it was by no means isolated.533 After 
the harsh criticism on “Mediterranean Union” German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel declared that the project will be built on existing Barcelona Process and 
included not just the EU countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea, but the 
whole EU countries. And she continued saying that the project will be Union 
for the Mediterranean, not Mediterranean Union. Turkey agreed to participate to 
the project after France guaranteed that the UfM is not going to be an 
alternative for Turkey’s EU membership. 
Map 4: Turkey and Spain 
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  The story of transformation from the ‘Mediterranean Union’ to the 
‘Union for the Mediterranean’ and through the ‘Barcelona Process: Union for 
the Mediterranean’ was a painful and confusing period for all the countries of 
the Union: Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP, or Barcelona Process) 
established in 1995, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) launched in 
2003–04, and after in 2007 Nicolas Sarkozy planted the idea of Mediterranean 
Union but especially after the critics made by Spain, Italy and Germany 
Mediterranean Union transformed to Union for the Mediterranean in 2008. 
Considering the international conjuncture, all the changes was a part of the 
necessarily needs and motivated by domestic politics and rooted in national 
foreign policy priorities. Euro-Mediterranean dialogue and cooperation, within 
the framework of the Union for the Mediterranean and within the context of the 
various sub-regional initiatives, is not a choice but a must for the achievement 
of peace, stability, and prosperity for all.534 
 
3. Alliance of Civilizations 
 When secretary General Kofi Annan was puzzling over the biggest 
nightmare of the time, the possibility of a clash of Civilizations as Huntington 
specify, he addressed the leaders of Spain and Turkey to co-chair the Alliance 
of Civilizations(AoC) .With the background of having different cultures co-
existing peacefully an harmoniously, both in the Iberia and Anatolia, no other 
countries would have better to lead such an initiative Alliance of Civilization 
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Forum, an important achieving global peace, which is being supported by 
Premier Minister of Turkey and the president of Spain by promoting cultural 
understanding among the people or the world to achieve global peace. 
 The idea of AoC was coming from the previous initiative of intercultural 
and interdenominational dialogue; Dialogue among Civilizations promoted by 
former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami in a framework of UNESCO as a 
response to theory of a Clash of Civilizations. UN worked on the proposal and 
2001 was named as the United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations. 
The initiative was an important opportunity to transform negative image of Iran 
in international community. Because of the changing nature of international 
affairs after September 11, partners of the initiative become on the verge of war. 
Continuously, crisis like the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, the Danish 
cartoon crisis, Pope Benedict XVI’s insulting comments on Islam, issues related 
to immigrant rights, and torture photos from Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib 
prisons revived traumatic memories of the colonial era for many Muslims 
damaged the tine tie between Muslim and Christian world.535 
 The transformation of Dialogue among Civilizations to Alliance of 
Civilizations took at least six years. The idea came from prime minister of the 
government of Spain, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. The aim of the Alliance 
was to bridge the growing cultural and growing gap between West and East/ 
Christian and Muslim world. After eight years of People’s Party governance in 
Spain, Zapatero came to power with the rhetoric of change in terms of foreign 
policy. Internal dynamic of Spain could explain the need of change, first of all 
towards the end of its 1994-2004 periods in government the Conservatives’ 
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pursuit a kind of assertive foreign policy. José Maria Aznar, unlike to the other 
European partners, choose to align with USA in order to participate Iraq War. 
He was aiming to enhance the importance of Spain in international arena like in 
the transition to democracy period. The terrorist attacks in Madrid on 11 March 
2004 were perceived as a natural result of Spain’s assertive foreign policy. It is 
likely for this reason that the Socialists’ success was due to the ‘social 
momentum’ against the participation of Spain to the Iraq War.536  
 The first action of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero was the immediate 
withdrawal of the troops from Iraq which created a positive image on Spain 
among European, Arab and Muslim countries. Zapatero was outlining the new 
Spanish foreign policy upon soft power of Spain. Meanwhile Zapatero prepared 
the proposal of AoC and presented it before the UN General Assembly on 
September 21, 2004.537 He said that: 
“Thus, in my capacity as representative of a country created and enriched by 
diverse cultures, before this Assembly I want to propose an Alliance of 
Civilizations between the Western and the Arab and Muslim worlds. Some 
years ago a wall collapsed. We must now prevent hatred and 
incomprehension from building a new wall. Spain wants to submit to the 
Secretary General, whose work at the head of this organization we firmly 
support, the possibility of establishing a High Level Group to push forward 
this initiative.”538 
AoC employs soft diplomacy as a toll to mitigate all kinds of radicalism and 
fundamentalism.  The main goal is to contribute to a global movement which 
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reflects the will of the vast majority of the people and rejects extremism in any 
society. AoC launched in 2005 with the presence of President Jose Luis 
Zapatero y Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 
 
Figure 6: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero 
 
Place and date: 3rd High-Level Turkey-Spain Meeting 6/September/ 2011, Istanbul 
Source: The Guardian 
 
 This ideological initiative criticized by Popular Party in Spain. The 
Socialists’ lost the election in 2011 and de novo Popular Party came to power. 
Although they criticized a lot AoC, they maintained the participation for not to 
harm Turkish-Spanish relations and for not to create a negative image on Spain. 
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4. Conclusion 
 In the post–11 September world, the eastern Mediterranean has been the 
focus of attention of policy makers, news organizations, and academics.539 
Those initiatives created for to promote the relations Western and Eastern 
world. In this regard the outlines of Turkish and Spanish foreign policy towards 
Mediterranean in general, Middle East in particular built upon soft power. It is 
clear that Barcelona Process and AoC are working for the global peace but in 
this turbulent environment it seems that is so hard to bring peace to Middle 
East. 
 
 
. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 The question is; it exist unique and an universal change for all 
societies, it means that when all the societies will be equal in economic 
terms, their cultural life will be similar, or in different cultures with different 
beliefs, “modernization” will develop in different forms?  Those questions 
above can be interpreted as the critics of modernist elites who accept 
modernization equal to occidentelization in Turkey. More precisely, is it 
possible to “modernize” by rejecting the western path of development? 
Otherwise of all societies eventually faced to take the same way of change 
and development as western ones. Or, revolution is a concept only for 
Western Societies? Why the revolutions which takes place among Muslim 
countries named as Arab Spring? Why the world beware of calling the recent 
events as revolutions.  
 Those questions seems as they are not relevant to the subject but I 
want to explain why I asked those questions. In the second chapter of the 
dissertation I gave a wide explanation on democracy after I explained the 
tiny tie between democracy and foreign policy. Continuously for to 
understand and to evaluate Turkey’s level of democracy, I choose the most 
relevant western country which is Spain, the idea was to compare the period 
of transition to democracy. The results are: 
1. Turkey is not a democracy, but Turkey has its own democracy. From 
that point on the question is: Turkey’s interpretation of democracy 
could be an inspiration for Muslim countries? 
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2. First of all it should be mentioned that Turkey is not a country which 
respects the minority rights, and all the countries pointed in the 
dissertation; Iran, Iraq, Syria, Israel and Cyprus living struggle with 
theirs’ ethnic and religious minorities. Maybe Turkey can be an 
example for the synthesis of Islam and democracy but Turkey’s 
democracy with the lack of minority rights, can not be and should not 
be an example for those countries.  
 
3. Turkey should study more the example of Spain for to learn how to 
consolidate its democracy.  
 
4. On the other hand in the Turkish interpretation, Modernization is 
equal to Westernization. This attitude of Turkish elite especially 
created a negative image on Turkey among Arab Middle East. For 
this reason, promoting Turkey as a role model in Islam world is not a 
clever move, moreover it increases the struggle between Iran and 
Turkey, this struggle hits Syrian internal dynamics and other 
neighbors of the region blames Turkey because of its assertive 
foreign policy.   
 
 The other question that I posed was; is there any change in Turkey’s 
tradition foreign policy? What drives Turkey’s new foreign policy activism? 
Is there any shift in Turkey’s western oriented foreign policy?  
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1. The dissertation shows that before to develop good relations with 
Middle East AKP always declared that accession to EU is the priority 
target of Turkish foreign policy. The willingness to enter E.U 
decelerated after the neutralization the role and influence of Turkish 
Armed Forced with the reforms made for E.U accession.   
 
2.  Until 2002 four foreign policy principles dominated Turkey’s 
agenda. Primarily, external recognition of Turkish Republic, 
afterwards remain outside of WWII, keep territorial integrity of 
Turkish Republic particularly along the Cold War and post-Cold War 
era,  finally integration to E.U. Today, Turkey is the unique pending 
candidate of the EU with a predominant Muslim population and Spain 
supports the full membership of Turkey. But the reality is, until AKP 
governance Turkey keep its distance to Syria, Iraq and  Iran, on the 
other hand Turkey has always good relations with Israel furthermore 
it was the first Muslim majority country that recognizes Israel.  
 
3. The change in Turkish foreign policy started with Turgut Özal, 
continued with   Ismail Cem and fostered with Ahmet Davutoğlu . 
They all argue that in a changing environment Turkey need to 
redefine its foreign policy superiorities and compose equilibrium 
between realities and her national interest. In other words Turkey 
needs to change its security base foreign policy. The significant 
change on Turkish foreign policy during AKP government is one of 
the few subjects that reach consensus on academic level. Especially 
Ahmet Davutoglu considered as the architect of new foreign policy 
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practices With the help of Davutoğlu’s Strategic Depth doctrine that 
shaped Turkey‘s foreign policy orientation to a large extent, Turkey 
entered a new era. He argues that Turkey need consider her historical 
and geographical background to move towards to “bridge country” to 
“central country”.  According to him Turkey needs to create multi-
dimensional and multidirectional proactive foreign policies in order to 
strengthen its position so as to be a regional power. Also he considers 
Turkey as a wise country.  
 
4. With the guidance of him, first Turkey entered to a compromising era. 
Initially developments of  relations  with  Syria  aftermath of Adana  
Protocols,  natural gas agreements with Iran and close affiliation with 
Israel in this period are good samples to figure out Ankara‘s  
engagement with the Middle East.  
 
5. Turkey‘s foreign policy engagement under the AKP rule, towards 
Middle East may not be considered as an axis shift. Actually the 
unexpected external dynamics change the rules of cooperation. As a 
consequence Turkey re-oriented to its habitual Western allies. Today 
Turkey has got unstable relations with her Eastern neighbors. The 
case of Syria and Israel is the clear evidence of this instability 
 
 Finally, Turkey and Spain can really have an international impact by 
using soft power tolls like Alliance of Civilizations or Union for 
Mediterranean?  
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1. It is clear fact that after the collapse of Soviet Union moreover after 
9/11 Islam appears as the different one, as new source of threat. The 
international initiatives that work for to annihilate the prejudices are 
our way to peace. In order to achieve such an aim we all have to work 
hard. But today, especially because of the economic crisis and after 
the government changes, Turkey and Spain leave their noble cause to 
bring peace to our old world.  
 Nonetheless, when analyzing the recent developments, it is essential 
to see the political, economical and cultural background as well. The major 
problem in Turkey built upon the question: Is it exists the modernity with 
Islam? In other words there is segmentation between Islamist and Kemalist 
which causes debates on modernity and Islam, religion and politics, tradition 
versus modernity. There is common belief that the reason why AKP came to 
power was a result of negative feelings among the general public towards the 
ruling Kemal elites. AKP came to power with the rhetoric of change and 
liberty. In Turkey foreign policy consists of internal dynamics. The impact of 
changing domestic political alignments and the power struggle among the 
elites effects the decision making process. 
 Today Turkey is so far to be a model for Middle East countries. At 
first glance Turkey need to develop its democracy, Spain can be good 
example for Turkey in this point. But, is it exists one true definition of 
democracy? What really is democracy? Is it exists other path of 
modernization which is not a Westernization? I hope that after the Arab 
Revolutions, Middle East can develop its own democracy which arises from 
will of the people sharing the same soil.
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix1: Basic Statistics, Spain and Turkey 
Comparative Statistic Spain  Turkey 
Population (Million) (*)
540
 47,370,542  80,694,485 
Unemployment rate ( %) 
(*) 
25.1 9.2 
GDP (Purchasing Power 
Parity) , ($ trillion) (*) 
1.109 1.388 
GDP per head (*) 30,100 14,800 
GDP-composition by sector 
of origin % (*) 
  
        Agriculture  3.1 9 
        Industry 26.3  27.2  
        Services 70.7  (Est. 2012) 63. 8  (Est. 2012) 
Exports of goods and 
services (% of GDP) 
32.7 31.5 
Imports of goods and 
services (% of GDP) 
31.9 26.5 
Real GDP Growth -1.6 2.2 
Current account (% of 
GDP) 
-1.1 -6.1 
Inflation rate (Consumer 
price) (%) 
 2.4 8.9 
Government deficit (% of 
GDP) 
-9.6 -0.8 (Est. 2011) 
General government debt 
(% of GDP) 
92.4 -- 
General government 
revenues (% of GDP) 
37.1 36.6 
                                                          
540
 (*) 2013 unless otherwise stated. Other data based on 2012 values. 
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Inflows of foreign direct 
investment investment 
(MIn $) 
27 063 12 519 
Outflows of Foreign direct 
investment (MIn $)    
-4 081 4 074 
Total tax revenue  (% of 
GDP) 
31.6 ( Est. 2011) 25.0 ( Est. 2011) 
Fertility rate 1.36  
UN human development 
index 
541
 
0.885 0.772 
Percentage of population 
over the age of 65 
17.5% (male 
3,514,051/female 
4,753,638)  
25.9% (male 
10,682,900/female 
10,201,965) 
Percentage of  population 
under the age of 15 
15.4% (male 
3,747,028/female 
3,531,247) 
6.6% (male 
2,422,983/female 
2,870,341) 
Transparency 
International Corruption 
Perceptions Index 
(Ranking, 2013) (*) 
59
th
 53
th
  
Number of governments 
since 1977
542
 
10 20 
 
Source: Eurostat, OECD, Turkish Statistical Institute, Spanish Statistical Institute, 
UNCTAD, UN Human Development Report and World Development Indicators, 
CIA Factbook. 
 
 
 
                                                          
541
 The maximum value is one. 
542
 This is taken as the reference year because it was when Spain had its first free elections 
since 1936 
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Appendix 2: List of Interviews 
Demirkıran, Afif( 2013), Member of the Turkish Parliament and Co-President 
of the Turkey –EU Joint Parlimentary Committee, Barcelona. September 10. 
Kardas , Saban (2013), Associate Professor of Internaitonal Relations at TOBB 
University of Economics and Technology and Advisior of the Center for 
Strategic Research (SAM), Barcelona. September 10. 
Özcan, Mesut (2013), Deputy Chairman of the Center for Strategic Research of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Barcelona. 
September 10. 
Ǘlgen, Sinan (2013), Chairman of the Center for Eonomics and Foreign Policy 
Stuides (EDAM) and Visitng Scholar of Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, Barcelona. September 10. 
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Appendix 3:Graphics of Exportation  
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